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spectators experience a sense of awe and an appreciation of possibility, together 
with deep emotion.  This phenomenon results from an impulse to understand a 
novel theatrical metaphor in a perceptual field that is informed by an empathetic 
engagement with a character represented theatrically.  Moreover, in its 
apprehension of possibility, theatrical wonder is implicated in utopian thinking.  In 
analyzing a performance of Mnemonic by Theatre de Complicite, and in 
theorizing about my own directorial experiences in professional productions of 
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Goat, or Who is Sylvia?, by Edward Albee, I develop an autoethnographic and  
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Chapter One 
Pathways to Wonder 
 
Introduction 
There are times, sitting with others in a darkened theatre, when my powers of 
perception, my very senses are heightened, and I feel myself expanding with a sense of 
possibility, a sudden alertness to that which is, to that which will – or might – be.  I see.  
I hear.  And my seeing and hearing is linked to my breathing – and to my awareness of 
the breath that charges me.  Inhale.  Oxygen bubbles ride my bloodstream to a synaptic 
fireworks display.  Colors are more vivid, vibrating.  Emotions seem full and fleshy.  
Vision is a paradoxical portal – broadening the field before me while refining the focus at 
the center in the darkness.  My skin is alive, bristling, prepared.  My fingers flex.   I hear 
the insistent murmurs of coded communications, full of nuance and the pleasures of 
subtlety.  I hear the underscoring of ambient sound.  Exhale.  Astonishment fills the 
cavities left vacant by air expelled.  Associations flash; connections link; juxtapositions 
jostle for attention and compete for primacy.  I am immersed in complex layers of 
conjured collages, some burning brightly onto a plate of memory, others effervescent, 
that will resist recall or replication.  Neural pathways are bright with activity, and I glide 
on tiny ripples of rapture.   I am on the edge of my seat.  I watch and listen and breathe 
some more.  For me, this is the experience of theatrical wonder. And while some of its 
physical manifestations may be peculiar to me, I believe it is an experience whose 
fundamental characteristics I share, at least on occasion, with other spectators. 
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I define theatrical wonder as the experience by a theatrical spectator, during a 
performance, of a sense of awe and aesthetic appreciation that is coupled with deep 
feeling and a sense of expanded possibility.  It is a phenomenon that, for me at least, 
happens rarely, but is always accompanied by an acknowledgment that in the 
experience of it, I have engaged something profound and powerful beyond the confines 
of its temporal boundary.   
What follows is a personal attempt to explore the phenomenon of theatrical 
wonder: to understand and theorize about the conditions of its experience; to investigate 
its utility as an instrument of social and political engagement; and to describe the means 
by which the experience might be made available to spectators of my own work as a 
theatrical director.  My focus on my own experience and my own practice has led me 
both to a philosophical perspective about the epistemological dimension of my project 
and a methodology for writing about my thinking and research.   
Theatrical wonder is a personal experience, and the process of developing 
knowledge about it must include an intellectual reckoning of that experience.  I have 
been drawn, almost inexorably, to an intellectual strategy that privileges the primacy of 
fully embodied experience, to a phenomenological perspective in other words, and I am 
indebted to the phenomenological probing of theatre scholars like Stanton Garner and 
Bert O. States.  In my analysis of performance, I have been profitably drawn to the 
phenomenological work of Wilhelm Sauter (who has, in turn, relied heavily on the 
phenomenological hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer), and I have found it useful to 
refer to some of the ideas of Paul Ricoeur about interpretation.   
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I have undertaken my research with a hypothesis: that theatrical wonder involves 
the perception of theatrical metaphor in an empathetic field, where a spectator 
experiences both a sense of pleasure in apprehending the metaphor and an emotional 
identification with a character as performed in a particular moment.  Accordingly, my 
work has led to both a consideration of empathy in theatrical reception and the workings 
of metaphor.  I have relied upon scholarship in diverse fields, especially psychology, 
neuro-science, anthropology and cognitive linguistics.  The largest part of my work, 
however, has involved a critical scrutiny of my own practice in selected instances, and 
my practice is, of course, necessarily linked to who I am. 
Like most people, my various identity markers represent a welter of 
description, a chaotic jumble of indicators of age, class, ethnicity, sexuality, and 
political orientation.  I am a white, middle-aged, middle-class, heterosexual man 
of Jewish background, with a decidedly leftist inclination and a stubborn affinity 
for humanistic values, even given a scholarly immersion in feminist theory and an 
ardent appreciation of a broadly representative collection of theoretical signposts 
(decentered, all of them) of our postmodern moment.  I am a spouse and a       
father, a teacher, a critic, and an administrator, a lover of dogs and of food, 
music, film, and literature.  But above all, I am a theatre practitioner.   
By any measure, my work in the theatre has been, still is, and will likely 
continue to be that aspect of my being that consumes the largest portion of my 
waking (and sometimes sleeping) hours.  It has been, and is, the single source of 
my most profound satisfaction and pleasure.  It is a site of passion and 
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commitment in my life that is rivaled only by my family.  I began my sojourn in 
theatre as a professional actor at the age of eight, and long after my 
abandonment of acting as a profession and a variety of various vocational 
detours, I returned to a life as a director, without any formal education in that 
field, but possessing a considerable accumulation of experiential knowledge. 
I began my graduate education in theatre, after a decade or so of 
experience as a professional director, because I wanted to teach as well as 
direct, and I needed the validating credential of a graduate degree.  While 
working on my MFA in directing at the University of Iowa, however, I made a 
discovery that changed the direction of my life.  I discovered that the “academic” 
courses I encountered as part of that program, courses in theatre history and 
performance theory, had a significant impact on my work as a practitioner, 
serving as sources of insight and inspiration, suggesting avenues of artistic 
exploration that I would not have otherwise undertaken.  Following my 
completion of that degree, I continued to work as a director while teaching as an 
adjunct lecturer at several Midwestern institutions.  After several years, I decided 
that both my teaching and my directing would profit from a more intensive 
immersion in history, theory and criticism, and I entered the PhD program at the 
University of Texas at Austin.  My goal was, and is, to continue to explore the 
productive tension between theory and practice both in my work and in my 
thinking.   
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My practice is extensive.  I have directed approximately eighty shows in the 
last twenty-two years, and even now, as a full-time tenure-track professor at 
Cornell College, I average directing four productions each calendar year, both in 
the academy and in the larger professional world.  I do not approach theatre 
projects simply from the vantage point of an academic seeking a laboratory to 
work on various theoretical issues, though I think this is a vital and too often 
neglected aspect of pedagogy.  Jill Dolan, writing from a complex identity location 
as a theatre scholar, a feminist and a queer theorist in Geographies of Learning, 
has made an impassioned and compelling case for the focused merger of theory 
and practice, asserting that theatre practice is well situated to interrogate 
assumptions about identity: 
        If theater is engaged in deconstructive epistemology, 
questioning how we know what we think we know, and who 
we think we are, its representational apparatus can be 
pressed into service.  We can use it in specific contexts to 
study and play with, for example, performances of sexual 
identities, to make subcultural codes widely legible, to resist 
the inculcations of heterosexuality performed as congruent 
with ‘correct’ gender acts (83). 
I agree, but I observe further that theatre practice constitutes a means of 
examining the epistemology not only of identity, not only of various issues 
involving representation, but also a whole complex of issues involving perception 
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and ontological constructions.  That is what I am seeking to explore in the context 
of wonder. 
 My approach is not that of a theorist seeking to make concrete various 
hypothesized or critically derived ideas in a theatrical laboratory.  I begin at the 
opposite end of the spectrum, phenomenologically, from the experience of a 
practice, which may have been motivated by considerably less analytical and 
more intuitive forces.  Instead of conducting research that initiates analytically, I 
am engaging a process that begins with experientially inflected intuition and 
proceeds from there to theoretical discourses that hopefully illuminate the 
experience that has begun the process.  It is a process that necessarily privileges 
a highly personal dimension of scholarship. 
For me, the creation of a production is not only a means of personal 
artistic expression or textual interpretation; it is a means of posing questions and 
gesturing toward some tentative answers.  It is both a vehicle for investigation 
and a way of knowing.  This restless union of theory and practice was the fact of 
my professional work long before I discovered a theoretical rubric within which I 
could think about this in a more disciplined way.  That discipline has emerged as 
performance studies, a discipline that acknowledges different ways of producing 
knowledge, which “struggles to open the space between analysis and action, and 
to pull the pin on the binary opposition between theory and practice” 
(Conquergood 145).  It is a discipline that involves “another way of knowing that 
is grounded in active, intimate, hands-on participation and personal connection” 
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(146).  Conquergood’s argument is that the nexus of theory and practice avoids 
an arbitrary and unnecessarily limiting division of labor between theoreticians and 
practitioners.  It is an argument that I have taken to heart.  And it is an argument 
that parallels in interesting ways one of the most profound intellectual shifts of 
our time: the dismantling of the Cartesian construct that assumed a division 
between mind and body and championed an entrenched belief that mental 
operation is a more reliable mechanism for the generation of useful information 
than embodied experience.  The implications of valuing embodied experience are 
profound, both for the practitioner and the critic, for the performer and for the 
spectator.   This focus on the experiential dimension of knowing, and on the 
restless tension between analysis and emotional response, is an inextricable part 
both of my personal history and of every theatrical project I undertake.  It is also 
one of the means by which I undertake this critical investigation of theatrical 
wonder. 
The still-evolving practice of autoethnography has emerged (largely in the 
social sciences) as a result of the critiques of traditional methods of qualitative 
research resulting from the inability of those methods to adequately account for 
the deficiencies and biases of “objective” observers of cultural or social 
phenomena (Holt 2).  The very notion of a neutral observer or researcher has 
been thrown into disrepute by an understanding of the extent to which each of us 
carries the markers and prejudices of our own social and intellectual contexts, 
and the corollary insight that no single one of those contexts has a justifiable 
  8 
claim to truth or objectivity.  One response has been the emergence of 
autoethnography, a research technique where the author predicates her/his 
understanding of a particular cultural phenomenon or discipline upon personal 
accounts drawn from her/his experiences in that culture or discipline (Reed-
Danahay 1997).  These texts typically are written in the first person and feature a 
self-conscious style that may include descriptions of emotional states or 
reactions, recreations of dialogue, and a variety of literary techniques once 
thought inappropriate to scholarly research (Ellis & Bochner 2000).  The 
assumption and aspiration of autoethnographic research is that targeted self-
study, undertaken with a sufficiently rigorous critical perspective, may yield 
valuable information and insight about the subject of scrutiny without reliance on 
a discredited pose of objectivity. 
Some critics have objected to what they perceive as a lack of rigor and 
insufficient relation to empirical data in this methodology (Holt 8).  Others have 
expressed a deep-seated mistrust of the self both as a research vehicle and as 
an object of study, because they perceive the practice as being prone to self-
indulgence and even narcissism (Holt 15).  These are certainly concerns that 
must be considered, but it is important to note that many of the objections to this 
methodology flow precisely from the historical reliance on “objectivity” the distrust 
of which has given rise to the very practice now found suspect because of its 
subjectivity.  There is clearly a sense of circularity to the whole argument.  In the 
realm of theatre practice, and its academic companion, performance studies, 
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however, even the notion of objectivity is vexed, and the potential value of the 
critical insights of the participant observer has proliferated in the literature1.   
Much of what follows is predicated on my own work as a director in a 
series of selected projects.  And even as I consider work external to myself, in 
the form of a production by Theatre de Complicite, I am undertaking that 
consideration through the highly personal lens of my own reception of that work.  
I am practicing a form of autoethnography, in which “[t]he researcher, in context, 
interacting with others, becomes the subject of research, thereby blurring 
distinctions of personal and social, self and other” (Spry 170).  In her discussion 
of writing and performing autoethnography, Tami Spry, referencing both Sidonie 
Smith and Trinh Minh-ha, goes on to suggest: “Identity exists in a constant flux of 
interpreting self’s interactions with others in sociohistorical contexts.  
Autoethnography – with its body in the borderlands of autobiography and 
ethnography – is a narration signifying at least one interpretation of ever-
fluctuating identity” (171).  I agree that the practice of autoethnography 
necessarily involves a negotiation of personal identity, but it is important to note 
that it is also a means of scholarship that builds a bridge from the exquisitely 
personal and therefore particular to a more generally useful category of 
information and knowledge.  Again, I find the words of Tami Spry especially 
compelling:  “The point of my work is to express scholarship in ways that mirror 
the passion, pain, and hope of lived experience” (174). 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Jill Dolan’s account of her directing experiences in Presence and Desire or any of the 
performers writing as participant observers in Voices Made Flesh, edited by Lynn C. Miller, Jacqueline 
Taylor and M. Heather Carver. 
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One theorist in the social sciences has proposed a series of evaluative 
criteria that might be used in grappling with personal narratives as research (and 
therefore the work that I present here):  a) Substantive contribution.  Does the 
work make a contribution to the state of our understanding of the subject matter?  
b) Aesthetic merit.  Does the work succeed aesthetically in that it is satisfyingly 
complex?  c)  Reflexivity.  How has the author’s subjectivity been both a producer 
and a product of the text?  d) Impact.  Does the research affect the reader 
intellectually and/or emotionally?  e)  Expressive of reality.  Does the text 
communicate a fleshed out sense of lived experience? (Richardson 15-16).  I 
invite the reader to apply these criteria to the work that follows. They are helpful 
criteria, but the simple truth may be that each instance of such research must be 
met upon its own terms, and judgments made about the ultimate usefulness or 
value of the work based upon its internal rigor and the intellectual integrity that 
the work manifests.  I have no doubt that opinions will differ. 
  My project is this:  I want to theorize that theatrical wonder is 
characterized by a simultaneous embracing and distancing.  I believe that the 
space and the tension between embracing and distancing, between affect and 
cognition, empathy and metaphor, correlate closely to spaces and tensions that 
now have great intellectual currency in a variety of disciplines that study human 
behavior and capacity, including psychoanalysis, anthropology, neuro-science 
and others.   I make reference to these disciplines without claiming expertise in 
their various complexities, but instead extracting from them ideas and insights 
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pertinent to my own project.  My theoretical framework for exploring these 
questions relies upon analyzing performance as a form of communication and 
understanding as the result of a dialectical process that has both analytical and 
emotional dimensions.  
 My methodology is to look to actual theatrical events, in the first case to a 
production by Theatre de Complicite, the company whose production of The 
Street of Crocodiles impelled me to begin this exploration, as I suggest below.  I 
want, however, to focus on a subsequent production by this company: 
Mnemonic.  It is a production that takes up the issue of empathy very directly, 
even while demonstrating emphatically that Complicite (as the company is 
familiarly known) remains a masterful practitioner of embodied metaphor.  I will 
also discuss how the teachings and principles of Jacques Lecoq have found 
expression in the work of Complicite.  Then I consider three of my own 
productions.  The first is Harry’s Way, a production I directed in 1997 of a new 
play by Keith Huff, in which I worked with notions of empathy and metaphor 
before I had begun to think about them in theoretical ways.  The lessons I have 
extracted from my experience with Harry’s Way have less to do with the 
generation of wonder than some discoveries about conditions which may 
preclude wonder, especially an excessive familiarity with controlling metaphors 
and too much intellectual distance between spectator and character.  The second 
production is a Romeo and Juliet that I set in the contemporary Middle East in a 
self-conscious attempt to manipulate empathy while drawing metaphorical 
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connections between the world of Shakespeare’s play and the Israeli/Palestinian 
conflict.  That production engaged an interrogation of the parameters of empathy 
directly and also raises vexing questions about performance ethnography and 
the representation of an exotic other.  Finally, I will consider my 2004 production 
of Edward Albee’s newest play, The Goat, or Who is Sylvia? -  a work which 
seeks to invoke empathy in the context of exploring the essence of the tragic and 
which seeks to make a plea for tolerance by means of a metaphoric 
transposition.  This production serves as an opportunity to explore wonder, not 
as a phenomenon of delight, but in the context of tragedy. 
 I write as both critic and director, as a sort of autoethnographer and as a 
participant/observer.2  I write, too, as a politically engaged person, convinced that 
theatre remains a viable location for community dialogue and public discourse, a 
place where provocative ideas may be considered forthrightly, and a better world 
imagined collectively.  Above all, I write as a seeker, in hungry pursuit of those 
rare occasions that I have chosen to call theatrical wonder. 
I experienced a sense of wonder at a theatrical event on the occasion of my 
very first exposure to professional theatre.  I was five years old when my parents 
took me to see the Broadway production of Peter Pan, starring Mary Martin.  This 
was an overwhelming and foundational experience that ignited a passion for 
                                                 
2 I am qualifying my own self-identification as an autoethnographer, because autoethnography is usually a 
present practice that values the immediacy of present experience, while some of my own work necessarily 
involves a retrospective interrogation of events that were certainly experienced personally but have since 
passed into memory.  On these occasions, it might be said that I am manifesting a post-modern gesture to 
increased self-reflexivity in ethnography generally, rather than a true autoethnographic practice.  I believe, 
however, that the same evaluative criteria apply.    
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theatre that resulted in my first work as a professional child actor three years 
later and continues to this day in my work as a director, teacher and critic.  I can 
still summon vivid memories of that production (the nicely contained, non-
threatening evil of Captain Hook and the Pirates, the seductive adventurousness 
of Wendy and the Lost Boys, and of course the unmitigated thrill of Mary Martin 
as Peter Pan gleefully flying through the audience), but one aspect of that 
production performs more brightly in memory than any other: the near death of 
Tinkerbell and her salvation by the restorative power of the audience’s belief.  
Tinkerbell, Peter’s loyal fairy companion, was not portrayed by an actor; 
Tinkerbell was portrayed by a moving light, a tightly focused, twinkling follow spot 
whose gyrations, especially to the imagination of a child, seemed endlessly 
articulate in communicating what “Tink” was feeling.  When, in an act of selfless 
devotion, Tinkerbell consumed poison intended for Peter, she hovered near 
death (represented by a dimming of the light which was Tinkerbell) while Peter 
desperately implored the audience to save her through the collective power of its 
belief in fairies.  Peter exhorted us to demonstrate that belief by our applause; I 
still remember my five-year-old sense of urgency in loudly and rapidly clapping 
my hands.  And I remember my delight (and considerable relief) as Tinkerbell’s 
light grew and brightened, signifying her return to health.   
In retrospect, I am interested in the implications of Peter’s direct address 
to the audience.  Did Mary Martin’s obliteration of the fourth wall in that moment 
figure in the scope of my reaction and the vividness of my recollection of the 
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event?  I cannot be sure, of course, but I believe that that direct address 
established conditions of intersubjectivity that, at the very least, facilitated my 
emotional engagement.  And some of the theoretical argument that will follow will 
support that belief. 
Now even as a five-year-old, I knew that a light was not a living creature, 
supernatural or otherwise.  This was simply the occasion of my earliest theatrical 
suspension of disbelief.  But I was amazed.  I had never conceived of 
representing a creature metaphorically with a flickering light, but I had no 
difficulty whatsoever in making this leap of imagination, and, as I will contend, the 
operation of the imagination in the processing of metaphor, especially novel, 
theatrical metaphor, is a phenomenon closely linked to our capacity to conceive 
new ideas, new possibilities.  At the moment of Tinkerbell’s crisis, I was 
immersed in waves of both emotion and thought: an appreciation of Tinkerbell’s 
courageous sacrifice, my identification with Peter’s desperation to save his friend, 
my own active need to help, and my truly joyous relief at her recovery.  I thought 
the entire episode was wonderful – that is to say, filled with wonder.   
Throughout my life of theatre going (and theatre-making), I have been 
fortunate enough to revisit one or more versions of this experience of wonder on 
memorable occasions.  One such occasion led specifically to my present attempt 
to think about theatrical wonder in a disciplined way.  In July 1998, I attended, 
with my wife, Claire, and daughter, Galen, a performance in New York of The 
Street of Crocodiles, a theatre piece created by Theatre de Complicite and based 
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upon the life and extraordinary writing of Bruno Schulz, a Jewish and Polish 
writer killed by Nazis at the height of his creative powers.  I had read the novella 
Street of Crocodiles (from which the theatre piece takes its name) and been 
swept away by the imaginative power of Schultz’s writing, which seemed to me to 
flow from a surrealist tradition but also to anticipate magic realism and fantastic 
writing.  His work struck me as quintessentially literary, using the theatre of the 
reader’s imagination to stage events that defied realization in more concrete and 
corporeal terms.  I was more than a little curious (and more than a little skeptical) 
to see how this work could be interpreted in physical terms, to be embodied in 
real time and space.  
I had seen Complicite’s work before (the touring production of The Three 
Lives of Lucy Cabrol), and was familiar enough with the company’s aesthetic to 
understand that it was committed to a highly imaginative physical theatre, in 
which the bodies of actors were used to suggest all kinds of creatures and even 
inanimate objects, an aesthetic of embodied metaphor that was capable of 
surprising and delighting.  I knew, too, that this was a company with decidedly 
literary sensibilities, frequently using non-dramatic literature as a foundation for 
ensemble-devised theatrical works.  But nothing had prepared me for the impact 
of this particular theatrical experience. 
At the conclusion of this performance (which I will describe in the next 
chapter), I found myself weeping uncontrollably, moved not only by the content of 
the performance and its holocaust context, but by an appreciation of the artistry 
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of the production.  I was simultaneously devastated by the senseless death of 
someone whose extraordinary creative gifts offered so much to the world, and 
infused with a sense of wonder about the creative gifts of Complicite in finding a 
theatrical vocabulary that could express the fantastic flights of imagination that 
typified Schulz’s writing (for example, the seamless transformation of a group of 
people involved in reading their books into a flock of chattering birds in which 
fluttering and manipulated pages somehow conjured wings in flight).  The 
cumulative impact of watching astonishingly evocative images, constructed with 
simple materials and the bodies of the actors in endlessly inventive ways, simply 
overwhelmed me.  I sat and sobbed throughout the curtain call and until the 
theatre had emptied.  We were the last spectators to leave the auditorium, and 
even over drinks in a nearby café after the performance, I found myself unable to 
summon afterimages of the performance without a profound emotional 
accompaniment.  Later, I learned that the technique that supported this highly 
moving work was, in part, derived from the teachings of Jacques Lecoq.  I will 
discuss some of the principles of that training and consider their implications for 
the creation of moments of theatrical wonder in Chapter Two. 
My own directorial work had for years been moving away from psychological 
realism and toward a style which was unabashedly “theatrical,” influenced both 
by my own intuitive process and by my readings about Meyerhold’s theories and 
practice.  I have always been fascinated by the seemingly mysterious ways that 
theatre artists enter into a partnership with the imaginative powers of audiences, 
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with the ways in which theatrical metaphors conjure worlds and associations that 
are startling in their newness and beauty.  I have also been keenly interested in 
the ways that theatre could stimulate strong feelings of empathy, even while 
simultaneously engaging serious ideas and calling upon its audiences to think 
critically.  It was only after the experience of The Street of Crocodiles, however, 
that I began to think about these two phenomena of theatrical reception, empathy 
and metaphor, in a critically rigorous way and to contemplate the implications of 
their convergence in a single theatrical moment. 
While I am vitally concerned with this convergence, I am also mindful that 
both the phenomenon of empathy and the use and perception of metaphor are 
separately and discretely important in theatre practice.  It may even be possible 
to identify a dimension of what I call wonder that is specific to each of these 
phenomena.   I want, therefore, to consider the import of each of them 
individually as well as to explore the implications of their combination. 
Empathy, in terms of its definitional contours and especially in terms of its 
perceived usefulness in the theatre, has been a controversial topic.  There has 
been, and continues to be, confusion about the distinctions between empathy 
and a more general kind of emotional identification, and more recently the notion 
of intersubjectivity. The idea of empathy was intuited by Aristotle several 
millennia before the term was coined.  Aristotle’s famous formulation of “pity and 
fear,” as the appropriate and productive consequence of the tragic experience, 
rests upon an insight that the tragic spectator might be expected to empathize 
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with the tragic hero.  Many centuries later, the operation of empathy was decried 
by Brecht as an impediment to an intellectual apprehension of various social 
problems and, therefore, an impediment to a politically efficacious theatre.  But 
more contemporary insights about the operation of empathy, indeed, about the 
nature of consciousness itself, may advance the primary Brechtian project of 
articulating a means of theatrical production that advances a progressive political 
agenda even as they debunk portions of Brecht’s argument.  That is, in part, 
what I intend to argue. 
Our understanding of metaphor has journeyed from an appreciation of a 
purely literary device that compares one thing to another to a far-reaching 
conception of metaphor as a foundational element of the human thought process.  
I intend to examine, in the context of theatrical reception, whether there is a 
distinction between metaphors that are perceived as largely conceptual, by some 
kind of purely intellectual operation, and those which are somehow embodied, 
that is, both created and received in some fashion that depends upon the 
physical senses.  Moreover, I want to explore whether novel or unusual 
metaphors have a different impact in theatrical contexts than do familiar ones.   I 
believe that the use and perception of metaphor in theatrical circumstances are 
part of a holistic phenomenon, an aspect of an emotional and intellectual 
ecology, which enables spectators to move imaginatively outside of their own 
parochial experience and concerns in uniquely pleasurable ways that have 
significant political and critical implications.  It is intriguing to note, in this regard, 
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that George Lakoff, well-known and frequently cited in this project for his 
theoretical work on metaphor, observes in his book Moral Politics that empathy 
with its definitional notion of projecting consciousness into the mind and body of 
another, something that cannot be literally achieved, is itself metaphorical (2002: 
114).  Moreover, Lakoff associates empathy directly, even causally, with liberal or 
progressive values.   
My particular project is to explore both these phenomena of perception, 
empathy and metaphor, in a specifically theatrical context, which I have chosen 
to call theatrical wonder.  Wonder is an experiential phenomenon complex 
enough to enfold multiple criteria.  I understand theatrical wonder to mean, in 
part, a sense of awe, in the most expansive meaning of the word.  Awe may be 
characterized variously as delight, reverence or dread, but in all cases, the idea 
of awe carries with it an intimation of something outside ordinary experience, a 
nod toward something larger than the self and its customary frames of reference.  
As a component of theatrical wonder, awe suggests an excitement at a sudden 
expansion of perceived possibility, an insight which is deepened by what is felt in 
that moment of perception.  That quality of feeling, which is also a component of 
theatrical wonder, is triggered by the engagement of profound emotion linked to 
the spectator’s appreciation of the specific circumstances of a character on 
stage.  I do not mean to suggest that wonder represents some kind of 
necessarily optimistic insight about human potential, though in some cases it 
might represent precisely that.  My conception of wonder is broad enough to 
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include a profound sadness, where the expansion of perceived possibility 
gestures toward an appreciation of the horrifying way in which a capacity for 
cruelty or an inability to affect the sweep of destructive circumstances may 
coexist with a fearsome beauty, the peculiar pleasures, for example, of tragedy 
(or the pleasures I experienced on seeing Street of Crocodiles).  
 I believe that the phenomenon of theatrical wonder is important not only 
because it represents a significant and powerful experience that is part of the 
dynamic range of  theatrical reception, but also because it represents a gesture 
toward a conception of alternative ways of knowing or understanding someone or 
something outside the narrow personal experience of the spectator, and, 
therefore, offers transformational opportunities that are especially useful in 
building communities and mindsets, even temporary ones, that may imagine new 
and better worlds, a necessary precondition of progressive social change.   Jill 
Dolan has engaged a similar idea in her articulation of the “utopian performative,” 
an ephemeral moment in live performance when the spectator, in an often 
complicated dynamic with the performer, recognizes, if only in the moment, the 
possibility of a better world: “In these utopian performative moments, we can 
experience emotionally and affectively, as well as intellectually and aesthetically, 
politically and spiritually, the possibilities of a world purposefully, revealingly, out 
of joint.  In the rupture of the possible into the real, we can feel our way 
elsewhere” (2004: 4). 
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I want to emphasize that Dolan has identified a complex phenomenon of 
experience that involves both affective and intellectual criteria, a complexity of 
experience that is also necessarily bound up in the experience of empathy, as I 
suggest in the following section of my argument.  I am asserting that it is 
precisely this potent combination of emotion and cognition (in the form of an 
empathic reaction) that unites with the expansion of imagination (represented by 
the apprehension of metaphor) in a theatrical context to yield wonder. 
 
Thinking about Empathy  
I want to think about empathy in a variety of ways.  I want to think about it 
first in terms of a general definition, because the notion of empathy actually 
encompasses several meanings.  I want to think about it in terms of recent 
theorizing about consciousness, and suggest that if “feeling” is fundamental to 
individual consciousness, then empathetic “feeling” is an essential element of 
collective consciousness and, therefore, community.  I want to propose some 
distinctions between empathy and identification and argue that intersubjectivity is 
an especially dynamic form of empathy, a form that has been utilized extensively 
in the social sciences as well as in performance theory.  Finally, I want to 
observe several of the historical ways that empathy has been considered in 
theatre practice.  This broad introduction to a multi-faceted conception of 
empathy will resonate (I hope) in my narratives about my efforts to explore 
empathy through the lens of my reception of Theatre de Complicite’s production 
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of Mnemonic and through my own directorial activities in Harry’s Way, Romeo 
and Juliet, and The Goat. 
The word “empathy,” according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is derived 
from the Greek empatheia, which is usually translated as affection or passion, 
but the word was not coined until the early part of the twentieth century. It is a 
translation of the German word einfühlung, which was used in aesthetic criticism 
to mean “the power of projecting one’s personality into (and so fully 
comprehending) the object of contemplation” (where the object of contemplation 
was a work of art).  It is fascinating to note, therefore, that from the beginning of 
its usage, the word empathy was associated with the realm of art.   Moreover, the 
word was from its beginning associated with comprehension or understanding.  
Here is the critical difference between emotional identification and true empathy.  
Whereas emotional identication suggests a shared (or mimiced) experience, 
empathy suggests that a shared experience may yield something more: an 
intellectual process that contains an interpretive or critical function, that of 
understanding.  It is precisely this intellectual process, itself an amalgamation of 
both emotion and analysis that lends empathy its distinctive usefulness.  And, 
when combined with the imaginative leap associated with the perception of 
metaphor, empathy can yield a potent mixture of understanding and vision – the 
province of wonder.   
The definition of empathy has been considerably expanded from its origin in 
aesthetics.  Psychologists list at least three definitions of “empathy” which are 
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pertinent here:  “1) a cognitive awareness and understanding of the emotions 
and feelings of another person [that is, an intellectual grasping of another’s 
affect];  2) a vicarious affective response to the emotional experiences of another 
person that mirrors or mimics that emotion [this emotional sharing would be in my 
formulation more akin to emotional identification];  and 3) assuming, in one’s 
mind, the role of another person [actually taking on the perspective of another]” 
(Reber 249).  The nuances of definition shift between emphases that are 
emotional and those that are cognitive – and between understanding and actually 
standing in another’s circumstances.   Kathleen Cotton, in a paper reviewing fifty-
eight articles considering the role of empathy in education, concludes that the 
majority of psychologists and educators agree that empathy includes both 
cognitive processes and affective experiences (“Developing Empathy”).    
This insight about the complementary nature of emotional and cognitive 
response from the social sciences is confirmed by contemporary theory in 
neuroscience.  In his recent book The Feeling of What Happens (1999), the 
celebrated neurologist Antonio Damasio sets forth an argument for a neurological 
explanation of consciousness.  Summarizing his earlier research, which 
demonstrated that an impairment in consciousness was almost always 
associated with impaired emotional response, Damasio states flatly that 
“consciousness and emotion are not separable” (16).  Dismissing the reluctance 
of medical science (until now) to explore the relationship of emotion and 
consciousness as a remnant of the formerly predominant Cartesian model that 
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bifurcates mind and body, Damasio theorizes that “the alleged vagueness, 
elusiveness, and intangibility of emotions and feelings is . . . an indication of how 
we cover the representation of our bodies, of how much mental imagery based 
on nonbody objects and events mask the reality of the body . . . Sometimes we 
use our minds to hide a part of our beings from another part of our beings” (29).  
For Damasio, both emotions and feelings (he defines “feeling” as the private, 
mental experience of an emotion), together with the consciousness that allows us 
to formulate ranges of response, are important evolutionary adaptations that 
have helped to insure human survival.   
I believe Damasio’s argument may be extended further.  If the capacity to 
experience emotion as feeling is critical to the development of individual 
consciousness, then perhaps the capacity to experience the emotional state of 
another individual, to feel empathetically, helps to account for human 
communication and the alliances made possible by such communication, surely 
another critical evolutionary adaptation.  It is not insignificant that Damasio uses 
a theatrical metaphor, implying a spectator and a performer in describing the 
operation of emotion in consciousness:  “Emotion was probably set in evolution 
before the dawn of consciousness and surfaces in each of us as a result of 
inducers we often do not recognize consciously; on the other hand, feelings 
perform their ultimate and longer-lasting effects in the theater of the conscious 
mind” (37).  I believe that the capacity to apprehend the “feelings,” the private 
mental experiences of another, or empathy, are vital to the actual theatrical 
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encounter, the part of that encounter that requires an understanding of human 
experience and behavior by a group of individual consciousnesses.  It is an 
explanation, too, for the raw stuff of community, an enterprise that necessarily 
reckons with both individuals and groups, with intellect and with feeling.  The 
theatre is a site of fusion, where distinctions between cognitive and affective 
response melt into an experiential gestalt that gestures toward an ecology of 
human response, an ecology of response that in its capacity to conjure 
unanticipated possibilities of both analysis and emotion, may gesture both toward 
utopian performatives and the experience of wonder.  
An issue that reverberates throughout any discussion of empathy is the 
elasticity of language used to describe the phenomenon. In various discourses, 
the words empathy, identification, and intersubjectivity are used almost 
interchangably.  Yet there are, for purposes of this discussion, some important 
differences. 
The concept of identification, in theatre studies as elsewhere, has been 
linked to the politics of identity.  Elin Diamond has argued, for example, that 
identification, which she descibes as “becoming or inhabiting the other on stage 
or in spectatorial fantasy” is associated with mimesis, especially in realistic 
drama.  She cautions that “[s]uch acts are distinctly imperialistic and narcissistic:  
I lose nothing – there is no loss of self – rather I appropriate you, amplifying my ‘I’ 
into an authoritative ‘we’” (1992: 390).  Diamond goes on, however, to rescue 
identification from a swamp of regressive ideology by invoking a Freudian 
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pychoanalytical model that conceives of identification as a constitutive part of 
psychic life, where the ego is the product of a historical process of object 
choices.  “In other words, it would be impossible to conceptualize a subject in the 
process of identification who would not be engaged, however, unconciously, with 
the history of her identifications, which is at least partly the the history of her 
psychic life with others” (396).  Diamond, by focusing on the historicity of the 
identifying process, has located it squarely within the parameters of a materialist 
analysis.  Because cultural subjects are able to inhabit powerfully depicted roles 
that are understood as a product of their material circumstances, the possibility of 
some kind of progressive transformation is preserved, at least theoretically. 
Diamond’s materialist perspective on identification seems particularly apt since 
identification in my view focuses on becoming or inhabiting the other in terms of 
assuming that other’s material identity markers.  In other words, I associate 
identification with a close engagement of material circumstances.  It is 
theoretically possible, I believe, either as an actor or a spectator, to identify with 
the circumstances of a character without the primary emotional engagement that 
I associate with empathy, to achieve identification despite an emotional 
detachment.  Diamond’s analysis of the identificatory process then is well-suited 
to a Brechtian theatrical model.3 
I understand intersubjectivity to imply a communication, with both cognitive 
and affective dimensions, between at least two subjectivities in which each is 
                                                 
3 Diamond develops these ideas further and with specific reference to Brechtian theory in Unmaking 
Mimesis.  I will take up part of her analysis in a discussion of Brecht later in this paper. 
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fully aware of the other and that mutual awareness is confirmed in some way.  In 
other words, I understand intersubjectivity to mean a kind of expanded or multiple 
empathy that is both interactive and dynamic, precisely the circumstances that  
exist between spectator and performer at a theatrical event.  The idea of 
intersubjectivity has achieved especially far-ranging impact in the social 
sciences. 
In 1932,   Alfred Schutz in his Phenomenology of the Social World argued 
through a process of phenomenological description and eidetic reduction for the 
possibility of intersubjective communication and its value in the social sciences.  
The reverberations of this work have been profound.  Intersubjectivity, as a tactic 
for understanding others and as a profitable psychic location where the forces of 
identification and difference may be interrogated, has gained considerable 
currency in diverse discursive enterprises, in anthropology, in psychoanalysis, 
and in political science, among others.     
Anthropologist Michael Jackson makes the case for intersubjectivity in 
ethnography in his Minima Ethnographica.  Tracing the idea of intersubjectivity to 
Martin Buber’s dialogic process, Schutz’s social phenomenology, the pragmatism 
of William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead, and 
existential/phenomenological thinking generally, Jackson understands the focus 
of intersubjectivity as the dynamic interplay between subject and object, between 
ego and alter (6) – and as the platform on which empathy, transference or 
analogy may bridge the gap between “me and you” (10).  Acknowledging that the 
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idea of intersubjectivity is inherently paradoxical and ambiguous, Jackson 
promotes it nevertheless a means of negotiating the tensions between individual 
and collective experience, between particularity and universality.  It is, for him, a 
means of addressing “a paradox of human existence – that one can be in the 
world only if one feels that one’s own world is, in some significant sense, also the 
world.  In other words, it is irrelevant whether the psychic unity of humankind is 
proven scientifically or accepted on ideological grounds because it is existentially 
imperative.  Human sameness everywhere consists in similar differences” (15).  
The intersubjective approach does not allow Jackson to view the particular and 
the opposed as static and in opposition.  Rather they are a perpetual dialectic 
that contemplates no resolution.  His thesis is that control over the relationship 
and balance of these worlds is a central human preoccupation (20-21). 
Jessica Benjamin, who approaches intersubjectivity both from 
psychoanalytic and feminist perspectives, sounds a similar theme.  She 
characterizes her project as one that explores “a series of complimentary 
polarities, showing how we move in and out of entanglement in them.  Subject 
and object, active and passive, observer and participant, knower and known – 
these reversible complementarities have structured the psychoanalytic 
relationship.  The intersubjective perspective is concerned with how we create 
the third position that is able to break up the reversible complementarities and 
hold in tension the polarities that underly them” (xiv).  Her embrace of 
intersubjectivity is informed by a passionate idealism that imagines a practice 
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that values creative tension and collaboration, giving her reason to “hope that we 
may enlarge the dialogic space that engenders the third position, that the    
oppositions we present can play in freedom their hour upon the stage” (xx).    
 Feminist political scientist Jodi Dean, in The Solidarity of Strangers (1996), 
stakes out a claim for a third, intersubjective position that she calls “reflective 
solidarity.”    
I define reflective solidarity as the mutual expectation of a 
responsible orientation to relationship.  This conception of 
solidarity relies on the intuition that the risk of disagreement 
which accompanies diversity must be rationally transformed 
to provide a basis for our intersubjective ties and 
commitments.  This means that the expression “we” must be 
interpreted not as given, but as “in process,” as the 
discursive achievement of individuated “I’s” (Dean 3). 
Dean’s contention is that the “we” of solidarity must be understood, not as a    
monolithic concept in which identities are subordinated to a fiction of 
commonality, but as a function of a communicative process in which debate, 
dissent and questioning are reconstituted as factors which actually bond a group 
(or community) rather than fracturing it.  Her essential insight is that in a world 
composed of multiple and interlacing identities, in which subjects move into and 
out of various groups in various contexts, we can never be sure who “we” are.  
That very capacity for movement, however, creates a hypothetical location 
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between identities that affords a critical location for a newly refined perspective 
about inclusion and exclusion, a perspective that allows us to take accountability 
for our exclusions.  Our capacity to reflect upon this evokes the potential for 
community (34). 
The quality and extent of intersubjective exchange in the theatre may 
fluctuate wildly in different circumstances.  Theatre events using the convention 
of a fourth wall may produce meaning in the mutuality of the performer/spectator 
communication, but that convention militates against the dialogic confirmation, 
the mutuality of awareness that is a condition of intersubjectivity.  The actor in 
that convention typically does not overtly acknowledge the audience.  Other 
theatre forms, however, emphasize that kind of exchange.  I am thinking, for 
example of the kind of solo performance, especially that developed by feminist 
performers in recent decades, that directly involves the audience or that finds 
occasion to physically penetrate the audience, dissolving barriers that otherwise 
preclude intersubjectivity.  This is the phenomenon that Jill Dolan originally 
described in as a “utopian performative” in her 2001 Theatre Journal article 
“Performance, Utopia, and the ‘Utopian Performative.’”  The same kind of 
interactive mutual awareness may exist in any performance that indulges in 
meta-theatrical flourishes, when the fourth wall is intentionally dissolved in a 
sudden field of mutual awareness.   In a more general sense, however, and 
especially from a phenomenological perspective, conditions of intersubjectivity 
  31 
are present theoretically in every theatrical encounter in which a spectator and 
actor are mutually aware, irrespective of the fourth wall. 
Stanton B. Garner points out that the bodied nature of the theatrical 
encounter of performer and spectator introduces a complex series of variables.  
He observes that as actors enter onto a stage in an auditorium with spectators 
present, “a fundamental shift takes place with phenomenological consequences 
different from those for artistic genres where the body fails to make an actual 
appearance.  With this appearance, the phenomenological parameters of both 
stage and spectatorship undergo complicated reorientation” (1994: 46).  Because 
the actor is herself a subject both aware of and capable of perceiving the 
spectator, conditions of intersubjectivity and multiperspectivity abound.  The 
actor’s body, for example, “constitutes a subject point from which the other 
elements [on stage] receive competing orientation” (47).  A prop exists on stage 
not only for the visual consumption of a spectator, but also as an instrument that 
may be manipulated by the actor.  Moreover, the actor is capable, whether she 
does so or not, of returning the gaze of the audience.  There is, in Garner’s 
conception of the theatre event, an almost infinite field of perceptual complexity.   
The performer/character’s gaze, like the body’s living 
presence that it asserts, exceeds the containing parameters 
of representational space and confronts the audience’s gaze 
with an intersubjectivity that represents a potential or actual 
‘catastrophe’ in terms of spectatorial detachment.  From the 
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phenomenological point of view, the living body capable of 
returning the spectator’s gaze presents a methodological 
dilemma for any theoretical model – like semiotics – that 
offers to describe performance in ‘objective’ terms.  Alone 
among the elements that constitute the stage’s semiotic 
field, the body is a sign that looks back (49). 
Whether or not the disruption of spectatorial detachment is “catastrophic,” it 
seems clear that, at least on a theoretical level, a condition of intersubjectivity, 
together with the empathy contained within it, is embedded in the very substance 
of the theatrical event – and has been recognized, either by its embrace or its 
attempted rejection, for a very long time. 
Theatrical writers sought, from at least the fifth century BCE, to portray 
characters in circumstances that aroused an emotional response from an 
audience.  Theatrical characters have been conceived, at least from 
Shakespeare on, as having the capacity to empathize in every way with other 
characters.  It was not until the early part of the twentieth century, however, that 
a systematic approach for training actors to empathize with the characters that 
they embodied was developed.  Stanislavsky, influenced by a taste for 
Wagnerian illusionism and the uniquely nuanced performances of Eleanora 
Duse, devised (at least in his early work) a system of actor training that required 
actors to “live” their roles by finding a matrix of emotional identification with the 
experience of the characters they portrayed.   Stanislavsky wrote in An Actor 
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Prepares: “The thoughts, feelings, conceptions, reasoning of the author are 
transformed into his [the actor’s] own.  And it is not his sole purpose to render the 
lines so that they shall be understood.  For him it is necessary that the spectators 
feel his own inner relationship to what he is saying” (quoted by Wiles 18-19, 
emphasis in the original).  Stanislavsky believed (again in his early and most 
influential work) that only if the actor could empathize with his/her character, 
could the audience empathize with that character.  This was not a new idea (two 
thousand years earlier, Horace wrote in his Ars Poetica, “If you wish me to weep, 
you yourself must first feel grief”), but Stanislavsky systematized the idea in a 
method of actor training.  David Kaplan, in his acting textbook, Five Approaches 
to Acting, points out with respect to Stanislavsky’s system, “No matter what the 
role, the performance of action and obstacles is meant to elicit compassion” (39, 
emphasis in the original).  There can be no question that the evocation of 
compassion is understood to be a primary benefit of empathy.                                          
 In that part of theatre practice that views the theatre as an agent of social 
change, however, compassion has not always been seen as a boon.  Brecht, 
who sought in his concept of epic theatre a means to facilitate critical thinking 
and politically efficacious criticism, saw empathy as a byproduct of illusion and as 
an obstacle to intellectual analysis.  He responded by articulating the need for 
verfremdungseffekt, an approach to acting which required the actor, instead of 
empathizing with his/her character, to maintain a critical distance, discouraging 
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runaway empathy on the part of an audience that might overwhelm the capacity 
for detached, critical observation.  
Brecht was seeking a theatrical means by which he could “disrupt the 
viewers’ normal or run of the mill perception by introducing elements that will 
suddenly cause the viewer to see familiar objects in a strange way and to see 
strange objects in a familiar way” (Fuegi, 83).  His intention was “to stress that 
understanding is fundamentally dialogic, first in the stance of the actor vis-à-vis 
himself as he presents his role, and secondly between the actor and the 
spectator” (Kiebuzinska 88).  In his emphasis on dialogic understanding, Brecht, 
along with his contemporary in Russia, Meyerhold, anticipated a means of 
approaching performance analysis that is of compelling interest today, but in his 
anti-empathic model for theatre, he overlooked the real usefulness of empathy 
(and more specifically intersubjectivity) in assisting the achievement of a more 
just society4.   
To create a better world, a kinder and more just world, one must first be 
able to imagine it.  André Gide wrote in Portraits and Aphorisms, “True kindness 
presupposes the faculty of imagining as one's own the suffering and joy of 
others.”  He is clearly offering a compelling social justification for empathy as well 
as touting the beneficial byproducts of a well-exercised imagination.  Empathy 
has been hailed, after all, as a vital ingredient in any moral education (Verducci).  
It is interesting to note that educational theorist Maxine Greene ties imagination 
                                                 
4 I take up Brechtian theory and empathy, along with the theoretical interventions of various contemporary 
critics, in much more detail in the course of my consideration of theatrical wonder and tragedy in Chapter 
Five. 
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directly to empathy:  “One of the reasons I have come to concentrate on 
imagination as a means through which we can assemble a coherent world is that 
imagination is what, above all, makes empathy possible” (3).  And with particular 
regard to an investigation of theatrical wonder, imagination in the theatre is 
inextricably linked to the perception and understanding of metaphor. 
 
Thinking about Metaphor 
Imagination is more than an enabler of empathy.  It is the means by which 
we make meaningful use of metaphor.  It is imagination that enables us to 
conceive something in an experiential phenomenon that may be paradoxically 
outside our own historical experience.  It is imagination, summoned as an aid to 
understanding, which enabled me as a five year old to transform a moving 
spotlight into the vibrant seductive persona of Tinkerbell the fairy.  And while the 
process of aging may diminish its scope, imagination remains the engine that 
makes metaphor possible.  But the province of metaphor, wherein reside 
definitions, associations, modes of operation, and implications, has been difficult 
to explore and even more resistant to cartography. 
Theatre, of course, has always made extensive use of metaphor as a 
means of engaging the imagination of the spectator to create theatrical worlds 
and generate new insights.  It is not an exaggeration to say that metaphor is as 
fundamental a component of theatrical technique as is mimesis.   In the most 
basic way, any realistic theatrical representation, whether environmental 
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(scenographic) or behavioral (actors depicting characters) relies upon the 
convention whereby audiences understand that what is actually transpiring 
before them is meant to represent another fictional world.  In their most basic 
operation, that of communicative comparison, metaphors quite literally make 
theatrical representation possible.  But I suspect that practitioners have always 
understood that the potential of communicated comparison offers more than an 
opportunity for representation.  Metaphor enables imaginative leaps that 
generate insight.   
This is, to choose one obvious example, a foundational premise of 
scenographic design, where design students are routinely taught to develop 
metaphors as a way of conceiving design ideas that communicate insights they 
have developed about the world of the playtext that their design references.  In 
1941, Robert Edmund Jones, the great teacher of stage design, advised young 
stage designers that “[i]n the theatre the exciting thing is never the actual thing” 
(Jones 82).  He instructed his students that 
What we are now interested in . . .  is not illusion, but 
allusion, and allusion to the most magical beauty.  I seek 
less, said Walt Whitman, to display any theme or thought 
and more to bring you into the atmosphere of the theme or 
thought – there to pursue your own flight (136, italics in 
original). 
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In this brief bit of exhortation, Jones managed not only to articulate the value for 
the theatre artist of metaphorical thinking, but also to gesture both to the 
necessity of the spectator’s participation in the dynamic of theatrical achievement 
and to the received wisdom that metaphor, for the theatre practitioner just as for 
the poet, represents a heightened form of artistic expression.  The somewhat 
exalted notion of metaphor as belonging squarely and exclusively in the realm of 
the poetic would be decisively challenged roughly four decades later, when 
Lakoff and Johnson published Metaphors We Live By in 1980, and in the process 
transformed cognitive linguistics.   
 Lakoff and Johnson argued persuasively that the very structure of our 
thinking is metaphorical.  While acknowledging that the essence of metaphor is 
the understanding and/or experience of one thing in terms of another (5), Lakoff 
and Johnson take pains to distinguish what they mean by metaphor from the 
more commonplace understanding of metaphor as a poetic substitution.  They 
argue that the word “metaphor” refers to a construct in which one concept (the 
target domain) is understood in terms of another concept (the source domain).  
For example, in the metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY5, the rather abstract idea of 
love, is linguistically understood in terms of the more empirically experienced 
aspects of a journey.   Lakoff offers examples of the ways in which commonplace 
verbal expressions demonstrate the ways in which we think:  “Look how far we’ve 
                                                 
5 It is a convention of the literature of cognitive linguistics to represent conceptual metaphors in capital 
letters.  These are distinguished from linguistic metaphorical expressions, more specific verbal expressions 
that manifest or illustrate the larger construct of the conceptual metaphor.  The quoted examples cited are 
linguistic metaphorical expressions, and these are typically expressed with ordinary type. 
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come.  It’s been a long, bumpy road.  We may have to go our separate ways. . . 
We’re spinning our wheels.  Our relationship is off the track.  The marriage is on 
the rocks (Lakoff 1993, 206). 
 Lakoff argues that this phenomenon of language should be understood, 
not as poetic or as calculated to produce a particular rhetorical effect, but as a 
means of understanding and conceptualizing abstract or elusive ideas. 
[T]he metaphor can be understood as a mapping (in the 
mathematical sense) from a source domain (in this case, 
journeys) to a target domain (in this case, love).  The 
mapping is tightly structured.  There are ontological 
correspondences, according to which entities in the domain 
of love (e.g., the lovers, their common goals, their difficulties, 
the love relationship, etc.) correspond systematically to 
entities in the domain of a journey (the travelers, the vehicle, 
destinations, etc.) (207). 
Lakoff goes on to demonstrate that many basic concepts, including those dealing 
with time, quantity, state, change, action, cause, purpose, and others, are 
understood metaphorically.  These are conventional conceptual metaphors, 
deeply entrenched in our way of thinking. 
 Individual metaphorical linguistic expressions, on the other hand, may be 
quite unconventional.  This is the province of novel metaphoric expression that 
we are accustomed to regarding as the province of artists and poets, where the 
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very unusual character of a perceived comparison may assist the 
reader/spectator in seeing the world in new ways (Kövecses 32).  Linguistic 
research has suggested that artists regularly employ several devices to create 
novel language and images from commonplace language and thought.  These 
include extending, elaboration, questioning and combining.  In extending, a 
conventional conceptual metaphor is expressed by new linguistic means based 
on introducing a new conceptual element in the source domain.  In elaboration, 
an existing element of the source domain is used in an unusual way.  In 
questioning, the appropriateness of an everyday metaphor is called into question.  
The device of combining, as the term implies, suggests the activation of several 
known metaphors simultaneously (47-49).  All of these devices are useful in 
understanding the manner in which theatrical metaphors register in especially 
potent ways, and I will refer to them in the analysis of various performances that 
is to follow.  I intend to argue, using the insights of philosopher and literary critic 
Paul Ricoeur, that novel metaphors are an essential ingredient of wonder.  
Before turning to Ricoeur, however, I want to consider one other aspect of Lakoff 
and Johnson’s research that has flowed from their consideration of metaphor, 
that part of their research dealing with the embodied nature of the mind. 
 In their recent book Philosophy in the Flesh, Lakoff and Johnson argue 
that metaphor is a neural mechanism that allows us to adapt those neural 
systems employed in sensory-motor activity for the purpose of creating a means 
of abstract thinking.  In other words, anything we are able to conceive is shaped 
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and determined, in fact, limited by, the physical processes that are the ways in 
which our bodies and brains engage the world.  This is yet another direct 
refutation of the (increasingly) quaint Cartesian notion of a mind/body duality.  It 
is also a scientific affirmation of the essential insights of the select group of 
philosophers who have argued either that the body is a site of knowledge 
(Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology) or that insight is the direct result of experience 
Dewey’s pragmatism).  Like the insistence of neuro-scientists that cognitive and 
emotional aspects of mental process are inseparable, this conception of 
metaphor has interesting implications for the theatre theorist.  If the perception of 
metaphor is an embodied process, then perhaps the evocation of metaphor in a 
highly embodied context, the dynamically experiential context of theatre, has a 
special potency that is different from the perception of metaphor by reading.  I 
want, too, to pose a question about the source of the metaphor.  Does it follow 
that a metaphor, which is itself constructed in an embodied way, i.e., using the 
body of the performer, has an impact that is different than a metaphor which is 
conjured entirely on the basis of an idea, perceived as a result of absorbing a 
disembodied conceptual reference?  I shall attempt to address these questions in 
the chapters that follow. 
 For philosopher and critic Paul Ricoeur, a consideration of the operation 
and interpretation of metaphor is an integral aspect of his larger concern, the 
examination of language as discourse and a theory that accounts for the 
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communication of meaning.6  Discourse, according to Ricoeur, who applies a 
complex melding of phenomenological analysis and hermeneutic exegesis, is a 
dialectic of event and meaning.  The event, which for Ricoeur is the reading of a 
written text, but which I suggest is equally applicable to the reception of a 
theatrical work, is, from the perspective of the writer (or creator), experience as 
expression.  The event is also, however, composed of the intersubjective 
exchange between the writer/creator and the recipient of the communication.  
That exchange, which includes a sense of lived experience, produces meaning, 
which is, in its public manifestation, discourse (Valdes 262).  Ricoeur’s position 
with regard to metaphor is that metaphoric language propels human discourse 
toward new meanings (Gerhart 217).  Ricoeur reasons that metaphor plays a 
vital role in the process of interpreting the meaning of a given text by 
acknowledging the need to make sense as the basis for all meaning.  
 Critical to Ricoeur’s theory of metaphor (and to his theories generally with 
regard to discursive language) is his distinction between semiotics and 
semantics.  Semiotics, as the science of signs, relies upon the capacity of the 
critic to reduce language to its constitutive parts.7  For Ricoeur, however, 
semiotics is ill-equipped to engage questions of meaning inasmuch as it deals 
with language at a lexical level, whereas meaning is produced, in his argument, 
                                                 
6 Thomas Postlewait, defending the use of narrative in historical writing in “History, Hermeneutics, and 
Narrativity,” cites Ricoeur for the proposition that the relationship between history and narrative centers on 
the need for explanation and interpretation considering history.  Here, as in his consideration of discourse 
generally, Ricoeur blends perspectives which are experiential (phenomenological) and interpretive 
(hermeneutic). 
7 Indeed, when considering the theatre event from a semiotic perspective, Keir Elam rehearses C.S. Pierce’s 
typology of signs: the icon, the index and the symbol.  Metaphor is specifically identified as an example of 
iconicity (Elam 21). 
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at a discursive level.  Semantics, which is the science of the sentence, deals with 
the integrative capacity of language and is better suited to a consideration of 
meaning (Valdes 262).  This notion of integrative capacity is useful, not only in 
semantic analysis, but also in the analysis of the theatrical event, whose 
constituent parts combine in a gestalt of experience, the reception of which 
involves, at least in part, a struggle to extract meaning.  Bert O. States, in 
explaining his phenomenological approach to theatre, alludes to Ricoeur’s 
integrative capacity of language in explaining his use of the term “image” to 
signify the full range of theatrical representation as an effort to “abridge the 
process of signification and throw the emphasis onto the empathic response” 
(24). 
 Whereas ordinary language tends to reassert the lexical meanings of word 
in a sentence, the tension created by the need to interpret metaphor destroys the 
consistency of those words, creating a condition where new meaning can be 
encountered (Gerhart 216-217).  It is important to note that Ricoeur is speaking 
about “live” as opposed to “dead” metaphors.  Dead metaphors are those so 
assimilated into the language that their consideration produces no tension for the 
reader.  Meaning is apparent.  Live metaphors, on the other hand, especially 
novel ones, have a productively disruptive capacity that requires an interpretive 
process and a need to discern meaning.  “The sense of a novel metaphor . . . is 
the emergence of a new semantic congruence or pertinence from the ruins of the 
literal sense shattered by semantic incompatibility or absurdity” (Ricoeur 1978, 
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151).  For purposes of my analysis, Ricoeur’s live metaphors function much in 
the way that the novel metaphorical linguistic expression does for cognitive 
linguists.  Both require interaction with a recipient to manufacture meaning in an 
uncertain field where intention melts into the open textuality of perception.   
“[U]nderstanding a metaphor is as much a creative endeavor as making a 
metaphor, and as little guided by rules” (Davidson 29).  And both concepts of 
metaphor can be transferred from a realm of pure language to the multi-
dimensional forms of signification found in the theatre. 
 Ricoeur even extends his consideration of metaphor to include the idea 
that both imagination and feeling are necessary aspects of the process by which 
metaphor may be theorized to yield informative value or a truth claim. His 
argument is laid out in his essay “The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, 
Imagination, and Feeling,” published in 1978.   He works from Aristotle’s earliest 
observations about metaphor to assert that the idea of metaphor necessarily 
carries with it the corollary notion of resemblance (the essence of the kind of 
implied comparison that metaphors represent).  Resemblance in turn has a visual 
or pictorial dimension, what Ricoeur calls the “picturing function” of metaphorical 
meaning (142, italics in original).  This picturing function is a product of an 
imaginative process, a process that involves both “a thinking and a seeing” (145).   
 Ricoeur, in asserting the semantic and visual character of metaphor, 
invokes the idea of metaphoric embodiment: 
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The very expression ‘figure of speech’ implies that in 
metaphor, as in the other tropes or turns, discourse assumes 
the nature of a body by displaying forms and traits which 
usually characterize the human face, man’s ‘figure’; it is as 
though the tropes gave to discourse a quasi-bodily 
externalization.  By providing a kind of figurability to the 
message, the tropes make discourse appear (142). 
It is not that he refutes the iconic character claimed for metaphor by semiotic 
theorists.  Rather, he argues that the metaphoric icon is described rather than 
presented.  Its description requires a process of construction or interpretation, 
which is the realm of imagination (148).  Ricoeur compares the function of 
metaphor in discourse with the function of a model in scientific pursuits, arguing 
that a metaphor may be seen as a model for changing our way of looking at 
things.  “The word ‘insight,’ very often applied to the cognitive import of 
metaphor, conveys in a very appropriate manner this move from sense to 
reference which is no less obvious in poetic discourse than in so-called 
descriptive discourse” (150, italics in original).  Clearly, this idea of moving from 
sense to reference in an imaginative field has significant implications for a 
consideration of the theatrical process, which may begin in the apprehension of 
various sensory stimuli and proceed, as I contend in my discussion of wonder, to 
the generation of original and useful insights about the world. 
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 Finally Ricoeur asserts that imagination and feeling have always been 
closely linked in classical theories of metaphor, noting that the function of rhetoric 
(and theatre, I might add) has always been understood as “a strategy of 
discourse aiming at persuading and pleasing” (153, my emphasis).  His argument 
that feeling is a necessary part of imagination rests upon his insight that poetic 
feelings are different than emotions, that in fact, they represent a kind of 
metamorphosis of emotions, a translation of emotions into a form in which they 
may be merged with the cognitive dimension of our reading (or spectatorial) 
experience.   
[F]eelings – I mean poetic feelings – imply a kind of epoché 
of our bodily emotions.  Feelings are negative, suspensive 
experiences in relation to the literal emotions of everyday 
life.  When we read, we do not literally feel fear or anger.  
Just as poetic language denies the first-order reference of 
descriptive discourse to ordinary objects of our concern, 
feelings deny the first-order feelings which tie us to these 
first-order objects of reference (155). 
Ricoeur’s distinction between feelings and emotions may, at first blush, seem to 
militate against my central thesis about the centrality of genuine empathy, with its 
deeply emotional associations, in that form of theatrical reception, which I call 
wonder.  In fact, however, I think that his distinction is an extremely valuable one, 
which bears a startling resemblance to Antonio Damasio’s contention in The 
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Feeling of What Happens that feelings are simply the private mental experience 
or awareness of emotions, the merger, in other words, of cognitive and affective 
reactions.  It is precisely this synthesis of emotion and cognition that is implicated 
both in a general understanding of empathy and in my conception of wonder.  
Ricoeur has related this same human process to the operation of metaphor, and 
that, in fact, contributes pertinently and directly, as I will argue, to my exploration 
of theatrical wonder. 
  If theatrical wonder is, in fact, precipitated by virtue of a hermeneutic 
process, a conscious quest for meaning, and if indeed the presence of some kind 
of emotional rapport is a necessary part of that process, then there must be a 
mechanism by which emotion is rendered into a form that is compatible with 
cognitive processes.  Damasio’s “feeling,” understood as the mental operation 
that allows for awareness of emotion, provides such a mechanism.  Ricoeur 
provides for a substantially similar mechanism by casting “feelings” as an eidetic 
reduction of “bodily emotions.”  By bracketing emotion in a phenomenological 
analysis, Ricoeur allows this otherwise unruly phenomenon profitably to meld into 
a broader discursive enterprise that privileges cognition.   
 Ricoeur understands that the production of pleasure is a vital aspect of the 
discourse of reading (and by extension, theatrical reception), and that the use of 
metaphor is a strategy for the production of pleasure, as well as a productively 
disruptive tactic that may generate new insights.  For me, the apprehension of 
metaphor is implicated in that aspect of theatrical wonder that is grounded in 
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delight as well as that aspect of theatrical wonder that may gesture toward 
previously unknown or unimagined possibilities.  Ricoeur’s analysis, in other 
words, may account for the capacity of metaphor and emotion combined to 
produce both an elevated sense of pleasure and even an insight that rises to the 
status of a utopian inkling. 
 
Focusing on Performance 
In the context of the theatrical experience, imagination, especially that form 
of imagination linked to the creation and appreciation of novel metaphor, and 
empathy, or some form of intersubjective exchange, are sometimes linked in 
astonishingly original ways.  Those occasions are, I believe, occasions of 
theatrical wonder, but even the more commonplace instances of theatrical 
empathy require a specific kind of communicative exchange between actor and 
audience, an exchange that allows for understanding and for the production of 
meaning.  On the issue of theatrical meaning, Meyerhold anticipated current 
modes of performance analysis.  In rejecting the theatrical idea, championed by 
devotees of realism, of the illusionistic fourth wall, Meyerhold instead considered 
the audience to be “the fourth dimension” (following the dimensions of playwright, 
director and actors).  Theatrical meaning was not created by the playwright and 
transmitted to the audience by the actors, but created by the theatre practitioners 
and the spectators jointly (Leach 30).  Meyerhold said quite unambiguously, “We 
produce every play on the assumption that it will be still unfinished when it 
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appears on the stage.  We do this because we realize that the crucial revision of 
a production is that made by the spectator” (Braun 256).  Meyerhold anticipates 
the poststructuralist impulse to vest responsibility for the determination of 
meaning in the recipient of a communication as opposed to the initiator of that 
communication.  He also articulates an interactive theory of the theatre 
experience, where meaning ultimately resides only in the ephemeral and 
embodied intersection of performer and spectator on the occasion of a theatrical 
exchange.  This is entirely consistent both with Willmar Sauter’s notion of the 
theatrical event and with Paul Ricoeur’s account of discourse as a dialectic of 
event and meaning. 
Willmar Sauter’s model of performance analysis focuses on the theatre 
experience as a communicative event that occurs in the actual encounter of 
performer and spectator (the mutuality of that encounter is a key part of his 
analysis) and upon the contexts in which the communication takes place.  His 
characterization of the theatrical encounter as a communicative event considers 
it a place where meaning is sought.  Using a self-described phenomenological 
approach, Sauter divides theatrical communication into three aspects, which, 
while being distinguishable from each other, are dynamically interconnected 
during the process of performance: the sensory aspect, the artistic aspect, and 
the symbolic aspect.  The sensory level of communication may be understood as 
beginning with an exhibitory practice, by which Sauter means all those factors 
about an embodied performer which may be perceived by a spectator.  They 
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include both physical features (appearance, movement, facial expression, vocal 
presence, etc.) and psychological characteristics (intensity, mood, energy, 
temperament, etc.)  The artistic level of communication involves both encoded 
and decoded communication, which for Sauter includes theatrical conventions, 
genres, skills and appreciation, pleasures and critical judgments.  The symbolic 
aspect of communication comes into play when the spectator has prior 
knowledge or accumulated information that allows for associational leaps of 
interpretation or understanding and for identification and empathy with fictional 
persona (82-88).   
Relying heavily on the hermeneutic theory of Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
Sauter argues, “theatre primarily can be understood as a communicative process 
in which neither the stage image nor the spectator is privileged, but where their 
mutual intersection marks the nucleus of scholarly interest” (29).  Gadamer uses 
the term “horizon” to describe the historical place and contextual circumstances 
of the scholar (or, I would suggest, spectator) seeking to interpret a text.  The text 
occupies its own horizon.  Horizons, however, move and can be expanded.  
Gadamer’s hermeneutical process contemplates a conscious and systematic 
encounter of horizons until they melt together in understanding.  Sauter quotes 
Gadamer as writing, “In fact, understanding is always the process of fusion of 
those horizons, which are assumed to be separate” (89).  Sauter applies this 
model of interpretive process to the theatre event, arguing that the three aspects 
of performative communication constitute the horizon of the performance text, 
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and that their reception by a spectator inhabiting his own contextual horizon is 
both the core of the theatre event and the means by which the meaning of that 
event is produced.   
While Sauter is content to rely on Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur’s refinement of 
Gadamer’s interpretive process of literary texts is especially useful in thinking 
about the theatre event.  As I have suggested, Ricoeur introduces the concept of 
discourse as a dialectic of event and meaning.  Mario Valdes explains, “The 
direct consequence of Ricoeur’s theory of the text-reader dialectic to literary 
criticism is the transformation of interpretation into a dynamic dialectic between 
the distanciation of the text and the appropriation of the reader” (Valdes 263).  In 
the context of a theatre event, then, horizons are fused in the interactive process 
of embracing and distancing between performers and audience (the theatrical 
equivalent to Ricoeur’s “community of readers”).  Ricoeur understands this 
process to be generative of new worlds of understanding.  He replies to Valdes, 
“the capacity of redescription or refiguration of the world by the text does not 
occur unless it becomes a ‘shared meaning’; the presumed truth of the 
redescription of the world can, therefore, only be intersubjective” (Hahn 283).  
Ricoeur establishes intersubjectivity as the process both by which meaning is 
sought and new worlds conjured.  Sauter’s analytical model, as refined by 
Ricoeur’s description of the intersubjective nature of understanding, provides a 
particularly insightful way to engage the theatrical experience, and I will use it in 
engaging the theatrical works described in this project. 
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 A brief example will help to demonstrate the application of these ideas.  In 
a subsequent chapter, I will take up my Middle Eastern Romeo and Juliet, in 
which I chose to represent the Montagues as contemporary Israelis and the 
Capulets as contemporary Palestinians.  Using Sauter’s analysis, the sensory, 
artistic, and symbolic elements of the production constituted the horizon of that 
production, as they would any theatrical production.  In this case, however, the 
symbolic elements of the play included costuming, scenic design and sound that 
squarely placed the action of the play in an Israeli/Palestinian context.  The 
horizons of individual spectators contained their pre-existing knowledge and 
opinions about that conflict, together with their pre-existing knowledge of Romeo 
and Juliet.  In Gadamer’s terms, whatever understanding was achieved by 
spectators in the course of this event was achieved as a result of the fusion of 
those horizons.   Ricoeur’s contribution to this analysis is in understanding that 
the process by which a reader (spectator) engages or embraces the otherwise 
detached and distanced text results in a shared meaning, a process which he 
characterizes as intersubjective.  The abstract intersubjectivity that Ricoeur 
posits in the interpretation of a written text becomes concrete in a performance 
text, where the intersubjective exchange in phenomenological terms is fully 
embodied, takes place in real time, and, at least potentially, is mutually 
acknowledged by spectator and performer.   It was my hope in undertaking 
Romeo and Juliet, that, as Ricoeur suggests, the process of seeking 
understanding could be generative of new meaning.  I was hoping to stimulate a 
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new and deeper level of compassion about a contentious political circumstance.  
I will discuss the outcome in Chapter Four.                                                                                
Ricoeur’s approach, of distancing and embracing as a dialectical means of 
achieving understanding, is the central theoretical method of my inquiry.   My 
writing design of incorporating both an analytical engagement with the work I am 
describing and an autoethnographic consideration of my own place in that work 
provides a structural mirror to my theoretical method, where the analytical 
function may be understood as a distancing stance, and my highly subjective 
description of my own work and thought process, with all the emotional 
investment that that entails, may be understood as a kind of embracing.   
Sauter’s conception of the way in which meaning and understanding is 
produced in the mutuality of the performer/spectator interaction (especially 
incorporating Ricoeur) provides a platform for thinking about the role of 
intersubjectivity in the theatre event as well. Theatre can provide such an 
opportunity for reflective community, for the opportunity to enter into meaningful 
dialogue about the lived experience of others.  Indeed, in some ways the theatre 
event provides a site for intersubjectivity that is especially apt in theoretical 
terms.  Schutz says, “I apprehend the lived experiences of another only through 
signitive-symbolic representation, regarding either his body or some cultural 
artifact he has produced as a ‘field of expression’ for those experiences” (100). 
Theatre, along with dance, is the most embodied form of artistic representation; 
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moreover, it constitutes a field of expression with a full complement of signifying 
and symbolic conventions.     
I believe that theatre represents a uniquely powerful site for the interplay 
of emotion and cognition.  This is what I hope my performance analysis and 
hermeneutic interrogation will explore, so that through the carefully balanced 
combination of critical thought and empathic projection, I might better understand 
wonder, how and when it works—and use that understanding to imagine worlds 
more just, more inclusive, more beautiful, and more creative than that which we 
presently inhabit.  John Dewey wrote of the implications of the unique capacity of 
art to meld the actual with the apprehension of the possible.   
While perception of the union of the possible with the actual 
is itself a great good, the good does not terminate with the 
immediate and particular occasion in which it is had.  The 
union that is presented in perception persists in the making 
of impulsion and thought.  The first intimations of wide and 
large redirections of desire and purpose are necessarily 
imaginative.  Art is a mode of prediction not found in charts 
and statistics, and it insinuates possibilities of human 
relations not to be found in rule and precept, admonition and 
administration (349). 
I believe that a theoretically informed practice is one way to meld the actual with 
the possible.   For me, the efforts to achieve that represent far more than an 
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academic exercise.  They are a personal quest for theatre that contributes 
significantly to the mix of aspiration and hope that continues to characterize the 
art to which I am drawn. 
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Chapter Two 
Theatre de Complicite, Purveyors of Wonder 
 
 I stated in Chapter One that I trace much of my present interest in 
theatrical wonder to a performance of Street of Crocodiles by Theatre de 
Complicite that I attended in 1998.  In this chapter, I will argue that Theatre de 
Complicite (or simply Complicite, as it is often called) serves as an exemplar of 
the theatrical use of highly original embodied metaphor and how that helps to 
generate theatrical wonder.  I will briefly review my first two experiences 
witnessing this company’s work, and then I will examine the company’s 
performance of Mnemonic as an occasion when embodied metaphor is used 
quite consciously in connection with the evocation of empathy, a set of criteria 
that I have suggested may yield theatrical wonder.  I will argue that the specific 
training received by the company founders from Jacques Lecoq, with its 
distinctive embrace of physicality and imagination, helps to account for the 
techniques used in this production.  Finally, I will consider the political 
implications of Mnemonic, which espouses a deeply humanistic conviction about 
the inter-relatedness of all people, and by extension, the political implications of 
theatrical wonder. 
 More than any theatre company of which I am aware, Complicite, led by 
its artistic director, Simon McBurney, has developed a way of working that yields 
theatrical experiences flecked with wonder.  The company’s techniques, which 
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include a performance style that is highly physical, derive directly from certain 
aspects of theatrical study devised and promulgated by Jacques Lecoq, with 
whom the founding members of Complicite trained, especially with regard to 
those portions of his curriculum that sought to stimulate an exuberant exercise of 
theatrical imagination and explored the role of embodied metaphor in the 
transmission of imaginative impulses.  
 Theatre de Complicite, now twenty-one years old, is led by artistic director 
Simon McBurney.  It was founded in 1983 by McBurney, Annabel Arden and 
Marcello Magni, all of whom had trained in Paris with Jacques Lecoq 
(Tushingham 13).  The company also acknowledges the influence of Phillipe 
Gaulier, who had himself been part of Lecoq’s faculty before branching out on his 
own.  Historically, the company has undertaken three different kinds of work:  
Complicite reinterprets classics (a 2004 production of Shakespeare’s Measure 
for Measure falls into this category); it adapts works of literature into theatrical 
form (The Street of Crocodiles, adapted from Bruno Schultz’s novel of the same 
name is one example); and it develops its own works from diverse sources.   
Mnemonic, commissioned by the Saltzburger Festspiele in 1999, falls into this 
latter category.  The only authorial credit for this theatre work is “devised by the 
company,” and while a written text has been published, the work of Complicite, 
often extremely physical, always highly visual, and frequently employing 
deceptively sophisticated uses of technology alongside centuries-old 
performance techniques, cannot easily be reduced to the page.  Mnemonic, in 
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particular, is a multimedia event, using a complex recorded sound design, 
automated lighting, video and projected images seamlessly interwoven with the 
company’s trademark style of physical theatre and imaginative staging.   
 One aspect of that imaginative staging especially pertinent here is the 
focus of the company on manufacturing metaphors from the raw material of their 
bodies, especially their bodies in a state of motion.  This emphasis on movement 
and the body as a flexible signifier is both a distinguishing characteristic of the 
company’s aesthetic and a legacy of the Lecoq training that the company’s 
founders shared.  I take up the issue of that training below, but it is clear that the 
work of Complicite addresses the question of whether embodied metaphor has 
some special currency in theatrical reception, especially with regard to the 
generation of wonder. 
 
Initial Encounters with Complicite 
 I had first admired this internationally acclaimed British company for its 
production of The Three Lives of Lucy Cabrol in 1996, when it was mounted as 
part of the Lincoln Center Festival.  Vincent Canby, in his New York Times 
review, described that production, which depicts the life, death and afterlife of a 
French peasant woman, as “a seamlessly performed amalgam of conventional 
theater, narration, music, movement, and mime” that “fills the great space of the 
concert hall, not by appearing to reduce the hall’s dimensions but by expanding 
the imagination and the receptivity of the audience” (New York Times 9 August 
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1996).  In these summarizing remarks, Canby emphasized two aspects of 
Complicite’s work that are vital to my argument.  He emphasized the physical 
dimension of the performance by referencing its reliance upon movement and 
mime, and he noted the company’s primary achievement: “expanding the 
imagination and receptivity of the audience.” 
 In The Three Lives of Lucy Cabrol, seven actors play not only the 
numerous characters figuring in Berger’s story, but also a variety of animals, 
including horses, flocks of birds, and barnyard chickens.  The theatrical alchemy 
practiced by Complicite, however, is not limited to animate creatures.  I recall 
sequences when the actors represented earth as it was being plowed and even 
more remarkably, blueberry bushes as their fruit was picked.  As an actor 
representing a mountain peasant spoke briefly of picking blueberries, other 
actors seamlessly move into positions wherein their bodies formed a sort of 
bramble.  As the first actor “picked” the fruit, the “bushes “contracted and 
trembled in reaction to small violence of their denuding.  Moments later, bodies 
unfolded, and the “bushes” morphed again into the additional peasant characters 
now required by the narrative.  These transformations occurred with an exquisite 
fluidity. 
 The technique involved here is much more subtle and nuanced than 
simple mimetic representation.  Once a context is explicated, the actors contrive 
to form movement patterns with their bodies, sometimes individually and 
sometimes in coordination with each other, that somehow identify and conjure 
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one or more specific features or aspects of the thing being represented. Those 
features or aspects are expressed as physical impulses, readable by virtue of the 
context in which they are fashioned, and all the more marvelous for having been 
manufactured from a gesture or posture – or sometimes simply from the rhythm 
and dynamic of a movement sequence. The performance blurs any boundaries 
between acting and dancing, but unlike pure dance, never trades in abstractions. 
 For me, on my first experience of it, the work of Complicite seemed to 
represent an invigorating blend of the kind of physical theatre that I had 
previously observed in Europe, a theatre of actorly virtuosity and seemingly 
unlimited imagination, with a thoughtful and nuanced literary sensibility (Lucy 
Cabrol is adapted from and inspired by a novella by John Berger), and an 
engaging sense of humor that did not detract at all from the sheer theatrical 
power of the performance.  It was as if some theatrical gods had blended 
Meyerhold’s embrace of popular, virtuosic physical entertainment and Artaud’s 
insistence on the preeminence of theatrical spectacle, and I was artistically 
smitten. 
 Complicite returned to New York and the Lincoln Center Festival in 1998 
with a revival of its production of The Street of Crocodiles, and I was lucky 
enough to be in New York at that time.  I have described my reaction to that 
extraordinary production in an earlier chapter as one of powerful emotion and 
untrammeled awe.  I experienced a profound sense of empathy for the central 
character, even as I was marveling at the imaginative use of metaphor that 
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characterized Complicite’s work.  I was seized by wonder.  It was an experience 
that triggered many of the interests that now find expression in this writing. 
 Street of Crocodiles merges a theatrical adaptation of Bruno Schultz’s 
book of the same name with an account of Schultz’s life as a reclusive literary 
figure and a Polish Jew during World War II, culminating in his execution by his 
Nazi masters shortly before the war ended.  Schultz wrote astonishing stories 
whose imagery and incorporation of the fantastic anticipate magic realism.  The 
very beginning of Complicite’s production sets the tone.  As Joseph (the Schultz 
character) sorts books in a Gestapo library, his recollection of his family 
summons them forth from his imagination.  Characters arrive in improbable ways. 
One walks down an upstage wall perpendicular to the audience, his flying 
harness detectable only upon close scrutiny.  Another emerges wet and dripping 
from a bucket on the floor that disguises a trap door.  Others emerge from 
bookcases.  They all hold books.  As the play progresses, grounded only by 
Joseph’s imagination, the Complicite actors practice a technique of suggestive 
transformation.  Bird imagery is everywhere. A single feather flutters from a book 
held by Joseph.  Moments later, a party of bored dinner guests transforms, 
without benefit of costume change or lighting effect, into a flock of birds – and not 
just any birds, but clearly differentiated exotic varieties.  This is accomplished 
simply, by the manipulation of the actors’ bodies.  But props are employed 
transformationally as well.  Actors as birds lift wooden chairs above their heads, 
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and by virtue of the way they peer through the legs of the chairs, we understand 
immediately that they are now in a forest. 
         Ben Brantley wrote in his New York Times review of Complicite’s 
production: 
Shadow and substance bleed and intermingle, and even the 
most fixed-seeming forms refuse to hold onto their shapes. 
Bolts of fabric plummet from above to transform the stage 
into ever-shifting landscapes. A long row of weighty books 
leaps from a high shelf to undulate to the floor in the 
snakelike configurations of a Slinky toy. Uninhabited clothes 
appear as vividly alive as the animate actors. The members 
of a boredom-plagued dinner party metamorphose into a 
screeching flock of exotic birds. And don't even try to 
imagine what can happen to a simple block of wood. . . How, 
after all, do actors, trapped in the too, too solid flesh of 
human bodies capture a world view that insists, as one of 
Schulz's characters puts it, that ‘the migration of forms is the 
essence of life,’ a style that anticipates the magical realism 
of Borges and Gabriel Garcia Marquez?  (New York Times 
18 July 1998). 
The actors capture that world view by inhabiting a theatrical state that is defined 
by a constant and restless metamorphosis, where minimal props (a table, a stack 
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of books, a chair) are transformed to represent almost anything imaginable, 
where actors manipulate items of clothing like puppets, where suggestion and 
metaphor are accepted as the norm, and above all, where the actors’ own bodies 
seem not limited by physical law.  Jeremy Kingston, in his 1992 review in The 
Times, describes another moment of bird imagery, where the actors manipulate 
the leaves of books to suggest the movement of wings: “In true Complicite 
fashion, since Joseph's Father takes a mad delight in his aviary, the books 
become flapping birds, held aloft in the performers' hands. A flock of birds 
sweeps over the stage, sending Joseph in flight before them” (The Times 15 
August 1992). 
  In context, the actor and book as bird in flight image metaphorically 
references not only Joseph’s flight into literary fantasy, but also the flight from 
oppression of Poland’s Jews, clinging to vestiges of their intellectual tradition.   It 
was, for me, a strikingly original, highly theatrical, and deeply powerful metaphor 
that melded seamlessly with one of the thematic currents that informs the piece:  
that every aspect of the physical world is in flux, in a constantly shifting and 
morphing tango, led by a sometimes grim political reality, but partnered, by virtue 
of imagination, with the fantastic.  
 Complicite’s passionate political engagement enhances the metaphoric 
power of its work.  The Three Lives of Lucy Cabrol recounts the experiences of 
peasant life from a pronounced Marxist perspective, with a clear nod toward the 
heart-breaking inequities of class.  In the case of The Street of Crocodiles, Rush 
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Rehm points out that in representing the imaginative, fantasizing protagonist’s 
death by a single Nazi gunshot, “Complicite contrasts Schultz’s liberating 
animism, which transforms objects into living beings, with its fascistic opposite, a 
literal-mindedness that systematically converts humans into inanimate objects, 
ready for the ash heap” (1995: 95). 
 
Mnemonic 
 I attended two performances of Mnemonic in 2001.  It is a production 
whose very purpose, Ben Brantley observed in his New York Times review, was 
“to draw you into its world of seemingly endless empathy.”   It was a production 
that employed a formidable arsenal of technically complex imagery, yet as 
Brantley observes: 
Yet always at the center of this phantasmagoria is the solid 
flesh of the human body.  ‘What does nakedness remind us 
of?’ a woman’s voice asks.  We have already felt, if not 
articulated, the answer before the answer comes: ‘Seeing a 
naked body of any age we remember our own’ (New York 
Times 29 March 2001). 
In addition to its intentional evocation of empathy, Mnemonic is a vivid example 
of the ways in which Complicite creates and makes use of theatrical metaphors.  
It is a production that elicited from me a response of theatrical wonder.  A close 
examination of two representative moments in that production serves to 
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underscore how embodied metaphor perceived in an empathetic field relates to 
the generation of that wonder.   
 Mnemonic is a tightly constructed work in thirty-eight brief scenes, which 
explores the fragmented nature of memory, especially as it relates to identity; 
meditates about origins, especially within the context of European history; and 
investigates the chaotic structures of emotional need.  It accomplishes this while 
developing two narratives: the scientific attempts to account for the origins and 
movements of a five-thousand-year-old “Iceman,” whose body was discovered 
preserved in 1991 in the Italian/Austrian Alps – and the desperate efforts of a 
young woman to locate the father she never knew, long presumed dead, but now 
believed to be alive and somewhere in Europe.  Both narratives are filtered 
through a character, Virgil (played by director Simon McBurney), who is 
fascinated by the “Iceman” story and is also the despairing lover of the woman 
(Alice) who has left him to seek her father.  The play is performed by seven 
actors, all of whom, except McBurney, who plays only Virgil and the body of the 
Iceman, take on a dizzying assortment of characters.   
 The company lists a bibliography of several dozen works that were used 
as points of reference in developing Mnemonic.  But no discussion of its sources 
can capture the mise en scene of this production.  On one hand, the scenic 
elements are quite simple.  They consist of two translucent plastic curtains, a 
cleverly designed collapsing chair, a bed, a table, a television monitor, a stone, a 
sink and mirror unit, and an assortment of hand props.  These elements are 
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constantly transformed, however, both technologically (as when they become a 
surface for projections) and by actor manipulation (as when the chair becomes a 
puppet).  The lighting scheme is extremely complex, involving hundreds of cues, 
a variety of projections, haze and air-moving fans.  The sound design is similarly 
complex, involving seamless transitions between recorded and live amplified 
sound.  Again, there are scores of cues, ranging from simple voiceovers to dense 
sound collages.  Video, both live and recorded, is a frequent factor on the 
television monitor.  In its imaginative, theatrical use of video, Complicite evokes 
some of the groundbreaking work of The Wooster Group, but the unique aspects 
of Complicite’s work consist of the complex interweaving of scenography and the 
spoken word with the bodies of the actors.  They are constantly and expressively 
in motion – using movement techniques derived from mime, clowning and other 
forms of embodied theatrical expression.  There is always a remarkable precision 
and clarity to the images they create with their bodies, enabling the lightning 
quick transitions from scene to scene that we encounter in Mnemonic.  The 
images created by the bodies of the actors compliment and parallel images 
created in the spoken text.  In the context of this production, the bodies of these 
performers are transformed into metaphors in motion that demonstrate the 
connections between all of us and our ancestors, the connections between 
pursuit and flight, and the connections between emotional need and the need for 
survival. 
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 I want to scrutinize two segments of this performance, the beginning 
sequence and the end sequence, for the insights such scrutiny might yield about 
a calculated effort to evoke empathy, the use and impact of embodied metaphor, 
and the capacity of these production elements, acting in concert, to engender 
wonder.  And I want to consider how the Lecoq training received by founding 
members of the company may be manifested in these performance segments. 
McBurney and Complicite chose to begin this performance without the mask of 
character and by engaging the audience directly.8  I recall the opening of 
Mnemonic like this: 
 Simon McBurney (as himself) appears on a stage bare except for a 
wooden chair and a large rock, and addresses the audience with a microphone in 
a long and humorous monologue about the current status of research into the 
phenomenon of memory.  While explaining the science, he alludes to the chair as 
being full of memories, having belonged to his father, an archeologist, and being 
one that he has used as a prop in many plays.  He sits in it and it collapses.  He 
warns the audience to turn off their cell phones and then asks them to don the 
sleep mask and hold the leaf that has been placed under every seat in the 
auditorium.  The stage goes black, and he leads the audience in a memory 
exercise which culminates in an attempt, using the network of veins on the leaf, 
                                                 
8 Interestingly, the most recent effort of Complicite to be mounted in the United States, a co-production 
with the Japanese company, The Setagaya Public Theatre, entitled The Elephant Vanishes, also begins with 
a direct address to the audience by a Japanese “stage manager,” who informs the audience that technical 
problems have delayed the show.  We quickly realize that her announcement, salted with witty observations 
about the use of technology in theatre, is in fact the beginning of the show.  Here, as in Mnemonic, the 
audience has been directly engaged as a device to disrupt their expectations and render them more alertly 
open to the initial moments of the production.  A condition of complicity has been achieved. 
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to visualize an almost endlessly multiplying series of ancestors until as 
McBurney’s disembodied voice points out, everyone in the theatre is related to 
everyone else.  The audience is instructed to remove its blindfolds as lights come 
up, revealing McBurney in a different costume, now as the character Virgil, who 
like us is removing his blindfold and listening to the monologue of McBurney 
(now a recorded voice).  Virgil’s cell phone rings and embarrassed by the 
intrusion of the cell phone into the theatrical event, he “exits” from the theatre 
while talking to an unidentified man and trying to explain the monologue about 
memory. 
It is only as the next scene begins with scenic elements rushing onstage 
to represent Virgil’s residence, and we see him, again on the telephone, 
discussing the mysterious departure of his lover Alice, that the action proper of 
the play commences, but the first “scene” serves as a monologue that introduces 
many of the themes that will preoccupy us throughout the evening: the way that 
memory conditions the present, the mysterious ways that one phenomenon 
morphs into another, and awareness of the interconnectedness of humanity as a 
means of stimulating an empathetic and intersubjective response.  And in each 
case, the themes are served up with a nod to a self-conscious, highly physical 
theatricality, an aesthetic in which the actors’ bodies are foregrounded, and a 
ready sense of humor.  
 
The Influence of Lecoq 
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In the case of Complicite, a consistent emphasis upon the inventive, 
disciplined, and metaphoric use of the body as a staple of theatrical 
communication is clearly traceable to the Lecoq training that the founders of 
Complicite share.  Franc Chamberlain notes that Lecoq’s insistence on the body 
as the single foundation of all theatrical expression represents a direct rebuke to 
the Cartesian mindset that separates the body from the thinking process and 
continues to dominate Anglo-Saxon theatre.  “Lecoq says: ‘l’homme pense avec 
tout son corps’ [man thinks with his entire body] and this fundamental position 
means that when he seeks the initial point of movement he also seeks the 
impetus of thought and meaning” (11).   
 A more extensive review of some of Lecoq’s training principles and 
techniques reveals some of the ways in which his influence is made concrete in 
the work of Complicite.   Upon his death in 1999, the New York Times obituary 
described Jacques Lecoq as “an extraordinary teacher of mime,” but to reduce 
Lecoq training to the study of mime, even endowing mime with the most 
expansive of definitions, is to seriously misunderstand the breadth of his 
theatrical scope.  Simon McBurney, the artistic leader of Complicite, writes in his 
foreword to Lecoq’s Le Corps Poétique (published in English as The Moving 
Body):  “What he offered in his school was, in a word, preparation – of the body, 
of the voice, of the art of collaboration (of which theatre is the most extreme 
artistic representation) and of the imagination.  He was interested in creating a 
site to build on, not a finished edifice” (Lecoq ix). 
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Lecoq’s pedagogy certainly evolved over time, but it was always 
ambitious.  Leabhart reports that an undated flyer for the school listed the 
following areas of study: “sensitizing of the body to space; analysis of movement; 
the dynamism of forms and colors; an organic approach to words; sound 
transfers; the drama of constructed spaces; playing of passions, states and 
situations; gauge of the body; dynamic objects; spatial structures of the body; 
portable architecture; animation; masquodrome; video; projects” (92).  Such an 
expansive list of techniques and practices, many of which are described 
somewhat idiosyncratically, suggests a complex and bewildering curriculum.   
Lecoq, himself, however, has reduced his principal pedagogical concerns 
to two: improvisation and movement analysis.  Improvisation, for Lecoq, is a 
means to foster creativity and invention.  He is careful to distinguish creativity 
from expression.  Expression, for Lecoq, is an activity undertaken for the benefit 
of the actor doing the expressing.  Creativity, on the other hand, suggests a 
relationship between the actor and a group of spectators (Lecoq 18).  This focus 
on spectators and the world external to the actor is a central tenet of Lecoq’s 
pedagogy: “In my method of teaching I have always given priority to the external 
world over inner experience” (19).  This focus on the external world and the 
spectator is a significant feature of Complicite’s work and helps to account for the 
exuberant theatricality of that work – and, in turn, its capacity to engender 
wonder by consciously engaging the horizon of that spectator. 
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Movement analysis, for Lecoq, has to do with the dynamics of movement.  
“The laws of movement have to be understood on the basis of the human body in 
motion: balance, disequilibrium, opposition, alternation, composition, action, 
reaction.  These laws may all be discovered in the body of the spectator as well 
as in that of the actor. . . The audience forms a collective body which recognizes 
life, or the lack of it, in a performance” (21).  Lecoq’s conception of movement, 
and his focus on its dynamics, is broad enough to govern all theatrical 
circumstances.  He specifically refers to a piece of writing, for example, as a 
structure in motion (ibid).  Lecoq’s project was to create a theatre artist training 
regimen (he often observed that his techniques were intended for directors, 
writers, and designers, as well as actors) that emphasized an embodied form of 
creative expression that targeted the interest of spectators in a dynamic, 
physical, and constantly shifting theatrical context.  If the concept of movement is 
itself endowed with metaphoric properties sufficient to include writing (and 
virtually any other aspect of theatrical endeavor), it is not surprising that the 
application of the concept by Lecoq yielded a technique that was itself highly 
dependent on metaphor, as a rich semiotic bridge created between the body of 
the actor and the imagination of the spectator.  
In an insightful and nuanced consideration of Lecoq’s training principles, 
Simon Murray identifies three related qualities that are central to Lecoq’s notion 
of the artist who is prepared to be creative: le jeu, disponibilité, and complicité.  
He crudely translates these terms as “play or playfulness; openness or 
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availability; and rapport or a spirit of the ‘accomplice’” (2003: 65).  These 
principles serve as a necessary set of preconditions for the practical techniques 
used in Lecoq training.  I suggest that these principles are an integral part of 
Theatre de Complicite’s aesthetic, well represented in Mnemonic, and warrant 
consideration in some detail.  They comprise what Sauter would call the artistic 
elements of Complicite’s performances, the theatrical conventions and principles, 
the particular pleasures that help to constitute the horizon of a Complicite 
performance text that a spectator engages when she seeks to meld her own 
horizon in a fusion of understanding. 
 Play is a rather elastic term for Lecoq.  According to Murray, Lecoq 
defined play as the capacity of the actor, fully aware of his theatrical 
circumstances, to shape an improvisation for some spectators (ibid).  Play is 
therefore a handy category of theatrical activity that encompasses the concerns 
of Lecoq already mentioned.  But the concept of play as Lecoq uses it also 
suggests a high level of acquired technical proficiency and a sense of 
spontaneity or presentness.  Philippe Gaulier, who taught at Lecoq’s school 
before establishing his own training program, characterizes play as involving a 
sense of pleasure and lightness in the work that is quite unrelated to the genre or 
content of that work (66).  The pleasure of play is equally important in the 
performance of a tragedy as in a commedia-inspired romp, because it is 
concerned with the processes of theatrical creation in its broadest sense.  Lecoq, 
himself, in describing the course of study in his school, which included work 
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investigating clowning, commedia, and tragedy, is quite explicit in attributing the 
highest importance to play in his conception of theatrical invention: 
My method aims to promote the emergence of a theatre 
where the actor is playful.  It is a theatre of movement, but 
above all a theatre of the imagination.  In the course of the 
second year, we shall not just aim to see and recognize 
reality, but to imagine it, to give it body and form.  Our 
method is to approach the ‘territories of drama’ as if theatre 
were still to be invented (Lecoq 98). 
Certainly, in the performances of Complicite that I have attended, a sense of 
pleasure in and playfulness about the theatricality of the presentation is almost 
palpable.  In an earlier essay, Murray points out that “[p]lay is therefore a 
dynamic principle which informs the quality of interaction between performers 
and with their audience, but also opens up possibilities for action which can 
liberate the actor from the ‘literalness’ of the text and enrich it with  additional 
(physical and visual) meaning” (2002: 34).  In other words, Murray identifies the 
concept of play as one which is directly implicated in Lecoq’s insistence that the 
performer claim imaginative space of his or her own quite outside the restraints 
represented in more traditional theatre practice by the twin authorities of text and 
director.   
I want to expand Lecoq’s insistence on the value of play to argue that it 
also represents a circumstance conducive to wonder, but I need to make that 
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argument in the context of the other two aspects of Lecoq’s formulation of the 
triad of features necessary for creative theatricality: disponibilité, and complicité. 
While the word disponibilité resists precise translation, Lecoq uses it to suggest a 
state of openness and receptivity on the part of the performer, not in the sense of 
emotional availability, as might be emphasized in a program devoted to a 
Stanislavsky-based technique valuing psychological realism, but in the sense of 
being prepared to respond physically and imaginatively to whatever stimuli are 
present in the moment.  As always, for Lecoq, the answers to theatrical questions 
are to be found in a disciplined awareness and use of the body in motion (Murray 
70).  A performer in this disciplined state of readiness is primed to embrace the 
spontaneous and unpredictable, words not only descriptive of improvisational 
practice, but also directly implicated in the pursuit of innovation and originality. 
 The notion of complicité is equally important.  It is, of course, no accident 
that this word, implicated as it is in Lecoq’s pedagogy, was adopted by Theatre 
de Complicite as a company name.  (In English-speaking literature, the company 
has chosen not to use the accented “e” in the word complicité.) Complicite has 
discussed its use of the word in the program for The Three Lives of Lucy Cabrol 
as signaling a theatrical approach conceived as “a form of collusion between 
celebrants.”  Murray observes that this phrase reveals much not only about the 
working style of Complicite, but also something about the sense in which Lecoq 
used the word, involving both his high regard for ensemble as a fundamental 
form of theatre practice and the nature of the performer-spectator relationship. 
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Here, I sense, that collusion suggests something much more 
than the anodyne and neutral ‘working together’ or 
‘cooperation’.  There is something slightly dark and 
suspicious about the term, implying perhaps a landscape 
where rules and laws are transgressed, and where 
boundaries are extended – not for some wicked purpose, but 
in a spirit of shared, gleeful pleasure. . .  Here, too, we are 
led back to Lecoq’s fundamental belief in ‘the pleasure of 
play’ (71). 
Le jeu, disponibilité, and complicité are fundamental aspects of Lecoq’s 
understanding of the spirit of imaginative theatre, a province of disciplined 
playfulness, where the performer’s receptivity and technical flexibility are 
necessary precedents to the experience and a gleeful collusion between actor 
and audience is a result of that experience.  While these principles underscore 
Lecoq’s philosophical approach to theatre training and creation, his actual 
techniques are the means by which the principles are realized.  While his 
rigorous two-year training program  embraces a variety of practices and 
disciplines, two techniques seem especially important in understanding the work 
of a Lecoq-inspired company like Complicite: the neutral mask and the auto-
cours. 
 The neutral mask, in Lecoq practice, is a blank mask worn by the student 
in various exercises intended both to enable that student to experience the state 
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of neutrality prior to action and to lend greater emphasis to the expressiveness of 
the body (Lecoq 36-38).  A state of neutrality, according to Lecoq, is “a state of 
receptiveness to everything around us, with no inner conflict” (36).  It is a 
practical training tool in this sense that, in its encouragement of receptivity, is 
closely related to the principle of disponibilité and the capacity to play.  “Beneath 
the neutral mask the actor’s face disappears and his body becomes far more 
noticeable.  Talking to someone, you often look that person in the face.  With an 
actor wearing a neutral mask, you look at the whole body. . . Every movement is 
revealed as powerfully expressive” (38).  By emphasizing the body as the 
primary expressive instrument of the performer, work with the neutral mask is 
intended to empower the performer by elevating movement as a medium of 
expression to coequal status with the voice and the face. 
 The concept of neutrality is central to Lecoq’s work, and in the regular 
curriculum of his training program, many months are spent in its cultivation.  
Neutrality may be understood as an “energized awareness, which is pre-
expressive” (Martin 61).  That state of creative tension is the starting point for 
play, for the creation of character, and for all improvisation (ibid).  Murray 
comments that “wearing the neutral mask encourages students to find a pure 
economy of movement which is uncluttered by extraneous social patterns and 
habits, and which invites them to explore a sensual and physical relationship with 
the world and its matter” (73).  I believe the work with the neutral mask does 
something more.  By encouraging the unlimited expressive capacity of embodied 
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presence, the training empowers the performer and paves the way for the use of 
the body in constructing unusual metaphors.  By virtue of its implicit assertion of 
simplicity as a precursor to elaboration and complexity, it invites the spectator to 
supply meaning within the context for the movement that is otherwise supplied by 
the narrative.  It is a recipe for actively engaging the imagination of the audience 
in appreciating metaphor, as when a flapping book becomes the fluttering of 
wings, and therefore directly pertinent to the consideration of wonder. 
 Auto-cours is the term Lecoq applies to a ninety minute session, held each 
day, during which students work together in fashioning a performance based 
upon a theme suggested by faculty but without any direct supervision by faculty.  
The performance is presented to the entire school at the end of each week 
(Lecoq 91).  Unlike other exercises in the curriculum, which focus on 
improvisation and the individual actor, the work of the auto-cours emphasizes 
production, playwriting and intensive collaboration (ibid).  It is a structured way to 
deflect attention from the individual to the group.  “[T]he auto-cours quite rapidly 
leads to the emergence of different roles in the creative process: students 
discover strengths as directors, authors, actors” (94).  The centrality of this 
practice was instrumental in paving the way for Lecoq-inspired companies like 
Complicite to proceed with ensemble-derived work.  “Confidence bred from 
Lecoq’s weekly auto-cours fed the company’s founder members with a belief 
that, rather than having to rely on existing play scripts, they could collectively 
create their own texts for theatre” (Murray 97).   A question that arises from an 
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affinity for ensemble-derived work is whether that practice tends to foster the 
creation of more imaginative work that is somehow more conducive to the 
generation of wonder.   Mnemonic is such a creation. 
  
Mnemonic Continued 
Some of the ideas absorbed by McBurney (and other Complicite principals) while 
studying with Lecoq are very much in evidence during the opening sequence of 
Mnemonic that I described above.   There is a note of theatrical playfulness 
throughout, in the substantive content of McBurney’s opening monologue, in the 
comically collapsing chair, in the theatrical legerdemain that enables McBurney 
the actor to transform into Virgil the character listening to McBurney the actor, 
and in the gently induced participation of the audience.  This use of the audience 
actually recalls not only the playfulness that Lecoq theorized was central to the 
actor/spectator relationship, but also evokes the corollary principles of 
disponibilité and complicité.  Instructing the audience to don blindfolds and 
engage in memory exercises not only introduces an important theme; the 
blindfold aspect of the game also makes the audience receptive to the 
McBurney/Virgil transformation and, by implication, prepared for more theatrical 
fun.  Moreover, by addressing the audience directly, by enlisting its participation 
in an event, and finally by including it in an “in” joke about theatrical 
representation, McBurney and company have created circumstances of collusion 
with the audience and a complicity in all that is to follow. 
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 It is worth noting, too, that by depicting Virgil in a comically embarrassing 
light – as disrupting the performance with his cell phone – spectators are invited 
to appreciate his human failings and more pertinently perhaps, to identify with the 
character.  Who of us have not been embarrassed by an inappropriate noise for 
which we have been responsible?   This is an intentional tactic.  As the 
performance develops, it becomes clear that we are expected to empathize with 
Virgil.  Indeed, the operation of empathy becomes a recurrent preoccupation of 
the production. 
 The actor McBurney appears throughout Mnemonic as both Virgil, the 
central character, and also as the remains of the recently uncovered iceman, the 
investigation of which serves as the second primary narrative of the production.  
In both roles, McBurney is nude throughout most of the performance.  His body 
becomes a focal point in a broad spectrum of critical enterprises embedded in 
the play, especially in terms of marking identity and thinking about experience (in 
this case the similarities and differences in lived experience between Virgil and 
the Iceman).  This points to a significant dimension of the Complicite aesthetic. 
When we look at bodies – including our own – we see more 
than just flesh, hair, blood, muscles and so on.  We see 
personal biography, the marks of suffering or happiness, and 
the imprint of class, gender, race and all those other 
characteristics and dispositions that make us who we are.  
This is an insight – an understanding – that lies at the heart 
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of any theatre which chooses to foreground bodies, gestures 
and movement in its practice (Murray 39).   
But here, McBurney’s nakedness is part of a deliberate strategy to evoke 
empathy.  While Mnemonic is devised by Complicite from a large number of 
sources, as well as the improvisations of the company, special attention is 
focused on particular sources, including material written especially for the 
production by John Berger.9  In the published text of Mnemonic, for which the 
authorial credit is simply “devised by the company,” an appendix is included 
comprised of passages identified as source material that inspired and informed 
rehearsals.  One such passage is by Berger, written specifically for the 
production process. It reads, in part: 
Seeing a naked body of any age or either sex, we remember 
our own, and the contact of our own from birth onwards with 
other bodies.  Such contacts were tactile: they involved 
touching and being touched.  They were also metaphoric for 
they were a demonstration of the similitude of all human 
bodies.  Temperaments, imaginations, minds vary 
enormously.  Bodies vary too, but minimally.  Each body is 
unique – every mother knows that.  But all bodies have so 
                                                 
9 Berger’s novella The Three Lives of Lucy Cabrol was the primary source for Complicite’s earlier work of 
that name.  It is also interesting to note that Berger is the author of Ways of Seeing, a book about the 
perception of art that, among other things, offers a scathing political analysis of the way that the nude 
female figure has been exploited by males throughout art history.  In the passage written for Mnemonic, 
Berger has moved from consideration of the female body as a sexualized object to consideration of a 
gender-neutral body as a site of empathy. 
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much in common. More than we habitually remember until 
we see one naked, or until we deliberately touch one 
another.  The similitude, however, is not a conclusion but a 
starting point.  It is where empathy begins.  It is how one can 
put oneself in somebody else’s place (Mnemonic Appendix). 
Complicite’s strategy in pointedly invoking empathy is intended to support its 
thesis, articulated repeatedly in various ways throughout the production, that all 
humanity is bound together in an intricate web of relationships that occur not only 
in a contemporaneous global way but also through time.  This fundamental 
insight, first expressed overtly by McBurney at the beginning of the performance 
in the context of asking the audience to associate the veins of a leaf with their 
own ancestry, is expressed more theatrically in the final moments of the 
performance, in a movement sequence involving embodied metaphor that, for 
me at least, engendered a sense of wonder. 
 In the final scene of Mnemonic, Virgil stands naked imagining that he is in 
conversation with his absent lover.  As her image fades away, he stands alone 
and speaks in an echo of the passage Berger wrote for the company: 
There is nothing innocent about the naked.  Only the 
newborn are innocent.  Seeing a naked body of any age we 
remember our own.  Putting ourselves in someone else’s 
place, in the gully for example 5,000 years ago. 
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He climbs on the table evoking the dual image [of both Virgil 
and the Iceman] we have seen throughout the piece. . . The 
other cast members appear silently behind the table and 
hold up the metal frame of the Iceman’s refrigeration unit in 
front of them. . . we begin to understand they are looking at 
him not with mere ghoulish curiosity, not in horror, but with 
empathy (Mnemonic  71-72). 
The company then begins a sequence wherein, one by one, an actor slips under 
the frame and, rolling on to the table, takes the place of the “Iceman” who in turn 
moves back to the group.  This process becomes faster and faster until we see a 
dynamic process of bodies tumbling and rolling over each other, evoking a never-
ending cycle of generations succeeding each other.  This rapidly moving 
metaphor, composed of bodies in coordinated motion is rendered more abstract 
by a change in lighting, whereby the sequence becomes backlit and is seen in 
silhouette.  Finally, the sequence changes, and as the table glides offstage, the 
cast forms a straight line downstage. 
They lean forward as if about to take a step. Their 
silhouettes briefly evoke the photographs of Muybridge.10  
From standing they lean back as if assessing the size of a 
mountain in front of them.  Suddenly their heads snap 
sideways.  What have they seen?  The gully?  A parent?  
                                                 
10 Eadweard Muybridge was a pioneer of stop-action photography in the 19th century, who gained world-
wide fame for his studies of bodies in motion. 
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The future?  The audience now becomes aware of a huge 
projection of the Iceman, emerging on to the back plastic [a 
kind of cyclorama stretched across the upstage portion of 
the stage].  The company turns towards it.  They walk 
upstage towards the body of the Iceman.  Before they get 
there … (ellipses in original) 
Fade to black (73). 
On the two occasions that I saw performances of Mnemonic, on successive 
evenings, the audiences sat in stunned silence for several long moments, before 
bursting into appreciative and sustained applause.  
 
Engaging Wonder 
 On the first evening that I observed the performance, I was totally swept 
up in the imagery created by Complicite, and as I absorbed these final moments, 
that churning engine of humanity, I found myself experiencing a complex 
combination of emotion and delight, a real sense of the kinship I shared with the 
bodies on stage and all that they represented, and an intense pleasure 
occasioned by my appreciation of the artistry that had achieved the images to 
which I was responding.  I was seized by a moment of wonder.  On the occasion 
of the second night of performance, I was more detached, watching with 
analytical appreciation but with a significantly reduced emotional engagement.  
On this occasion, wonder was replaced with profound admiration.   
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 I have theorized that wonder is a phenomenon of theatrical reception in 
which the delighted or awed apprehension of a novel stage metaphor, especially 
one that is embodied, occurs within a field of empathetic or intersubjective 
exchange.  My experience on the first viewing of the end sequence of Mnemonic 
was entirely consistent with that theoretical speculation.  The specter of tumbling 
and rolling bodies, gradually increasing in tempo, as a metaphor for the evolution 
of humankind over time and an acknowledgment of its interrelatedness, was both 
playful and viscerally powerful.  I was delighted at its inventiveness and a little 
awed by the precision and physical virtuosity required for its execution.  Clearly 
the metaphor was composed (in a way that Jacque Lecoq would have enjoyed) 
of nothing more than actors’ bodies, contextualized by the meaning of the piece 
they had created and the effort of the spectator’s to supply meaning to it.  The 
company was self-consciously seeking to invoke empathy throughout the 
performance, initially by means of our identification with the Virgil character and 
eventually by virtue of the attitude of the company evinced in its final regard of 
the Iceman.  This is a clear example of the theatrical generation of wonder – for 
me.  
 I do not believe that critical sophistication is a necessary prerequisite for 
appreciating the techniques of Complicite.  Much of the company’s work is highly 
complicated.  In some ways, however, virtuosity in performance is recognized 
simply because its apparent difficulty is self-evident.  The broad appeal of the 
modern circus performer in a Cirque de Soleil performance, for example, is a 
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product of nifty production values, but also of the jaw-dropping acknowledgment 
on the part of spectators that the performers are capable of feats that the 
spectators cannot replicate.  It is the time-honored appreciation of the acrobat; in 
the context of theatrical performance, it is a vindication of Meyerhold’s insistence 
on the necessity of popular entertainment three quarters of a century ago; and it 
is an implicit recognition of the role of intersubjectivity in theatrical reception.   
 I believe that the power of Complicite’s final metaphor is amplified by 
virtue of its embodiment, that metaphors constructed from the human body have 
a particular impact as a result of that uniquely corporeal source.  This follows 
from a consideration of the nature of perception in circumstances when that 
perception is informed by a conscious desire to understand.  In other words, 
when consciousness is placed in the context of a hermeneutic project, the very 
operations of that project impart special potency to consciousness of embodied 
communication. 
 Merleau-Ponty asserted that “consciousness is being-towards-the-thing 
through the intermediary of the body” (138-139). He, in fact, “(re)claimed the 
centrality of the lived body and embodied experience as the very means and 
medium through which the world comes into being and is experienced” (Zarrilli 
2004: 655).  The essential embodiment of consciousness or perception has been 
well established in fields as various as neuroscience (see, for example, Antonio 
Damasio’s Descarte’s Error) and cognitive linguistics and philosophy (Lakoff and 
Johnson’s Philosophy in the Flesh).  These insights have been passionately 
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embraced by theatre theorists engaging performance from a phenomenological 
perspective. Stanton B. Garner, Jr. engages the perceptual complexity of 
regarding the body of the performer in a theatrical context.  For him, the body on 
stage is a complex amalgam of the actual (indisputably present, fully available to 
the senses of the spectator) and the fictional (functioning as a signifier of 
character, often in a constructed narrative).  Therefore, even before considering 
the implications of the focused, desiring gaze of the spectator, there is a layered 
ambiguity, a “twinness” to the phenomenon of the body presented for theatrical 
consumption. 
Considered one way, the actor’s body is eclipsed, 
denaturalized by the character’s fictional presence . . . But 
the body asserts a much more fundamental and intrusive 
actuality into the field of dramatic representation, an actuality 
that charges even verbal reflections (and evocations) of 
bodily presence.  A point of independent sentience, the body 
represents a rootedness in the biological present that 
always, to some extent, escapes transformation into the 
virtual realm (Garner 44). 
Even more than the inherent ambiguity of the actual and fictional body, the issue 
of theatrical perception is exponentially complicated by the dynamics of the 
relationship between audience and performer.  Phillip Zarrilli points to the 
  86 
complexity of a dynamic in which the actor’s own experience is necessarily part 
of a reception equation: 
The actor’s body, therefore, is dually present for the 
objective gaze and/or experience of an audience, and as a 
site of experience for the actor per se.  The actor’s body is a 
site through which representation as well as experience are 
generated for both self and other (2004:664). 
The spectator’s embodied gaze is entirely capable of being returned (at least 
theoretically) by the actor, from an entirely different site of experience, creating 
the conditions for an exchange of embodied perception.  This exchange, a 
necessary consequence of the proximity between audience and performer and 
the liveness of the performance, sets up conditions of intersubjectivity and has 
the capacity to alter the performance in any of the familiar ways that audience 
response impacts the actor. 
  Using Sauter’s description of the audience’s quest for meaning at a 
theatrical event as one in which the spectator’s contextual horizon must join the 
horizon of the text (or performance phenomenon) that the spectator is seeking to 
engage and understand, a theoretical accounting for the special power of 
embodied metaphor emerges.  The spectator, occupying the intersubjective field 
of embodied perception that is integral to theatrical watching, appreciates the 
artistic skills manifested in the inventive and virtuosic use of the body by a 
company like Complicite in an abstract way, but also there is an additional 
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dimension of appreciation flowing from the implied comparison of the events on 
stage with the spectator’s own physical capacities, the spectator’s own horizon of 
experience with respect to her/his own body.   
 This process may be described, too, in terms of a Ricoeur dialectic, 
transforming interpretation into a dynamic that engages both the distanciation of 
the performance text and the appropriation of that “text” by the spectator, where 
the tension between the spectator’s appropriation of the image of embodied 
possibility represented on stage and the distanciation that is a result of the 
spectator’s pre-existing knowledge of her/his own body and its limits yield a 
synthesized new level of understanding and therefore appreciation.  Put another 
way, in the intersubjective field that is theatrical reception, the appreciation of a 
performing body is conditioned by the tension between otherness and familiarity.  
We make reference to the knowledge of our own bodies to make aesthetic 
judgments about other bodies.  In Ricoeur’s understanding of intersubjectivity as 
a mechanism by which worlds are reconfigured and reimagined (Hahn 283), the 
embodied metaphor is elevated to a perceived phenomenon of unusual appeal.  
Perhaps this is why Bert O. States speculates that certain images distinguished 
by their corporeality and their capacity to be immediately absorbed by the senses 
occasion a response of delight (10), a response that I have related to wonder.  
Certainly, there was an element of delight in the reaction of the audience to the 
performance of Mnemonic, a reaction notable for its collectivity. 
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The Politics of Wonder 
I have speculated that there is, potentially at least, a progressive political value 
inherent in the production of wonder, a value associated with imagining a better 
world.  The humanist message of Mnemonic, emphasizing as it does the 
interconnectedness of all humanity, might seem to represent an example of that, 
especially if that message reverberates throughout a large portion of the 
audience, creating a fleeting moment of communitas, a utopian performative.   
In this momentary, mindful, present-tense “doing,” audiences 
and artists entangle themselves in each other’s longings, in 
an intangible but palpable connection of human beings, 
gathered somewhere, together.  Utopian performatives 
recognize the artfulness of the moment; they revel in the 
artifice of the theatrical with an emotional knowingness that 
insists that through feeling together, we are moved, and 
change might happen (Dolan 2004: 60). 
My own experience on the occasion of that first performance of Mnemonic was 
one of emotional recognition, of perceived possibility, and above all, of hope – 
hope for the theatre and hope for humanity. 
 There are critics, however, who remain skeptical about some of the 
political implications inherent in the company’s work, especially in a work like 
Mnemonic.    Janelle Reinelt, in an article exploring the place of performance in 
the struggle to determine the character and parameters of the “new Europe,” 
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engages Mnemonic and finds it wanting. She argues that much of the struggle for 
what it means to be European will be fought around issues of identity formation.  
In this context, she considers precisely the same climactic sequence in 
Mnemonic that I have described above, but she is troubled by the extent to which 
the image of actors substituting for the body of the Iceman makes a “’family of 
man’ statement, linking everyone in an image of sameness.  The problem is that 
white Europeans (for all the characters are white) represent all humans who are, 
it is implied, essentially similar in their travels, their struggles to survive, their 
bodiliness” (376).  Reinelt is accusing Complicite of embracing a universalism 
that fails to account for difference and otherness and is therefore, politically 
deficient, or at least suspect.  She is, in effect, branding Mnemonic as a humanist 
performance text that fails to adequately acknowledge diversity, multicultural 
perspectives and identity locations outside the largely male, Eurocentric world 
that is depicted therein. 
 The objections to claims of universality (and the humanistic philosophy 
that informs any articulation of the universal), so well established both in the 
academy and in progressive political thinking, have themselves been questioned 
recently by an impressive array of critics who are identified with progressive 
points of view.  The notion of collectivity, inherent in a humanistic perspective, is 
politically powerful, perhaps even necessary to meaningful political action in a 
world that attempts to reconcile discrete cultural locations with common 
problems.  George Lakoff, in his book Moral Politics for example, argues for a 
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metaphoric understanding of political rhetoric that rests upon claims of cross-
cultural universality in parenting archetypes.  Terry Eagleton has pointed out: 
“Hostility to the universal is scarcely bad news for those whose interests would 
be threatened by talk of human rights and connected global struggles” (20).  
Eagleton agues that “humanity has never been so forcibly united in the face of 
the same military, political, and ecological threats” (ibid).  Jill Dolan, in her work 
on utopian performatives, observes that “[t]he sympathetic connectedness we 
feel in performance . . . can provide ways back to each other, back to some 
productive rearticulation of a more radical humanism” (2004:15).  It seems to me 
that progressive visions of the world are increasingly embracing a perspective of 
the universal, especially with respect to human rights, if only as a tactic in moving 
an agenda that serves the broadest possible constituency.   
 Edward Said, in his last book Humanism and Democratic Criticism, 
launches an impassioned defense of humanism in literary criticism, while 
observing that “schooled in its abuses by the experience of Eurocentrism and 
empire, one could fashion a different kind of humanism that was cosmopolitan 
and text-and-language-bound in ways that absorbed the great lessons of the past 
. . . and still remain attuned to the emergent voices and currents of the present” 
(11).  For Said, the value of humanism is precisely in its capacity to move from 
the spheres of the private to the public, to engage humanity in its commonality.  
And while Said’s remarks are directed to the reception of literature, his insights 
are equally applicable to other forms of expression. 
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Humanism, I think, is the means, perhaps the consciousness 
we have for providing that kind of finally antinomian or 
oppositional analysis between the space of words and their 
various origins and deployments in physical and social 
space, from text to actualized site of either appropriation or 
resistance, to transmission, to reading and interpretation, 
from private to public, from silence to explication and 
utterance, and back again, as we encounter our own silence 
and mortality – all of it occurring in the world, on the ground 
of daily life and history and hopes, and the search for 
knowledge and justice, and then perhaps also for liberation 
(83). 
 It is interesting to note, in light of the importance that I have attributed to 
the influence on Complicite of Lecoq, that Lecoq, too, has been criticized for his 
embrace of the universal.  Indeed, his expressed intention, especially with regard 
to the use of the neutral mask, is to rediscover the “universal rules of theatre” 
(Murray  2003:156).  Murray acknowledges that Complicite shared with Lecoq  a 
propensity for invoking a spirit of universality, “an ethical preoccupation with the 
power of theatre to break down barriers, to act as a unifying force” (2003: 109).  
He describes Complicite’s work as representing a “fusion between the politics of 
internationalism and the politics of imagination” (ibid).   What a company like 
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Complicite has achieved in Mnemonic is a means of imagining a European 
experience more united by what it shares than splintered by its differences.    
 Reinelt, even while articulating her objections to the imagery of Mnemonic,  
eventually acknowledges that “while perhaps the content of the play is not very 
bold, the attempt to work with an epistemology of performance that uses feelings 
of recognition to piece together new linkages may be experientially powerful . . . 
the liberal humanism of Complicite, embedded in theatrical innovations of 
physicality and memory, may go some way to interconnect with a range of both 
popular and high cultural practices in the service of a more progressive image of 
a New Europe” (386).  In other words, the imaginative theatre practice of 
Complicite, coupled with feelings of empathy may produce something both 
powerful and progressive.  Robin Kelley writes that the best progressive social 
movements fulfill a function similar to great poetry, transporting us to a place 
where we can imagine a new society.  He calls that act of imagination “poetic 
knowledge” (21).  For me and for many in the audience of which I was a part, 
whose appreciative response was readily apparent, Theatre de Complicite in 
Mnemonic served up a generous helping of poetic knowledge.  The experience 
was both an affirmation of theatrical wonder and a gesture toward its importance 
as a political force.  
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Chapter Three 
Harry’s Way: Searching for Wonder in Retrospect 
  
 I have already discussed Meyerhold briefly in the context of his insights 
about audience reception and the extent to which he anticipated contemporary 
understandings of the performance event as an occasion in which the audience 
and its reaction “completes” the performance (Braun 256).  Meyerhold was much 
more than a performance theorist, of course; as a practitioner he helped to 
establish a production style of exuberant theatricality that offered an alternative to 
the illusionistic psychological realism championed by Stanislavsky. By example, 
he helped to establish the modern understanding of the director as an auteur.  In 
terms of my own work, he provided inspiration for a particular production that, in 
retrospect, represented my earliest effort to experiment consciously with both 
theatrical metaphor and empathy as discrete conceptual constructs.  My 
theatrical experiment had nothing to do with a hypothesized experience of 
theatrical wonder.  Rather, I was seeking a theatrical style that would create a 
sense of aesthetic and critical distance in my audience, even while entertaining it 
with the broadest of comedic flourishes.  In the process, however, I learned that 
certain elements in a theatrical event, especially excessive familiarity with a 
metaphor and a too-successful effort to alienate the audience, are impediments 
to the generation of theatrical wonder. 
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 In 1997, I mounted a production at Riverside Theatre in Iowa City of a new 
play by Keith Huff, entitled Harry’s Way, a disturbing yet genuinely funny black 
comedy about domestic violence, which mounted a critique of unconditional love. 
This production involved a directorially imposed style that rested upon an 
extended metaphor related to the traditional Punch and Judy puppet show and 
simultaneously explored the notion of invoking empathy for two characters who 
might ordinarily be dismissed respectively as reprehensible and pathetic.  In his 
discussion of typologies of mise-en-scène from a semiotic perspective Pavis 
describes a “theatricalized” mise-en-scène as one which “instead of imitating the 
real, the signs of performance insist on play and fiction, and an acceptance of the 
theater as fiction and convention; for example, the mise-en-scènes of Meyerhold” 
(212).  Harry’s Way was such a production; it self-consciously engaged 
Meyerhold’s idea of the “theatre of the grotesque” in that it embraced an 
exaggerated theatricality and used a style informed by my study of the commedia 
dell’arte.  It was a production that, for me as a director, marked an interest in a 
more flamboyant theatricality than my work had ever previously manifested.  I 
can recall few other productions in which I thought so actively and recurrently 
about audience reaction.  In a sense, it was the first instance in which I 
consciously used my practice to address theoretical issues, in this case, issues 
revolving around audience reception.  And it represented an odd combination of 
intuitive stabs about the implications of style coupled with a conscious attempt to 
marry one aspect of Brechtian theory to my practice, that of seeking intellectual 
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distance.  At the time, I had not conceived of theatrical wonder as a phenomenon 
that I could articulate and explore, yet, in retrospect, this production seemed to 
encapsulate many of the criteria I have associated with wonder.  
 
Theatrical Time Travel: Interrogating the Past 
 It is, of course, challenging to look back over a gulf of seven years to 
mount a retrospective analysis of an ephemeral production, particularly when my 
chosen method of analysis involves my own insights as a participant observer.  I 
must access those insights by means of a process of remembering.  It is possible 
in part because of the availability of a video record of the production, along with 
various press clippings and other written documents.  It is possible because I am 
able still to consult with many of the participants.  But it is possible especially, 
because my recollection of the production, the conceptual birthing of the 
production, and the rehearsal process is unusually vivid.  In part, this is because 
of my affection for and attachment to this production as a risky but generally 
successful theatrical enterprise.11  In part, it is because every step of the process 
was articulated to an unusual degree among my collaborators and 
communicated to various people, including the public at large, outside the 
ordinary circuits of production conversation.  For these and various other 
reasons, I recall the process of creating this work with greater clarity than any 
number of plays I have directed in more recent years.  I am cautious, however, 
                                                 
11 By generally successful, I mean that at least portions of its audiences seemed to receive the production in 
the manner that I had intended.  I am not measuring success in this case either by the critical response, 
which was quite positive, nor the box office proceeds, which were somewhat disappointing. 
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about claiming too much veracity for my recollection.  I am exquisitely aware that 
memory is an unstable and uncertain domain, characterized by a process of 
selection and reconstruction.  I offer these caveats in advance, lest some of my 
descriptions seem too unequivocal.  Yet I am also mindful that memory is an 
inextricable part of all perception, including that which is contemporaneous.  
Henri Bergson, anticipating phenomenological analysis, wrote that “there is no 
perception which is not full of memories.  With the immediate and present data of 
our senses we mingle a thousand details out of our past experience” (24).  Much 
of my present thinking about theatrical wonder is flecked with memories about 
Harry’s Way.   Like much of the theoretical technique used throughout this 
project, and like the hermeneutic process described by Paul Ricoeur, memory 
represents a negotiation between distancing and embracing, between cognitive 
and affective relationship with various “facts” summoned for critical consideration.  
If memory has value, it is a value achieved through a dialectical process that is 
similar to that which seeks understanding, a fusion of that which is recalled with 
that which is understood in the present.  The tension between past and present is 
not the only manifestation of a serious duality in my conceptual spectrum. 
 My effort to theorize about this production is an attempt to achieve what 
Bert O. States called “binocular vision,” a perspective on theatre analysis that 
investigates the complimentarity of semiotics and phenomenology, that marries a 
capacity to see the world significatively and referentially with a capacity to see 
the world (or the theatrical event) phenomenally, as a holistic, embodied, and, 
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therefore, highly personal experience (1985: 8).  Stanton B. Garner cites this 
synthesized approach to theatrical analysis with approval, arguing that the 
phenomenological critic, by virtue of this dual perspective, can “maintain broader 
awareness of signification as the essential other dimension of the perceptual 
object” (15).  Both States and Garner suggest that the theoretical dialectic 
represented by a phenomenological approach that nevertheless acknowledges 
the place of the sign presents the possibility of engaging the theatre event as an 
embodied communicative experience that engages the artist and spectator both 
in a complex transaction, the study of which can make productive, dialogic use of 
a range of theoretical projects.  I approach Harry’s Way through my own 
experiential lens and also through an analysis of the ways in which its system of 
signs were interpreted. 
 As I look back upon the experience of Harry’s Way, and especially upon 
my own observations of audience reaction, I find myself concluding that, for most 
spectators, despite various pleasures and values that might have been 
generated by their engagement with this production, theatrical wonder was not 
among them.  The reasons why I think this is true, however, suggest a further 
refinement of what criteria are necessary to create or evoke wonder.   Bernard 
Beckerman, in his Theatrical Presentation: Performer, Audience and Act, 
distinguishes between simple and complex responses by the audience.  Simple 
responses are not ambivalent.  They can be intense, even overpowering, but 
they are single in effect.  Complex responses, on the other hand, may be 
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understood as “the simultaneous experiencing of two contradictory simple 
responses.  Instead of being overpowered by emotion, feeling may be tentative, 
subject to qualification, contingent and unresolved” (74).  In Beckerman’s sense 
of the phrase, I believe that theatrical wonder is a simple response to an image in 
an empathetic field, a sense of awe or delight that is unified and not qualified by 
various contingencies.  
 States takes up the notion of delight in a way that is directly pertinent to 
me here.  Describing the quality of delight as a kind of “wrappedness in the 
image” that occasions the reaction, States writes that “there is a playful tug-of-
war in the image between the useful and the delightful.  Usefulness implies the 
image’s transitivity, its sign-ness, or convertibility into social, moral, or 
educational energy; delight implies its ‘corporeality’ and the immediate absorption 
by the senses” (1985: 10).  In Harry’s Way, the usefulness of my imagery 
overwhelmed the corporeality to which States makes reference. 
 I will argue that a metaphor of unusual duration and constant perceptual 
presence, especially one that is sustained during the entire duration of the 
production, like that in Harry’s Way, generates both a complexity of response and 
a kind of familiarity on the part of the audience that tends to undermine the sense 
of discovery and delight that other more limited metaphors generate.  The 
absence of delight and the absence of discovery are impediments to wonder.  
Moreover, I believe that the aesthetic distance sought and achieved in this highly 
stylized production, in order to facilitate a consideration by the audience of the 
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ideas of the play, made an empathetic response to reprehensible characters less 
likely, and, therefore, undermined the empathetic field that is a necessary 
condition for the generation of wonder. 
 
A Production is Conceived: Channeling Mr. Punch 
 Keith Huff wrote the first draft of Harry’s Way in 1992.  It was substantially 
revised in 1994, and that version of the play served as the foundation for the 
production we undertook at Riverside Theatre in 1997.  Harry’s Way is a dark 
comedy with a quirky theatrical sensibility, which uses a plot revolving around the 
circumstances of domestic violence in a particular marriage to probe the limits of 
rationality and the liabilities of unconditional love.  It also offers a scathingly 
satirical view of the inept attempts by various social agencies and social actors to 
interrupt, punish, or publicize the abuse depicted in the play.  Harry’s Way charts, 
in unflinchingly humorous terms, the painful marriage of Harry and Harriet 
Caliban12.  Harry is a brute, a self-absorbed man prone to the physical and 
psychological abuse of his wife, whose compliant behavior tends to enable 
Harry’s darker impulses.  She is unabashedly portrayed as a somewhat hapless 
victim, both of Harry’s brutality and of her own unwillingness to take any steps to 
protect herself from his abuse, despite the varied efforts of those representatives 
of the larger social world, and even Harry’s own brother, to offer interventions 
                                                 
12 Harry’ s surname is an intentional reference to Shakespeare’ s famous “man-monster” in Tempest and a 
gesture toward semiotic signification.  As Marvin Carlson points out: “In the highly concentrated narrative 
world of the drama, the names given to characters potentially provide a powerful communicative device for 
the dramatist seeking to orient his audience as quickly as possible in his fictive world” (1990: 26). 
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that might alleviate her dire circumstances.  In this three-actor play, the actors 
playing Harry and Harriet are joined by an actor designated as “The Other,” who 
morphs into the various other comedic incarnations of the people (of all 
descriptions and genders) who enter Harry’s and Harriet’s lives: a doctor, a 
priest, a domestic abuse activist, a psychiatrist, a parole officer, Harry’s brother, 
a crusading journalist, and Harry’s mother.  The play is uncompromising in its 
insistence that Harriet loves Harry.  Even at the conclusion of the play, in one of 
its most disturbing moments, after Harriet has shot and killed Harry, she is prone 
to romantic and ambivalent daydreams about him.  
 Keith and I were graduate students together at the University of Iowa, 
where I had directed a number of his plays.  We were also (and remain) close 
friends.  Both of us had had active professional lives in the theatre before 
entering Iowa’s MFA program, and Keith had experienced considerable success 
as an emerging playwright, having had four or five of his scripts produced at well-
known regional theatres.  While we were in school, Harry’s Way had received 
concrete expressions of interest by several notable theatres.  It had received a 
major reading at the Public Theater in New York and an extended developmental 
workshop by the New York Theatre Workshop.  Yet despite the oft-expressed 
admiration for the play, these and other theatres had ultimately declined to 
produce it.  I was convinced that these theatres were dissuaded from production 
because the play was politically unpalatable, in that it required its audiences to 
laugh at the brutality of this marriage and appreciate Harriet’s inexplicable 
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affection for Harry.  I believed that for the play to work well, spectators needed 
some kind of aesthetic distance that would activate the comedy of the play.  They 
also needed to empathize with Harriet not only to the extent that they could 
appreciate her pain, but also to the extent that they could appreciate her illogical 
love for Harry.  For me, the play was deeply provocative and deserving of 
production. 
 By that time, I had begun my long directorial association with Riverside 
Theatre in Iowa City, and I approached its artistic directors about producing the 
play, promising that I would be sensitive to its political pitfalls and take 
appropriate steps to use the production as a platform for a community dialogue 
about the issues raised within it.  They agreed to produce the play in their 
1996/1997 season. 
 We all expected the play to be controversial.  For obvious reasons, 
domestic violence is not usually seen as fodder for comedy.  Iowa City audiences 
tend to be well-informed, actively political, and generally devoted to progressive 
causes, and if we created the impression that we were insensitive to the plight of 
battered women, critical reaction was likely to be vocal, passionate and 
condemnatory.  We were, of course, not embarking on this project to affirm our 
lack of sensitivity.  Committed to seeking a way of simultaneously honoring the 
script and avoiding the trivialization of its subject matter, I sought the participation 
of some professional counselors from the Domestic Violence Intervention Project 
(DVIP), a local women’s shelter.  After reading the script, the DVIP staff 
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professed considerable skepticism about the tone of the play and its attempt to 
find humor in a situation that they dealt with on a daily basis with the utmost 
seriousness, but they agreed to consult with me about the issues presented in 
the play and to participate in several public discussions that were scheduled to 
follow performances. 
  Along with my primary collaborators, especially my scenic and lighting 
designer, Bryon Winn, and my costume designer, Margaret Wenk, I struggled 
with the task of finding a way to present the play in such a way that the humor 
could survive the repellent behavior depicted, a task which required preserving 
the possibility of finding Harry entertaining in some way, and allowing the ideas of 
the play to surface for an audience.  As I studied the script, I became aware of an 
apparent analogy between the character Harry and the popular British puppet 
Punch of Punch and Judy fame.  While the story of Punch has been interpreted 
and reinterpreted over several centuries, the basics of his story have remained 
remarkably consistent (Bell 2000: 22).  The correlations between Harry and 
Punch were striking.  Like Punch, Harry was a brute who beat his wife.  As in 
Harry’s Way, in the most traditional Punch and Judy scenarios, various outsiders 
sought to intervene in Punch’s life (a constable, a magistrate, eventually Satan 
himself).  In the typical Punch and Judy scenario, Punch in a fit of temper, tosses 
his infant child out a window.  In Harry’s Way, Harry is accused of causing Harriet 
to miscarry.  Punch is usually depicted as carrying a slapstick cudgel; Harry is 
fond of carrying (somewhat inexplicably) a big stick.  The correlations between 
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Harry and Punch were truly striking, all the more so because Keith maintained 
not only that he did not intend any such comparison, but that he was generally 
unfamiliar with the specifics of Punch and Judy performance traditions. 
 As I thought about Punch and his centuries old popularity, certain notions 
became especially prominent.  Part of Punch’s popularity seemed to relate to the 
indomitability of his spirit and his class position, that as an everyman of sorts, or 
at least a representative of the common man, he was resistant to (in fact, defiant 
of) authority figures who sought to control him.  He has functioned in the popular 
imagination as a kind of endearing icon of anarchy.  Above all, he was a puppet, 
as were his victims and his antagonists, metaphoric and signifying nods to 
humanity but sufficiently removed from the realm of the actually human so as to 
render his behavior amusing rather than disgusting.  We can laugh at Punch 
because he is not real, and nothing about the circumstances of his performance 
suggests reality other than the anthropomorphic form of the puppets.  But can a 
puppet stand for something more than amusement?  Something more politicized 
or implicated in a social dialogue?  The Bread and Puppet Theater, as just one 
example, has been described as a “complex mix of avant-garde forms, political 
ideals, populist aspirations, and a definite desire to present an alternative to 
mass-media, capitalist culture” (Bell 2001: 56).  The artistic leader of Bread and 
Puppet, Peter Schumann, has suggested, with his tongue only partially in his 
cheek, that puppets are subversive ‘[b]ecause the meaning of everything is so 
ordained and in collaboration with the general sense of everything, and they, 
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being only puppets, are not obliged to this sense and instead take delight in the 
opposite sense, which is the sense of donkeys confronting the existing 
transportation system” (49). 
 I became more and more accustomed to thinking of Harry as Punch.  I did 
not think deeply then about the implications of treating the characters of the play 
as performing objects.  It is only in retrospect, as I think about the ramifications of 
embodied performance, that I recognize some of the liabilities of this conceptual 
strategy.  I will take up a consideration of how the objectification of these 
characters may have simultaneously elevated the importance of metaphor even 
while sabotaging the likelihood of generating a significant empathetic 
engagement by the audience later in this chapter.  At the time, however, the 
puppet show metaphor was irresistible. 
 Eventually, with the cheerfully trusting acquiescence of the playwright, I 
conceived the play as a human Punch and Judy Show; a tactic which I believed 
would create enough aesthetic distance for the audience to allow a consideration 
of the play without a knee jerk reaction of revulsion and rejection.  The concept 
ultimately informed not only the style of performance – but also the scenographic 
and costume design of the show.   
 My research into the Punch and Judy tradition inevitably led me to general 
research about the commedia dell’arte.  Indeed, the puppet show, by the late 
nineteenth century, was probably the last residual manifestation of the commedia 
dell’arte (Segal, Harold 40).  The character Punch is derived from the mask of 
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Pulcinella (Bell 18), one of the servant zanni whose antics gave to the commedia 
dell’arte its distinctive exaggerated comedic character.  Somehow, I made the 
leap from Punch to the grotesque theatricality of Meyerhold, especially in 
productions like The Fairground Booth (which I will discuss below), and the 
combination of these two sources guided all our production plans. 
 Both Bryon Winn, my scenographer, and Margaret Wenk, my costume 
designer, embraced the idea of a puppet show, but after a great deal of 
discussion, we collectively determined not to realize the metaphor literally.  
Instead, we chose to create a theatrical environment that gestured to Punch and 
Judy, but also to the commedia tradition from which it sprang, along with the 
overt theatricality and aesthetics of a vaudeville show.  After much discussion 
with the playwright and the design team, we settled on three different ways of 
creating that environment.  Merleau-Ponty argues for a unified understanding of 
sensory perception.  We were seeking a multi-faceted evocation of our 
metaphoric concept that would engage spectators on a terrain of both visual and 
aural stimuli, an environment that blended information without need for 
explanation.  “The senses translate each other without any need of an 
interpreter, and are mutually comprehensible without the intervention of any idea” 
(Merleau-Ponty 235).  
 First, with regard to scenic design, Bryon created a whimsical box of a set, 
painted in vibrant, pink and blue child-like colors, that was reminiscent of a 
puppet theatre. The flats that composed it were only eight feet high so as to 
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reinforce a diminutive, playhouse like quality.  The only furnishings were a table 
and two chairs, in the same pink and blue palette, all constructed in larger-than-
life proportions.  The effect of the furniture was to reduce the actors, making 
them seem somehow more constructed and doll-like.  Built into one stage left flat 
was the door to a sort of cupboard.  Any and all props required by the actors 
magically appeared in this cupboard whenever they were needed.  The props 
themselves were selected or built to suggest a sense of whimsy.  The rifle which 
figures prominently in the second half of the play, for example, was a wooden toy 
gun, painted in the same vivid colors as the set.  Other props, a recurring 
Twinkie, for example, was outlandishly oversized and rigged to spurt a cream-like 
substance (shaving cream) when squeezed.  Bryon’s lighting scheme included 
the use of a follow-spot and footlights, both intended to reaffirm the overt 
theatricality and vaudevillian sensibility of the production. 
 Second, Margaret’s costume design reflected the various influences that 
informed the production concept as well.  Harry and Harriet wore exaggerated 
makeup that suggested a clown-like sensibility without resorting to the literalness 
of whiteface.  Their costumes were brightly colored and exaggerated.  When 
Harry was incarcerated, for example, he wore a comical, striped prison uniform.  
Harriet’s basic costume featured a harlequin-inspired diamond pattern on a short 
dress worn with tights.  Margaret’s most inspired work though was reserved for 
the various characters played by the third actor identified as the Other.  Some of 
these costumes included masks as an intentional nod to our commedia dell’arte 
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inspiration, but these were masks that typically were worn on the side of the 
actor’s head so that the audience was able to see his own features, but in profile, 
he revealed a different face.  Some of the characters had surreal touches.  The 
character of Lydia, who was the representative of an organization that (ineptly) 
championed battered women, not only wore a profile mask, but sported a 
business suit that included a third breast on her right shoulder.  The appearance 
of these characters often produced laughter in production before they opened 
their mouths. 
 The third environmental aspect of the production represented an even 
more radical departure from the script.  Early on, I had determined that sound 
would play an important role in this production.  I envisioned not only transitional 
music of a type consistent with the production concept to move from scene to 
scene, I had embraced the idea of using sound to punctuate comic moments, 
especially moments of physical or slapstick humor.  I envisioned literally scores 
of these sound cues.  After some discussion with Keith, we decided to add what 
amounted to a fourth performer, an actor who would always be visible to the 
audience (and selectively to the other characters) through a scrim at the upstage 
center portion of the set.  This performer, played by Sean Williams, provided all 
the sound effects live, using a keyboard synthesizer, and a generous assortment 
of sound and noise-making devices that ranged from slide whistles and horns to 
rattles and maracas.  He never spoke, though he sang both at the beginning and 
the end of the show.  The process of working these sound cues into the 
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production was exacting.  I had scored the script to indicate each placement of 
an effect.  On each of those occasions, we had to select or devise an appropriate 
sound and then rehearse it with the actors so that we could achieve a seamless 
precision that would not interrupt the flow of the action.  At the beginning of the 
show, before we began the scripted portion of it, Sean appeared looming over 
the top of the upstage flat to sing a broadly comic version of “I’m Just Wild About 
Harry.”  His appearance looming over the set created an impression of him as a 
sort of puppet master, fixing our initial metaphor in the minds of our audiences.  
(At the conclusion of the show, he would reprise this song, now sung in a slower, 
more reflective, even mournful tone.) 
 The net impact of these production elements established a sense of 
whimsical theatricality and called forth our puppet theatre/vaudeville show 
metaphor with considerable clarity.  These ideas were carried over into the actual 
style of performance.   
 
The Production: Shades of Meyerhold 
 I assembled a cast that I thought would be flexible and technically skilled 
enough to undertake the kind of production I envisioned.  As Harry, I cast Dato 
Bakhtadze, an MFA candidate at the University of Iowa’s acting program, who 
had traveled to Iowa City from the Republic of Georgia to pursue his education.  
Dato was a skilled performer, trained in Georgia in a program that emphasized 
physical acting and specifically acknowledged a link to Meyerhold’s training 
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techniques.  He is a charming, burly man, who I thought might find a likeable side 
to Harry.  Dato’s casting represented something of a gamble in that his accent 
(which, of course, was read by most people as Russian) was so thick I was 
concerned about his intelligibility.  As Harriet, I cast a Los Angeles actor, Mary 
Sullivan, with whom I had worked several times before.  I knew her to be highly 
methodical and competent, though her training and background were exclusively 
in a psychologically based realistic acting style.  For the challenging role of the 
Other, I cast Stephen Thorne, another graduate actor from the University of Iowa 
with exceptional comedic skills and a knack for making bold choices that I 
thought would serve the daunting task of creating the eight broad 
characterizations that the script required.  
 I was especially interested in working with my actors to achieve 
performances that were resistant to easy categorization.  In exploring the 
relationship between actor and audience phenomenologically, Bert O. States 
describes three pronominal modes by which the actor may address an audience: 
the self-expressive mode (characterized by the pronoun “I,” or the actor); the 
collaborative mode (associated with the pronoun “you,” referencing the 
audience); and the representational mode (using the pronoun “he,” gesturing 
toward the character) (160).  While I had not read States at the time I directed 
Harry’s Way, his description of these three modes of acting captures the 
complexity of what I was seeking in performance.  In the self-expressive mode, 
the actor seems to be performing on his own behalf, to demonstrate that of which 
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he is capable (161).  In the context of this production, I associate that mode with 
an essential aspect of the commedia-like performance values I hoped to achieve: 
expressions of technical skill and performative virtuosity that were entertaining in 
their own right, moments in performance that called attention to the individual 
skill of the actor.13   
 The collaborative mode is one in which the actor uses some form of the 
“you” address with respect to the audience; it is both an overt acknowledgement 
of the presence of the audience and a presumption that the audience is 
somehow complicit in forging a collective response to events on stage (170).14   
There were already moments in the script when actors made comic asides to the 
audience, but I had discussed with the playwright my intention to create more of 
these moments.  At the time, I was primarily interested in cementing the 
theatrical style of the piece by ignoring the fourth wall and subverting any vestige 
of naturalism.  In retrospect, however, I recognize that this impulse could also 
have had significant effect with regard to the way that the audience engaged 
these characters, especially Harry and Harriet.  The use of the technique set up a 
condition of the dialogic confirmation and mutuality of awareness that I have 
argued is associated with intersubjectivity.  Without being able to theorize it at the 
                                                 
13 I want to emphasize that my appropriation (or imitation) of commedia techniques was limited to 
performance style.  I made no attempt to depict the characters of Harry’s Way as the stock characters so 
well associated with commedia traditions. 
14 States argues that this is a form of address typically present in comedy and melodrama, but absent in 
tragedy, which he characterizes as a non-collaborative form that “ creates an empathic experience wherein 
we are dissolved in what could be called a magnificent loneliness . . . What the audience shares in such 
moments, and in the play at large, is less important than what isolates each spectator in the experience”  
(171).  I disagree with his implication that a collaborative form is not likely to create an empathic 
experience, but I will return to his insights about tragedy in the chapter on Edward Albee’ s The Goat, or 
Who is Sylvia? 
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time, I had intuitively stumbled into a strategy for trying to create theatrical 
circumstances that might elicit empathy for characters who might otherwise be 
seen as repulsive or (in Harriet’s case) pathetic.  As I will discuss, I had not 
considered the complication of objectifying the characters, by virtue of their 
association with puppets, as it related to the generation of empathy. 
 The representational mode is, in State’s formulation, closely aligned to the 
narrativity of most theatre, “the shared sense that we come to the theater 
primarily to see a play, not a performance” (181).  It is the dramatic key of 
theatrical presentation that enables the actor to become a character in order to 
tell a story.  This is, of course, the mode that most clearly corresponds to 
methods of acting that involve mimesis and to our most commonplace 
assumptions about the embodiment of character.  States observes that in 
practice, these distinctions of acting modes are not as neatly discrete as their 
definitional elaboration.  Acting is a processual undertaking in which these 
various modes may melt into a perceptual synthesis.  Certainly, as I approached 
the beginnings of rehearsal for Harry’s Way, I envisioned performances that 
would meld these various distinctions into an appetizing performative stew. 
 I attempted to apply much of my commedia and Meyerhold research in 
rehearsal, seeking a broad comic and frankly theatrical style of acting.  We 
worked improvisationally with wildly exaggerated mask exercises.  We spent 
days exploring the physical performance of stereotypical characters without 
dialogue, fashioning a comically distorted dream ballet with the assistance of 
  112 
choreographer Mauria Brough.  We developed comic and acrobatic combat 
sequences punctuated by whimsical sound effects and outrageous lazzi (the bits 
of comic business associated with commedia techniques) - ranging from a cake 
glued to a platter that could be inverted to an oversized ejaculating Twinkie.  And 
even though I was hardly breaking new ground (in fact, I was following a well 
documented and historicized modernist, avant-garde trajectory), the work was a 
practical revelation to me.  It had a spontaneity and unabashed theatricality that 
entertained even while broaching the most sensitive subject matter.  I hoped that 
the audience (at least in large part) would be seduced into deferring judgment 
long enough to consider the ideas embedded in the play.  For me, the rehearsal 
experience forged a deep respect for commedia techniques, not simply as a 
fascinating bit of theatrical history, but as a vital means of evoking the very 
essence of theatricality with highly contemporary applications. 
 While the specific origins of the commedia dell’arte in sixteenth century 
Italy remain obscure, historians agree that the first clear reference to a commedia 
performance is in 1568 (Brockett 143).  During the next two centuries, Italian 
commedia troupes performed throughout Europe, many of them achieving 
considerable fame.  Wherever they went, these troupes left a vibrant theatrical 
legacy, influencing native actors and writers (148).  The prominent features of 
commedia practice during its most popular period are readily identifiable.  They 
include the use of virtuoso improvisation, well-cultivated stock characters whose 
masked performance emphasized movement, and inspired comic business.  
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Historically, the commedia dell’arte is also notable as an example of the rising 
professionalism of actors in Europe and as an institution that helped to 
popularize the appearance of women on stage.  None of these features in and of 
themselves, however, account for the intense resurgence of interest in commedia 
by artists in the twentieth century.   
Although some nineteenth century dramatists, artists, 
composers and writers had been drawn to commedia 
characters and images, at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, almost simultaneously, an astonishingly diverse 
group of playwrights, actors, directors, and designers 
rediscovered the art of commedia in ways that would 
permanently change the modern theatre.  Luigi Pirandello, 
Edward Gordon Craig, Vsevolod Meyerhold, Max Reinhardt, 
and Jacques Copeau, among many others, sought liberation 
from the pervasiveness of Realism, as well as the stale 
remnants of elaborate spectacles, overwrought melodramas 
and artificial acting styles of the previous century (Fisher 10). 
There is certainly no universally held conception of commedia that informs all of 
the artists cited by Fisher.  Indeed, each of them appropriated different aspects of 
commedia (and to different extents) in their own work.  What remains 
extraordinary, however, is that such a diverse group of artists could produce such 
a diverse creative output while acknowledging a common influence.  A potential 
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explanation of that phenomenon requires a more searching analysis of the 
commedia spirit.  Martin Green and John Swan argue in The Triumph of Pierrot 
(1986) that there is something about the moods and tone of commedia, a 
recognition of the essential duality of life, that was especially resonant in the 
early part of the twentieth century, a time when the imagery and associations of 
commedia characters were especially appealing to the imaginations of modernist 
artists.  “These moods can all be described as consciously brittle.  They include 
both gaiety and sadness, both exhilaration and terror, depending on the aspect of 
life encountered; but all commedia moods are characterized by a readiness for 
reversal, an insecurity about their source, a moral self doubt – by a sense of the 
artifice of all emotion” (xiii).   
  I believe that in focusing on the propensity of commedia to embrace 
duality (love and hatred, humor and despair, certainty and doubt) in a self-
consciously and exuberantly theatrical manner, Green and Swan have identified 
precisely those qualities of commedia which informed my own production of 
Harry’s Way.  Moreover, they are the qualities which inspired Meyerhold in his 
modernist attempt to overcome realism with something more vital. 
  Meyerhold was not the first twentieth century Russian artist to make use of 
the commedia dell’arte.  Stravinsky made use of the commedia derived character 
Petrushka (a Russian variant of Pedrolino) in his ballet of the same name in 
1910.  “However, the major stimuli toward the use of commedia dell’arte in 
Russia in the early twentieth century came from abroad, for native sources did 
  115 
not offer the rich variety of motifs, plots, images and masks that could be found 
elsewhere” (Pietropaulo 117).  Leoncavallo’s I Pagliacci was performed in Russia 
for the first time in 1893, and Aubrey Beardsley’s drawings of Pierrot had been 
widely distributed in the early 1900’s (118).  In a specifically theatrical realm, the 
theorizing of Edward Gordon Craig, which directly challenged realism while 
simultaneously casting a backward glance to earlier more vital theatrical forms 
(especially commedia and puppetry), was profoundly influential on Meyerhold 
and many others (Fisher 107).  Clearly, the European renewal of interest in 
commedia had begun, and it was manifesting itself in a transnational way in a 
variety of art forms.  There is no debate, however, that Vsevolod Meyerhold was 
primarily responsible for integrating the ideas of traditional commedia 
performance into a new Russian theatrical practice that was to be extremely 
influential in its own right. 
  Meyerhold was a founding member (as an actor) of the 
Stanislavsky/Nemirovich-Danchenko company which became famously known 
as The Moscow Art Theatre.  But despite his close associations with these 
theatrical leaders and his considerable acting success, Meyerhold chafed under 
the restrictions of naturalistic theatre.  Having left the Moscow Art Theatre and 
having rejected Stanislavsky’s emphasis on psychological realism in 1902, 
Meyerhold undertook a new career as a director/actor.  Among his earliest efforts 
was a production of an obscure Austrian melodrama about circus life, The 
Acrobats, in which Meyerhold played the role of an aging and failing clown 
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modeled on the character Pierrot (Braun 30).  He had begun a far-ranging 
exploration of commedia as a source of contemporary theatrical inspiration.  For 
Meyerhold, the commedia dell’arte “seemed the ideal antidote to the theatre of 
emotion and the naturalistic play, and it also spurred the actor towards physical, 
movement-based performance” (Leach 10).  
  In 1906, Meyerhold played Pierrot again in Alexander Blok’s play The 
Fairground Booth, a production that has come to be seen as a landmark event in 
the articulation of a new and revolutionary form of modern commedia (Green and 
Swan 85).  The play, adapted from Blok’s own poem at Meyerhold’s suggestion 
and using the milieu of the fairground as a controlling metaphor, offered a 
fragmented sardonic picture of a spiritually exhausted world and a critique of the 
symbolist aesthetic that had preoccupied many in the Russian avant-garde -
including, for a time, Meyerhold himself (Braun 73).  But the production is 
remembered now less for its substantive content than for its overtly theatrical 
style – especially its style of acting.  
  The abrupt changes of mood, the sudden switches of 
personality, the deliberate disruption of illusion, the asides to 
the audience, all demanded a mental and physical dexterity, 
an ability to improvise, a capacity for acting not only the part 
but also one’s attitude toward it.  These devices were all 
waiting to be rediscovered in the tradition of popular theatre 
stretching back to the commedia dell’arte and beyond.  It 
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was this theatre, the theatre of masks and improvisation, 
which the experience of The Fairground Booth led 
Meyerhold to explore.  It came to furnish his entire style, a 
style which in a word can be called ‘grotesque’ (Braun 74).   
Harold Segal points out that Meyerhold drew not only upon the commedia 
dell’arte for his inspiration in creating The Fairground Booth, but also specifically 
on puppet traditions, demanding a box set reminiscent of a puppet theatre within 
the larger set and treating the traditional commedia characters of Pierrot, 
Columbine and Harlequin as human puppets (227- 229).     
  For Meyerhold, the embrace of this “new” style of performance required a 
far different kind of training than that which he had experienced himself under 
Stanislavsky, and while he is best known now for his invention of bio-mechanics 
(after the Russian Revolution), even his earlier organized studios for actor 
training emphasized a wide variety of skills, including physical agility and 
acrobatics, musical proficiency, mime, the basic principles of improvisation as 
practiced in the commedia dell’arte, and the application in the modern theatre of 
the traditional devices of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Leach 49-
50).  Clearly, he was embracing a model for the contemporary actor that owed a 
great deal, especially with respect to the pursuit of virtuosity, to the great 
commedia performers of the past.  He wrote, quite explicitly, that 
  The public comes to the theatre to see the art of man, but 
what art is there in walking about the stage as oneself?  The 
  118 
public expects invention, play acting and skill.  But what it 
gets is either life or a slavish imitation of life.  Surely the art 
of man on stage consists in shedding all traces of 
environment, carefully choosing a mask, donning a 
decorative costume, and showing off one’s brilliant tricks to 
the public – now as a dancer, now as the intrigant at some 
masquerade, now as the fool of old Italian comedy, now as a 
juggler (quoted in Braun, Meyerhold 130). 
In the years after The Fairground Booth, Meyerhold created an alter ego named 
Dr. Dapertutto to continue methodical experimentation in theatrical form and 
training.  Those efforts yielded occasional productions, even as Meyerhold 
staged larger works under his own name.  One of the most frequently performed 
productions of that period was Harlequin, the Marriage Broker (1911).  Meyerhold 
wrote that this production was created with the specific aim of reviving the theatre 
of masks, based upon his studies of the scenarios of the commedia dell’arte and 
based upon the art of improvisation.  He cautioned that the actor’s freedom to 
improvise was limited by his obligation to adhere to the overall “score” of the 
production (Braun 121).  Green and Swan point out that even in his most famous 
productions (Magnanimous Cuckold, Mystery Bouffe, The Bedbug, The 
Bathhouse, and his famous transformation of Gogol’s The Inspector General), 
many of which had no overt thematic or imagistic references to commedia, and 
many of which advanced political agendas consistent with Meyerhold’s 
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emergence as the leading post-Revolution director of “proletarian theatre,” his 
actors were expected to meet the demands of this “grotesque” style, 
demonstrating physical virtuosity, improvisational skills, the ability to play types or 
masks, and the capacity to offer ironic self-commentary (100).  (It is worth noting 
that this latter theatrical technique bears more than a passing resemblance to 
Brecht’s roughly contemporaneous “alienation effect,” though Meyerhold’s 
version had no specifically political or didactic objective.)  Even after the Russian 
Revolution, Fisher argues that many of his most obviously political plays retained 
both an emotional power and the power to entertain through his use of “the 
comedic notion that characters can be seen as depersonalized human symbols” 
(124). 
  Meyerhold is often cited as a model of the “auteur” stage director.  Harry’s 
Way marked one of my first directorial efforts in which I took significant liberties 
with the playtext that I was staging, staking my own claim to the auteur mantle.  I 
was extremely excited and energized by the rehearsal experience, but as 
Meyerhold would have suggested to me, my work was incomplete until an 
audience received, engaged, and completed it.  Moreover, any consideration of 
the techniques of this production, steeped in the use of metaphor and conscious 
attempts to evoke empathy, as being generative of theatrical wonder rests upon 
the response of spectators.  
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The Reception of the Production 
  I want to acknowledge a series of difficult issues as I examine the 
experience of Harry’s Way in performance. I have already mentioned the issues 
posed by a retrospective examination after a period of seven years.  There are 
other issues as well.  I have announced an intention to use Wilhelm Sauter’s 
techniques for analyzing performance.  His taxonomical description of aspects of 
theatrical communication as sensory, artistic and symbolic, as well as his 
description of Gadamer’s hermeneutical process of achieving understanding or 
interpretation (82-88), is, I believe, extremely useful.  In fact, it represents a 
practical working model of the dual semiotic/phenomenological perspectives that 
I want to theoretically embrace. His technique of examining audience reception, 
like most semiotic theorists, however, is predicated on the response of a single 
spectator as opposed to the collective body that is an audience.  Patrice Pavis 
argues that such an approach, by positing an “ideal” individual spectator, ignores 
the ideological plurality of a theatre audience and the status of any individual 
audience member as “someone at an intersection of ideological and cultural 
tensions and contradictions” (28).   This is a fair critique, but it does not follow 
that insights gleaned from such an analysis are without value.  On the contrary, 
the information derived from such an investigation, while requiring rigorous 
interrogation in order to situate its own subjectivity and acknowledge the very 
plurality that Pavis mentions, does in fact yield a description of an understanding 
of the perceived event.   That (selectively individual) understanding does not 
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represent the end of research or offer a totalizing account of the event being 
scrutinized.  Rather, it provides a provocative platform for thinking about it.  The 
goal here is not to “prove” a proposition, but to engage it critically and to examine 
the potential of the performance in question to generate specific reception 
phenomena, especially as reception relates to techniques of staging.   
  The idea of a model spectator, according to Marvin Carlson, is derived 
from Umberto Eco’s formulation of a model reader and Marco de Marinis’s 
extension of that idea to theatrical circumstances, transforming the reader into a 
spectator.  Carlson offers an intriguing elaboration of this analytical strategy by 
observing that “the modern theatre provides a striking example of this 
hypothetical construct in an actual person, the director, who watches the 
development of a performance from the seat of a presumed spectator and 
orchestrates the effects as such a spectator is expected to receive them” (1990: 
12).  Here, I believe is an articulation of why the director, assuming an 
interrogation of his own subjectivity, is peculiarly well positioned to render a 
theoretically productive autoethnographic account of theatrical reception with 
regard to a particular production. 
  Pavis also describes a need for a theoretical approach to performance 
that will account for both reception and production (the final product of a mise-en-
scène and the roots of its elaboration). 
This conception of production-reception promotes an 
interactive strategy of productive and receptive instances 
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that we should seek to produce as creators and to receive as 
spectators.  Such a strategy prevents us from slipping back 
into the debate about the intentionality of the artist producer 
and the subjectivity of the spectator-receiver.  It reminds us 
that the answer lies in neither one nor the other, but in their 
mutual seduction (as opposed to reduction) (27). 
In this case, the spectator whose reactions are examined is not only a composite 
of audience members I have observed or with whom I have entered into 
dialogue, but me as the director/observer, well acquainted with all the 
circumstances of production and certainly unusually competent to consider the 
relationship between intention and result.  The application of Sauter’s 
phenomenological/hermeneutical analysis in this case is not only descriptive of a 
slice of performance.  It is an attempt to create the kind of discursive practice 
about which Pavis speculates, where practice is retroactively seduced by 
theoretical inquiry so that theory may prospectively enable the realization of 
theatrical desire. 
 I want now to offer a description of the penultimate scene of our 
production of Harry’s Way and then examine that scene through the mechanism 
of Sauter’s performance analysis, which seeks to provide accounts both of 
modes of perception and the process by which understanding is achieved.  
Perception (of metaphor) and understanding (through empathy) are, in my 
hypothesis, necessary antecedents to theatrical wonder.  I have selected this 
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scene because it was cited by some spectators in conversation with me as one 
of the (few) moments in the play when they responded emotionally to both Harry 
and Harriet.  I am keenly aware that the extraction of one or two theatrical 
moments from the global experience of the play as a whole may skew critical 
reaction.  I am attempting an analogue to the kind of analysis the anthropologist 
Clifford Geertz called “thick description,” a detailed “local” or partial analysis, by 
means of which a “global” or synthesized account of the larger work may be 
discerned or inferred (28).  Such an approach is entirely consistent with the 
phenomenological focus and the attention paid to specific facets of performance 
that characterize my argument.   “[T]he phenomenological attitude chooses the 
perspectival over the universal; it seeks to ground the general in the local 
instance” (Garner  5). 
 First, a set-up:  In the second half of Harry’s Way, Harry and Harriet have 
fled the authorities pursuing them.  Both of them in comically cross-dressed 
disguise, they have taken a Winnebago into the wilds of the Yukon territory, 
where it crashes in the midst of an Eden-like wilderness.  There, Harry and 
Harriet set up housekeeping and seem to be enjoying some rare moments of 
violence-free contentment.  Their wilderness is invaded, however, by Leonard, an 
unctuous and obsessive journalist, who has been crusading for Harry’s 
punishment and simultaneously seeking to seduce/rescue Harriet.  He is 
captured by Harry and eventually, Harry beats him to death with his stick in what 
(as staged) is a highly stylized moment accompanied by a cacophonous 
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symphony of synthesized percussion.  Harry prepares to leave the wilderness 
which has been his haven, but Harriet, horrified by the violent death she has 
witnessed, refuses to follow him any further. 
 Harry, still an outlandish figure in an oversized bright green and black 
dress, stands at a distance from Harriet. He sports an exaggerated bit of make-
up, a forehead appliqué signifying a wound where Leonard has previously struck 
him.  Harriet is cowering on the floor downstage, where she fell during the 
struggle with Leonard. The footlights lend an eerie, grotesque quality of light to 
the scene.  She is wearing vivid orange men’s coveralls over her clown dress, 
and sporting an obviously fake, luxuriously curled moustache.  Her hair is styled 
in a redhead burlesque of a forties style with a sweeping pompadour in front that 
flows into a long mane at the rear of her head.  Her make-up, as always, features 
kewpie-doll lips, deeply rouged cheeks, and thickly painted arched eyebrows that 
impart a look of perpetual surprise.  “You told me once you’d follow me to the 
ends of the earth,” Harry whines in slightly surprised indignation.  Harriet replies 
with a shouted, if rather shaky, courage, “I DIDN’T THINK YOU’D ACTUALLY 
TAKE ME THERE!!”  Harry pauses, turns his head to the audience, and says 
with familiar affection, “What a grouch” (75).  He walks across the length of the 
stage to Harriet, kneels beside her, and touches her with some measure of 
tenderness. Then suddenly, his hands close around her neck and he begins to 
strangle her, her legs flailing at odd angles.  Just as suddenly he releases her in 
horror.  She chokes and gasps and withdraws from him.  Once again, Harry 
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looks to the audience as he quietly says in an apparent effort to make light of 
what has just occurred, “Sorry.  Too many Yukon gooberberries” (75). 
 As he reaches, in apologetic tenderness, for Harriet, who is whimpering, 
she pulls away from him. As he attempts to apologize, she calls him an animal, 
and screams through her tears for him to get away from her.  He looks at her for 
a long moment, and then picks up the rifle from the oversized table on which it 
rests.  Despite the fact that the rifle is a toy and painted pink, it has a realistic bolt 
action, which Harry now operates as if to chamber a round of ammunition.  The 
sudden authentic, metallic sound is in marked contrast to the whimsical sound 
effects we are accustomed to hearing and instantly creates a sense of the 
ominous.  Harry pauses again, then looks to an audience member.  He holds out 
the rifle, inviting that person to take it.  When there is no response, he repeats 
the offer to another audience member, then another.  Finally, he shakes his head 
in apparent disgust at the unwillingness of the audience members to take action.  
He finally leaves the rifle with Harriet, still huddled on the ground, touches her 
with tenderness and gentleness, picks up his stick, and slowly exits stage left.  
She cries out after him, piteously begging him not to leave her. He does not 
respond.  There is a brief blackout, and we hear a shot. 
 The lights come back up, focusing intensely on Harriet.  She rises, and 
looking at the audience, ceremoniously removes her moustache and coveralls.  
Restored to her previous clown-like costume, she tells us about Harry’s death by 
rifle shot, and through her tears, which glisten in the harsh glow of the footlights, 
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recalls the red stripe of his blood on the white snow as his lifeless body slid down 
a hill. 
 Sauter’s notion of the sensory aspect of theatrical communication relates 
to all those elements of embodied performance, both physical and psychological, 
perceived by the spectator as part of the phenomenon of her reception.  The 
scene under consideration was intentionally loaded with contradictory 
information.  Here, the make-up and fanciful costuming helped to sustain an 
awareness of the comic dimension of the actors’ performance.  The emotional 
intensity of the scene, however, in terms of Harry’s homicidal rage and Harriet’s 
suddenly “real” vulnerability and despair, stood in stark contrast to that comedic 
sensibility.  The mood of the piece had abruptly shifted from the prior slapstick 
battles, accompanied by sound that would not have been out of place in a Three 
Stooges episode, to a theatrical representation of violence in which victims really 
could die, and the only sound, until the threatening sound of the rifle’s bolt action, 
was the sound of physical struggle.  Suddenly, the audience observed real tears.  
The movement by the actors was suddenly less stylized and more suggestive of 
actual behavior.  I was seeking by this rupture in the spectrum of sensory 
reception to facilitate an identification by the audience with the characters, to 
mount a surprise attack on spectator expectations established over the prior 
course of the performance in order to generate empathy.  
 As Sauter has suggested, the various aspects of perceived 
communication interlace, so that the physical change in the actors’ movement 
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may also be understood as reflecting the artistic level of communication, which 
includes both encoded and decoded information, and which includes the 
appreciation and critical judgment of the spectator with regard to the skill of 
performance.  Here the actors’ skillful embodiment of a commedia dell’arte 
inspired style has been subverted by their unanticipated resort to a more 
naturalistic mode of mimesis.  Ironic commentary has been replaced, for the 
most part, with the kind of immediate emotion with which many people recognize 
and share as a dimension of their own lived experience. 
 Sauter’s third aspect of communication, the symbolic, allows for the 
impact of prior knowledge and accumulated information that, when coupled with 
present perception, allows for interpretive or associational leaps, and potentially 
for empathy with fictional characters.  Here, the audience had eighty or ninety 
minutes worth of experience with a sustained metaphor, that of the puppet or 
vaudeville show, maintained by both scenographic elements and performance 
style.  That metaphor was substantially subverted in the scene under discussion.  
And the device employed throughout the play of comic asides to an 
acknowledged audience had suddenly taken a drastic turn.  By including the 
audience in his inadequate apology for his near strangulation of Harriet, Harry 
was inviting the audience to make a specific judgment.  Moments later, when he 
pointedly offers his rifle to a succession of audience members, none of whom 
take up his invitation that they intercede, and demonstrates his disgusted 
dismissal of their presence, Harry offers his own judgment about their complicity 
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in the circumstances being depicted on stage.15   Moreover, in his final touching 
of Harriet, in his leaving of the rifle, and in his unwillingness to yield to her final 
entreaties to take her with him, Harry’s behavior suggests an awareness of her 
needs (and perhaps his own deficiencies) that we have not seen before.   As I 
look back on this production, this scene, with its intentional departure from the 
stylized world that had been established, seems to me to have represented the 
best opportunity to generate audience empathy for either or both of these 
characters.  But for reasons that I will discuss below, I do not think that empathy 
was consistently called forth from most audience members. 
 Sauter relies for his account of the way in which theatrical understanding 
is achieved on Gadamer’s hermeneutics.  He cites with approval Gadamer’s  
idea that understanding is the result of the melding of two “horizons” - one 
representing the complex of signifying features of the text (or performance) 
created by the interlacing presence of the three modes of communication that I 
have described; and one representing the contextual circumstances of the reader 
(or spectator). Understanding is the product of the eventual fusion of these 
horizons (89).  I have already acknowledged that Sauter’s analysis is predicated 
upon an individual spectatorial subjectivity, as opposed to the collection of 
subjects who constitute an audience.  Here, my own position as a 
director/spectator has diminished utility.  I can speak with authority about the 
understanding I hoped to achieve, but I am unable to describe, by virtue of my 
                                                 
15 In rehearsal, we had developed a variety of contingent responses by Harry in case an audience member 
actually engaged him, but in four weeks of performance, no spectator did so. 
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own reception, the actual experience of other audience members.  Even if we 
construct an idealized composite spectator, there are obvious problems in 
attempting to identify the specific contextual circumstances of that spectator, 
inasmuch as these circumstances relate not only to issues of personal history 
and material circumstances, but also such intangibles as individual mood, 
alertness, etc.  Gadamer says, “This definition of the work as the focal point of 
recognition and understanding also means that such an identity is bound up with 
variation and difference.  Every work leaves the person who responds to it a 
certain leeway, a space to be filled in by himself” (1986: 26).  What then of the 
audience as a pluralistic body? 
 We can say, as Susan Bennett does in her influential theoretical study of 
theatre audiences, that the theatre event is a culturally constructed product, and 
an examination of the various elements that figure in this construction may 
enable us to generalize about another kind of horizon: the horizon of an 
audience’s expectations.  Bennett derives the idea of the horizon of expectations 
in theatre audiences from two literary critics.  The foundational idea that texts are 
mediated by the expectations of the reader in a specific historical moment is 
drawn from the work of Hans Robert Jauss, who sought to theorize an aesthetics 
of reception by positing that at its first publication a work is measured against a 
dominant horizon of expectations (Bennett 48-49).  Bennett cites Susan R. 
Suleiman for her critique that Jauss ignores the possibility of different horizons of 
expectation arising within different readers in the same society, and answers this 
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objection by linking Jauss’s diachronic horizon of expectations with the more 
synchronic, and therefore flexible, formulation by Stanley Fish of an “interpretive 
community,” yielding readings that “then would be identifiable as socially and 
historically mediated and open to investigation in this light “ (50).  In her use of 
Jauss and Fish, Bennet extends a line of theoretical speculation articulated 
earlier by Carlson, in which he suggested that Fish’s concept of interpretive 
communities avoids what, in Jauss, may be an overemphasis on text, by moving 
away from a resort to the text for authentication of a specific reading to a 
“’community of readers’, socially defined, which shares common values and 
determines collectively the norms and conventions according to which individual 
readings will take place” (Carlson 1990: 13).  This concept, according to Carlson, 
may be useful not only in describing theatre communities on a number of levels, 
ranging from the abstract and geographically scattered communities actually 
envisioned by Fish to the specific community assembled in a particular location 
for a particular performance.  
 Bennett develops the idea of a horizon of expectation with a specific 
interest in the material circumstances of production, from marketing to the 
physical characteristics of the theatre facility itself, from the social dimension of 
theatre-going to reception of the performance.  “The horizon(s) of expectations 
brought by an audience to the theatre are bound to interact with every aspect of 
the theatrical event, and, for this reason, it is useful to examine the idea of the 
event and its general implications for the act of reception” (99).  An examination 
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of the circumstances of production of Harry’s Way not only helps to situate 
observations about the reception it received.  It also offers information useful to 
the consideration of wonder. 
 Riverside Theatre, in its twenty-third season at the time of this writing, is a 
well-established cultural institution in Iowa City.  Iowa City is a progressive 
university town with theatre audiences who tend to be highly educated and 
politically liberal.  Despite its location in a university town, Riverside Theatre’s 
audiences tend to be middle-aged and, like the rest of Iowa City, somewhat 
ethnically homogeneous, which is to say white and Christian.  The theatre has, 
throughout its history, tended to produce psychologically-driven, and previously 
produced realistic works that might be characterized as displaying a mainstream 
Off Broadway aesthetic.16  The theatre itself is an extremely intimate house that 
seats approximately 120 people.  It has a tiny lobby that minimizes pre-show 
interaction. 
  Our production of Harry’s Way represented a departure from the usual 
fare at Riverside Theatre in several ways.  First, it was a new play, a world 
premiere, in fact, and therefore enjoyed no reputation (or presumed stamp of 
quality) on the basis of earlier productions.  Second, the style of the production 
eschewed realism in favor of a highly stylized theatricality.  Finally, it was 
freighted with a controversial point of view: that wife abuse could be the subject 
of broad, if exceedingly dark, comedy. 
                                                 
16 I have, for example, directed plays like Wit, Proof, and How I Learned to Drive there in recent years.  
Our audiences are generally familiar with such plays, at least by reputation, as a result of their New York 
incarnations. 
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 We set out to address these issues with an aggressive marketing 
campaign.  The show logo featured a representation of the Punch and Judy 
characters, fixing this reference in the minds of the audience from the outset and 
not so subtly suggesting an interpretive strategy.  Carlson points out that logos, 
ostensibly designed to attract attention and to entice people to attend the event, 
may also have a significant impact on reception (19).  We were able to convince 
local newspapers to present feature stories about the production before opening, 
which contained large color photographs of the actors in some of their most 
outlandish costumes along with interviews of various production personnel 
seeking to prepare the audiences for a theatrical experience that departed from 
the standards with which they were familiar.  We publicized our work with the 
Domestic Violence Intervention Project and trumpeted the public discussions that 
would follow selected performances.   
 In the most atypical aspect of this campaign, I wrote a piece for a local 
arts publication that described, in detail, the process by which the production 
concept was developed, provided some background on the commedia tradition 
and the work of Meyerhold, along with my own hopes and expectations about the 
ways in which the work would be received.  In a blatant attempt to anticipate and 
condition audience reaction, I wrote: 
 I expect a broad spectrum of reaction.  I expect some people 
will be delighted.  Others will be offended.  Still others just 
won’t get it.  But whether we enrage or engage, repel or 
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entertain, I hope we will provoke discussion and debate.  I 
hope we will live up to our responsibilities as artists to pose 
difficult questions – and to shine a bit of light on the shadowy 
boundaries of our lives, where mysteries wait, as always, to 
confound us (Hunter 1997). 
We had undertaken a conscious effort to shape the horizon of expectations of 
our audience. And we had endeavored to present enough public information so 
that the audience might be self-selecting enough to form an “interpretive 
community” that might receive this particular production in a productive way. 
 Harry’s Way opened its four week run on January 24, 1997.  The critical 
reception was enthusiastic (in fact, one of the reviewers approvingly quoted my 
newspaper article), and the response of audience members seemed quite 
positive. (I personally observed audience response in eight or ten performances.) 
Box office response overall, however, was somewhat disappointing.  Despite the 
apparent positive response from those in attendance, we were clearly not 
benefiting from a “word-of-mouth” endorsement from most spectators.  Our 
efforts to prepare our audience, to condition a specific interpretive community 
that would respond to the particulars of this production had not succeeded, at 
least in box office terms.  Perhaps this should not have been surprising.  Theatre 
history is replete with examples of deviations by audiences from the manner in 
which they were calculated to respond.  “[T]he frequency of such disjunctures 
should provide clear evidence that  the community of readers assembled for a 
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theatre event may apply very different strategies from those of the model readers  
assumed by the performance.  Problems are particularly likely to arise when an 
experimental work resists the reading strategies of an audience expecting 
something more conventional” (Carlson 1990: 13-14).  We speculated that the 
tone and style of the production deviated too much from the Riverside norm, that 
the production had been branded “weird” and “experimental” (two of the 
adjectives we heard most often reported back to us from spectators, even when 
they approved the overall experience).   In other words, there was a significant 
disjuncture between the horizon of expectations assumed by the model 
director/spectator and the horizon of expectations actually existing in most 
audiences. 
 The two performances most interesting for the purposes of this analysis 
were those followed by organized panel discussions and audience feedback.  
These events were contemplated to address two separate issues: the unusual 
(by local standards) aesthetic of the production and its commentary on domestic 
violence.  To address the former issue, we had invited the participation of two 
theatre scholars.  With regard to the latter issue, we had invited counselors and 
clients from the Domestic Violence Intervention project.  Both post-show 
discussions were well attended, with approximately two thirds of each house 
remaining for the dialogue.  The theatre scholars (Art Borreca and Kim Marra, 
both members of the theatre department of the University of Iowa and both 
former professors of mine during my MFA candidacy) helped to place the 
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production style in a historical context, invoking not only Meyerhold but various 
other manifestations of modernist and avant-garde theatrical production during 
the early part of the 20th century.  My sense was, however, that most audience 
members were eager to grapple with the issue of the way in which we had 
represented the social problem of domestic violence. 
 One of the DVIP counselors spoke first and was highly critical of the tone 
of the production, suggesting that it trivialized its subject matter and sought to 
extract humor from subject matter that contained none.  She expressed 
considerable skepticism that any productive insights could be gleaned from such 
a presentation.  Following her critique, a young woman, who I knew casually, 
raised her hand.  When recognized, she articulated a contrary position based 
upon her own experience.  With great emotion, she recounted a personal history 
(about which I had no previous knowledge) that involved a brutally abusive 
former husband.  She went on to praise the production on two grounds: that it 
accurately represented that which she could never explain – how she could 
continue to love her former husband even in the face of his unconscionable 
conduct – and that the experience of watching it had provided her with an 
occasion of much needed emotional release.  In effect, she described a personal 
catharsis. 
 Following her comments, several women, who were clients of DVIP, 
concurred.  One suggested that she felt that the production enabled her to laugh 
at situations like her own, and that such laughter had a therapeutic function.  The 
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DVIP representative graciously retracted some of her criticism in the face of this 
response (and during the second discussion, a week later, the DVIP 
representatives took a much more supportive view of the production).  I was 
gratified to note that some discussion followed that directly engaged one of the 
playwright’s central ideas: that unconditional love could be profoundly 
destructive. 
 
The Elusiveness of Wonder 
 As I recall this production and the audience response to it in the context of 
my present project, I conclude that regardless of the success or failure of the 
production on other terms, I cannot point to any audience reactions which 
combined the sense of awe, discovery, and delight or profound emotions that I 
associate with theatrical wonder, with the possible exception of those women 
who spoke from their own experience.  I have speculated that theatrical wonder 
is (or can be) aroused in the convergence of certain types of theatrical metaphors 
perceived in an experiential field that contains a significant dimension of 
empathetic reaction to one or more of the characters on stage.  On the face of it, 
this production seemed to offer the circumstances that I associate with theatrical 
wonder.  The entire production was framed by a sustained metaphor, reflected in 
all the design elements of the production and the acting style of the performers, 
that compared its characters to puppets and vaudeville performers.  In the 
context of this extended metaphor we had worked to create emotional moments, 
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especially those described above, that might evoke empathy from the audience, 
especially for Harriet.  A theoretical analysis of what might have prevented the 
expression of theatrical wonder yields additional insights about the character of 
that phenomenon.  I believe that we unknowingly established two obstacles to 
the phenomenon of theatrical wonder: one dealing with the nature and operation 
of that extended metaphor; and the other relating to the possibility of empathy in 
our particular theatrical circumstances. 
 States cites an essay by Ted Cohen for the proposition that one aspect of 
the use of metaphor is to forge a sense of intimacy between the maker or the 
transmitter of a metaphor and the reader or recipient of that metaphor.  The 
maker of the metaphor, in this view, extends a kind of invitation that is accepted 
by the appreciation of the metaphor by the reader, forging a kind of intimate 
community (States 1985: 114).  In the case of Harry’s Way, however, my 
intentions were very much to the contrary.  I chose to use the Meyerholdian 
metaphor of puppetry and popular entertainment as a device of estrangement.  
My strategy was to create a sense of aesthetic distance so that the audience 
would engage the ideas of the play in a more abstract way, rather than respond 
viscerally to the repellent specter of a man abusing his spouse.  (I had 
appropriated an aspect of Brechtian technique, while conveniently ignoring 
Brecht’s announced purpose in formulating the technique: to defeat empathy.) To 
the extent that by community States means to propose a kind of commonality of 
reference and understanding, I had, indeed, hoped to create a sense of 
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community.  But if the notion of intimacy carries with it a sense of familiarity, I 
was consciously working to resist that. 
 States also, however, discusses metaphor as a theatrical mechanism that 
makes visible the invisible, which allows the stage to encompass that which is 
beyond its literal scope.  “Metaphor is a device for getting in more world on the 
principle of similarity, or correspondence, whereby the world imitates the action” 
(States 65).  This more closely accords with my intentions.  By broadening the 
“world” to include violent scenarios whose violence does not necessarily horrify 
and offend us, I hoped to devise a theatrical circumstance that would allow for a 
deeper and (I hoped) more searching engagement with Harry’s and Harriet’s 
behavior.  I believe, at least insofar as the intention to desensitize the audience 
to Harry’s violence, this worked.  In every performance that I observed, audience 
members greeted certain stage conduct with a laughter that would have been 
almost unthinkable had that conduct been represented more naturalistically.  To 
that extent, the extended metaphor of Harry’s Way worked.  It was, at least at the 
outset, what a cognitive linguist might call a novel metaphoric expression, where 
the unusual character of a perceived comparison, Harry’s and Harriet’s life as 
either a Punch and Judy puppet show or a variety entertainment, could 
conceivably assist the spectator in seeing that collective life in a new way 
(Kövecses 32).  My strategy in offering these metaphors was consistent with 
what has been described as “combining,” or activating several known metaphors 
(HUMAN BEING AS PUPPET and LIFE AS SHOW) simultaneously (Kövecses 
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47-49) so as to invite the spectator to appreciate the implicit comparisons, and 
even, in the sense that Ricoeur celebrates the value of metaphor, to make new 
meaning (Gerhart 217).   
 I have suggested that Ricoeur distinguishes between semiotics, as the 
science of signs, and semantics, as the science of the sentence, with all the 
integrative capacity associated with the sentence.  This is roughly analogous to 
the distinction in performance analysis between a semiotic and a 
phenomenological approach, which like the sentence deals, not with individual 
signs, but with the integrative capacity, the experiential gestalt, of a performance 
event.  It is in that context, that of the integrated, holistic, experience of this 
particular theatre event, that the novelty of the metaphor became exhausted, and 
with that exhaustion came the loss of the capacity to engender wonder. 
 I have speculated that theatrical wonder involves, in part, the 
apprehension and appreciation of a novel metaphor, an unexpected comparison 
that excites the imagination as to hitherto unanticipated possibilities, what 
Bachelard called “the original amazement of the naïve observer” (107).  
Bachelard immediately cautioned, however, “Amazement of this kind is rarely felt 
twice.  Life quickly wears it down” (ibid.).  So does sustained exposure.  The 
combined metaphor of Harry’s Way is so unrelenting as to induce a familiarity 
that precludes the unexpected, at least insofar as the metaphor is concerned.  
Indeed, I made specific use of this metaphoric expectation in the scene 
described above.  By rupturing the metaphor with Harry’s and Harriet’s suddenly 
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more naturalistic conduct, I hoped to jolt the audience into a sudden emotional 
identification.  But this theatrical exercise in defeating expectation was almost the 
opposite of wonder.  I was seeking to remove the audience from an imaginary 
realm and douse its members with the chilly waters of an uncomfortable reality.  
Of course, I was not consciously engaged in a consideration of wonder at the 
time, but in retrospect, I believe that I pursued a directorial course that made its 
evocation most unlikely. 
 I had set out, on the other hand, to stimulate empathy for Harriet (and 
something akin to empathy for Harry).  Here, I believe that I failed.  I had 
speculated that people would empathize not only with Harriet’s circumstantial 
predicament, but also with the physical pain she suffered.  There are numerous 
moments in the script when another character innocuously touches Harriet, only 
to have her wince or recoil in pain because of the extent of her bruising at Harry’s 
hands.  I had even developed a specific, recurring, synthesized sound effect that 
punctuated each of the moments when she felt such discomfort.  The staging of 
a suffering body raises a number of complex issues, including the body and its 
representation as a site of political discourse.  “Post-Brechtian theater 
demonstrates a recurrent and markedly phenomenological interest in the body as 
a political entity and in the experiential issues which this body brings into focus” 
(Garner 161-162).  That phenomenological interest, however, must take into 
account the distinction between suffering and pain.   Elaine Scarry argues that 
physical pain, unlike other states of consciousness, has no referential content.  “It 
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is not of or for anything.  It is precisely because it takes no object that it, more 
than any other phenomenon, resists objectification in language” (5, emphasis in 
original).  In Scarry’s analysis of physical pain, this resistance to language 
ensures that physical pain remains a primal and personal experience, one that 
cannot be shared and cannot, therefore, be depicted in art.  She distinguishes 
physical pain from psychological suffering, which does have referential content, 
is susceptible to verbal objectification, and is, in fact, frequently depicted in art 
(11).  If empathy entails a kind of sharing of the experience of one subject by 
another, it follows that the experience of physical pain, as a phenomenon 
characterized by its lack of sharability, is not the province of empathy.  The 
engagement of suffering, on the other hand, under Scarry’s analysis, might 
(perhaps even should) be associated with empathy.  But why, then, was it difficult 
for many audience members to share Harriet’s psychological suffering? 
 I think, in this case, that the metaphoric context in which that suffering took 
place stripped from the bodied subject much of its immediacy and made an 
empathetic response less likely than it might have been in another context.  
Phillip Zarrilli, in Acting (Re)Considered, observes that “all languages of acting 
are metaphorical” and then goes on to cite Lakoff’s and Johnson’s influential 
Metaphors We Live By to pose the question that begins his survey of acting 
theories and approaches:  “[W]hat specific ‘metaphors’ are actors to ‘live by’?” 
(10).  While Zarrilli engages the notion of metaphor to interrogate acting 
practices, here the confluence of metaphor and acting choices helped to 
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condition reception.  The aesthetic distance occasioned by the puppet metaphor 
helped to create an emotional distance on the part of spectators that hindered 
empathy.  
 On the most general level, some measure of empathy is implicated in all 
theatrical reception.  States observes: 
But can art ever deliver itself from empathy?  Isn’t empathy 
the force that keeps us in our theater seats?  In short, a kind 
of sensory self-projection or willingness to vibrate in tune 
with the work, with whatever the work may be up to.  On this 
level, empathy disappears only when beauty disappears, 
when the play makes a mistake, or when an accident occurs 
on stage, and we come back, prematurely, to ourselves 
(1985:104). 
But the empathy States is describing here is that quality of self-projection and 
absorption that characterizes any focused engagement with an art object.  The 
further refinement of empathy that is at theoretical stake in my argument, an 
intersubjective empathy, involves more:  It is a self-projection and absorption that 
has a dimension of emotional and intellectual identification, and, most 
fundamentally, an explicit acknowledgment of mutual humanity, a sharing of 
experience.   States makes reference to this kind of empathy as “the empathy of 
signification, since its basis lies in a mirrorlike reflection of sign and signified” 
(ibid.)   In the case of Harry’s Way, I believe that there was a disjuncture for most 
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spectators between the sign of the puppet, reinforced in a variety of ways 
throughout the production, and the signified human being I sought to evoke as a 
mirror of audience members.17 
 This disconnect was, I believe, not simply a result of the object status of a 
puppet, but related to a series of associations that I unwittingly evoked through 
my employment of the puppet metaphor.  At least since the appropriation of 
puppets by modernist artists in the early part of the twentieth century, puppets 
have been associated with a metaphysical belief that humankind was dominated 
by larger forces beyond its control, a plaything in the hands of fate.  As such, 
humans could be likened to marionettes, compelled by their own lack of agency 
to follow the direction imparted by strings held by those forces (Bell 1995: 51).  
The person as puppet metaphor took on a sense of helplessness, a pejorative 
sense of an objectified entity subject only to manipulation.  This man-as- 
marionette metaphor resonated powerfully in theatrical theory as propounded by 
Edward Gordon Craig, whose “enthusiasm for puppet and marionette related 
mostly to his desire to transform the human actor into a totally submissive 
instrument by means of which the director, who now stood at the center of the 
production, could realize his personal vision of the theatrical work” (Bell 1995: 
55).  As a director, I unequivocally reject Craig’s (theoretical) derogation of the 
contribution of the actor as a creative collaborator, but by encouraging my 
audience to view Harry and Harriet as puppets, I deprived them of agency, 
                                                 
17 In retrospect, the thickness of Dato’ s Georgian accent, which required unusual effort on the part of the 
audience to decipher, also contributed to the disjuncture I describe.  
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relegating them to instruments subject to the design of external forces.  This 
created a kind of empathy gulf.   
 I had sought a kind of Brechtian estrangement in order to allow the ideas 
of the play to resonate more freely.  In retrospect, I think that strategy succeeded, 
but its unintended consequence was to create a significatory obstacle, a kind of 
semiotic trap that accomplished the goal of intellectual distance while subverting 
the other goal of fostering empathy, except for those women who, on the basis of 
their traumatic personal experience, found a personal connection to the 
characters overwhelmed metaphorical diversions. 
Harry’s Way was a personal success in many ways.  It opened stylistic 
possibilities for me that continue to figure in my work.  The experience of this 
production propelled me into much more sophisticated attempts to marry my 
directorial work to the theoretical enterprises that I consciously engage.  On the 
stage of my memory, illuminated by a lighting instrument that enables hindsight, 
it performs with power and distinction, as a milestone that directed my own 
theatrical imagination into new and worthwhile avenues.  With respect to the 
pursuit of theatrical wonder, however, it charts avenues to avoid:  theatrical 
metaphors whose intensity of use defeats their novelty; metaphors that evoke 
undesired ideas or associations; and staging strategies that frustrate the 
possibility of perceiving a mutuality of experience and an affirmation of agency 
that I believe is a necessary precondition to the establishment of the empathetic 
field in which wonder is cultivated.   
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Chapter Four 
Verona in Jerusalem: Empathy and Compassion 
 
In the summer of 2002, I directed a production of Romeo and Juliet for the 
Riverside Theatre Shakespeare Festival, set in the contemporary Middle East, 
which served as an occasion to explore theatrical empathy and the closely 
related phenomenon of compassion.  I understand compassion to mean not only 
the capacity to feel another’s suffering, but also the desire to alleviate that 
suffering.  The desire to eliminate suffering clearly has utopian dimensions.  In 
this chapter, I will consider whether or not empathy and compassion are 
distinguishable, and demonstrate that this production was specifically designed 
to evoke compassion in a specific political context, that of the Israeli/Palestinian 
conflict.  I will recount the development of this production in some detail and 
discuss some of the theoretical and practical issues raised by seeking to 
theatrically represent a cultural other in an ethical way.  While I continue to 
maintain the role of empathy in the phenomenon of theatrical wonder, and the 
potential political efficacy of wonder in generating moments of utopian longing, I 
am unable to prove that moments in this production generated that sense of 
wonder for specific spectators.  I do claim that the production succeeded in 
promoting a sense of compassion, and that that sense of compassion is a small 
but necessary essential step toward moving beyond conflict and hatred. 
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Background 
The Riverside Theatre Shakespeare Festival is a summer project of 
Riverside Theatre.  While the company in its season proper is devoted to a 
largely contemporary repertoire,18 the Shakespeare Festival is quite a different 
enterprise.  Housed in a lovely outdoor theatre with an Elizabethan architectural 
theme that seats 480 patrons and nestled in a verdant city park, the Festival, now 
four years old, has become a major cultural event in the annual life of this 
sophisticated university town.  It is generously supported by the city of Iowa City, 
receives extensive coverage in local media, and has been embraced by the 
community.  The company operates under an Equity contract, and the acting 
company is assembled on the basis of auditions in several parts of the country. 
 In the brief history of the Riverside Theatre Shakespeare Festival at that 
time (2003), four plays by Shakespeare had been mounted.  I had directed three 
of the four: the inaugural production, a rather traditional Twelfth Night; the second 
year offering, a wackily contemporary As You Like It, infused with an “indie rock” 
score; and now Romeo and Juliet, mounted in the third year in revolving 
repertory with a production of The Comedy of Errors.  Romeo and Juliet was the 
first tragedy selected for the Festival.  I felt a burden of responsibility.   
The idea of a contemporary Middle Eastern setting was immediately 
appealing to me, but the reasons for that appeal were not immediately apparent. 
I am not sure why the idea of setting Romeo and Juliet in Jerusalem occurred to 
                                                 
18 In recent years, I have directed plays like Wit, Proof, and Accidental Death of an Anarchist.  My 
production there of Edward Albee’ s The Goat, or Who is Sylvia?, which was mounted after the production 
considered here, provides the foundation for the next chapter. 
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me.  I was not at that time immersed in the geo-political machinations that 
provide the pulse of the Middle East.  The second intifada had begun, but even 
the most prescient prognosticators failed to foresee the pattern of violent 
escalation and wrenching human tragedy that was to evolve.  I am a Jew by birth 
and culture, but I have been non-observant from childhood, and I certainly feel no 
special allegiance to Israel.  In fact, I was predisposed to be hostile to the Sharon 
government, which I understood to be still another manifestation of the right wing 
political impulses that were afflicting the world and threatening many of the 
values I hold dear.  Nor was I sympathetic to the Arafat regime.  I believed then, 
and I believe now, that Arafat was a duplicitous, self-serving impediment to the 
rightful aspirations of his long-suffering people.  My knowledge of the region was 
limited to information gleaned from the New York Times, CNN, and an occasional 
magazine article.  I had, in short, no personal stake whatsoever, no political 
agenda to advance.  I was not even actively seeking a novel approach to the 
play.  I simply wanted to make the tragedy of the play meaningful, the experience 
of the play fresh and compelling to an audience that had thus far experienced (in 
the context of the Festival) a selection of fairly frothy comedies.  And I had an 
intuition, a still inchoate conviction, that contextualizing Romeo and Juliet in the 
contemporary Middle East might yield compelling theatre and a re-energization of 
the text. 
I had not yet begun the painstaking scrutiny involved in testing the idea 
against the text.  I certainly was not thinking yet of the production in terms of any 
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scholarly research.  And I knew, of course, that many people had passionate 
opinions about the conflict, but controversy was not on my mind.  I was seized 
simply with the restless momentum of that theatrical intuition, and so I took the 
idea to the artistic directors of Riverside Theatre, who were both my friends and 
my prospective employers.  I needed their approval to proceed with the idea. 
They responded with some reservation and a series of penetrating 
questions.  Specifically, they were concerned that a contemporary Middle 
Eastern context would squelch any opportunities for humor in the play.  
Moreover, they were concerned that a focus on polarizing and controversial 
issues might overwhelm the ability of an audience to appreciate the play itself.  I 
responded to their questions and their concerns with a litany of assurances, but 
for the most part, I was bluffing, because I had not yet thought through most of 
these issues.  In any case, Ron Clark and Jody Hovland, the artistic leaders of 
Riverside Theatre, know me well and trust me.  I had at that time directed 17 or 
18 productions for them over the preceding eight years.  Accordingly, despite 
what I perceived as some misgivings, they gave me their blessing to proceed 
with my Middle Eastern Romeo and Juliet.  
 
Theorizing the Production 
Only after I had formulated this vague plan for a production did I begin to 
think of it in a more disciplined theoretical way, especially with regard to the 
opportunities it provided to think critically about the operation of empathy in 
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theatrical events and the relationship of an empathetic dynamic to the capacity of 
that presentation to engender a sense of wonder, a theoretical interest that had 
finally taken the shape of an academic inquiry.  I contend that theatrical wonder, 
in what seems like an insistent mantra by now, is related both to the use of 
embodied metaphor and to the empathic exchange between performer and 
spectator.  But wonder is, I believe, more than astonishment, more than 
appreciation.  It is an inkling of potential that exceeds expectation – and therefore 
points to a realm of possibility, to a domain of aspiration.  It is in that dimension of 
wonder that utopian performatives may arise from the inchoate longing, the 
roughly formed desire that is a part of every theatrical event.   
In arguing that the human capacity to perceive beauty is necessarily 
related to the human capacity to conceive justice, Elaine Scarry observes that 
“[s]omething beautiful fills the mind yet invites the search for something beyond 
itself, something larger or something of the same scale with which it needs to be 
brought into relation” (29).  For Scarry, the considered apprehension of beauty 
involves both symmetry and the idea of fairness, both of which are fundamental 
to the idea of the just.  I suggest that what I call wonder operates in much the 
same way, by conjuring an awareness of what can be as opposed to what is.  Or 
as Susan Neiman puts it, discussing the idea of the is and the ought in western 
philosophy:  “We experience wonder in the moments when we see the world as it 
ought to be – an experience so deep that the ought melts away” (323, italics in 
original).   Maurya Wickstrom, citing Neiman, adds that the desire for the world to 
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be as it ought to be is as healthy a human impulse as any we have, that “[t]he 
moments when we feel the is and the ought merge, so that there is no difference 
between the two, is the experience of wonder” (Wickstrom 180, italics in original).  
Wonder, therefore, may be understood as not only an intimation of something 
better, a utopian gesture, but even the phenomenological experience of it – at 
least for a brief time. 
Like many theatre people, I have always taken as an article of faith the 
proposition that theatre had unique potential to affect people’s lives.  I invoked 
the usual assumptions about the vibrant immediacy of a live performance and the 
opportunities for community dialogue inherent in a process where groups of 
people assembled to collectively consider cogently expressed ideas.  I was, of 
course, aware of the historical role of theatre as a vehicle of civil discourse, and I 
had absorbed Brechtian prescriptions for a politically efficacious epic theatre.  
But I had not yet really thought in a rigorous way about theatre as a utopian 
project, as a means of both imagining and gesturing toward a world in which 
conflict resolution proceeds not from the exercise of power but from the exercise 
of human connection, understanding, and compassion.  And I had not yet 
concluded that an empathic process was central to that human connection, 
understanding, and compassion. 
I want to argue that empathy is essential to any utopian project and to the 
experience of wonder in which a utopian possibility is intimated.  I want to argue 
further that theatre represents a uniquely useful laboratory for the exploration of 
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empathy, and that my recent production of Romeo and Juliet represents an 
attempt at such an exploration.   
In the first chapter, I noted that psychologists identify at least three kinds 
of empathy which are pertiment here: “1) a cognitive awareness and 
understanding of the emotions and feelings of another person;  2) a vicarious 
affective response to the emotional experiences of another person that mirrors or 
mimics that emotion;  and 3) assuming, in one’s mind, the role of another person” 
(Reber 249).  Shakespeare demonstrated his uncanny intuitions about mental 
and emotional process time and time again.  Macbeth is a tragic hero because 
his tortured imagination and poetic sensibility provide an opportunity for 
audiences to identify with his humanity even in the midst of his capitulation to 
evil.  Encountering a sensitive performance of this character, we may experience 
something like the first definition of empathy: an intellectual grasping of another’s 
affect.   Lear howls in Act 3, Scene 4: 
Poor naked wretches, wheresoe'er you are,  
That bide the pelting of this pitiless storm,  
How shall your houseless heads and unfed sides,  
Your loop'd and window'd raggedness, defend you  
From seasons such as these? 
This is an example of the second definition of empathy, a vicarious affective 
response to the emotional experiences of another person, drawing upon the 
immediate experience of the empathizer.  When the Nurse, in Romeo and Juliet, 
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goes, at Juliet’s behest, to seek out Romeo at considerable personal risk, she is 
taking on the perspective of someone she deeply loves, the third kind of 
empathy.  Various definitions of empathy have nuances that shift between the 
emotional and the cognitive – and between understanding and actually standing 
in another’s circumstances.                                                                                      
 I tend to use the words “empathy” and “compassion” almost 
interchangeably, but this is not universally the case.  Martha C. Nussbaum 
argues in Upheavals of Thought (2001) that, from a philosophic tradition, 
compassion is distinct from empathy, which she defines as “an imaginative 
reconstruction of the experience of the sufferer” (327).  In her view empathy is 
not sufficient in and of itself to foster compassion.  A juror may empathize with 
the experience of a criminal, for example, without having compassion, if she 
believes the criminal to be responsible for his actions and guilty (329).  For 
Nussbaum, empathy is an operation of imaginative engagement, but one which 
is value neutral, at least in some circumstances.  Compassion, on the other 
hand, enlists our imagination for the good of others and makes them the subject 
of our care (13).  In assessing the psychoanalytical and experimental literature, 
however, Nussbaum acknowledges that there is significant evidence of a 
connection between empathy and compassionate emotion, concluding that “if 
empathy is not clearly necessary for compassion, it is a prominent route to it” 
(332).  Moreover, compassion is an indisputably worthy destination, because the 
experimental literature clearly suggests that the experience of compassion is 
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closely linked to altruistic action (336-340).                                                                             
 Nussbaum’s project is to argue that, in philosophy, emotions must be 
accorded a central place in any system of ethical reasoning.  That essential 
insight reverberates, of course, in discourses beyond philosophy.  The 
apprehension of emotion, or feeling, is implicated in discourses as diverse as 
neuro-science (see Damasio) and performance studies.   Dolan, in arguing for a 
“utopian performative,” suggests that performance has a utopian role not in 
prescribing a course of action, but affectively, by providing intersubjective 
moments when the dynamic between performer and audience allows both to 
“feel,” in small, incremental ways, a utopian possibility.  It is a way of imagining 
by feeling (Dolan 2001).  This is what I was after in my production of Romeo and 
Juliet.  I wanted my audience, by feeling profound compassion for an Israeli 
Romeo and a Palestinian Juliet, to imagine a world in which cultural and 
historical hatred did not trump every human exchange.                                                                          
 Feminist critic Maria Lugones has described (in non-theatrical contexts) 
circumstances in which individuals may achieve productive understandings of 
each other despite cultural and identity differences, circumstances that she calls 
“world traveling.”  Lugones argues passionately that women of color must 
playfully travel across “worlds” to achieve cross-cultural and cross-racial loving 
(Lugones 3-4).  Distinguishing her ideas from a potentially destructive project of 
traditional assimilation, she concludes that “traveling to someone’s ‘world’ is a 
way of identifying them . . . because by traveling to their ‘world’ we can 
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understand what it is to be them and what it is to be ourselves in their eyes. Only 
when we travel to each other’s ‘worlds’ are we fully subjects to each other” (italics 
in original, 17).  Lugones is concerned with both the material and the ideological 
locations of identity, but the “worlds” that she references are expansive enough 
to contain more than just the indicia of identity.  She is theorizing about 
conditions for intimacy that bridge disparate identity locations, which both 
authorize and enable travel to realms outside the boundaries of self.   The most 
essential condition for such a phenomenon in Lugones’s formulation is a 
simultaneously thoughtful and playful identification with or empathy for a 
stranger. Such identification is a relatively common experience in the preparation 
of theatrical performance and such identification is a frequent element of 
audience reception.                                                                                                                  
 A thoughtful and playful identification with a stranger is precisely what 
many acting techniques train actors to work toward both in classes and in 
rehearsal (Dolan 1993, 438). Theatre artists often must investigate the emotional 
and cognitive landscapes that transform the theoretical abstract into the theatrical 
particular.  They must have an artistic means of reckoning with the emotional and 
intellectual dimension of Otherness that they seek to inhabit.  The skill of the 
performer (or the director or the playwright) in portraying Others in fictionalized 
circumstances and the effort of the audience in receiving that portrayal together 
establish an empathic portal, an opportunity to empathize with an Other that 
otherwise might never occur.  It is a process that yields a notion of inclusion that 
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respects difference, invites compassion, and that seems especially useful in 
imagining better human circumstances.                                                                            
 Much of the foregoing discussion of empathy and compassion, especially 
in its theatrical applications, makes little distinction between identification with 
another and identification with an Other.  Yet any gesture toward a utopian vision 
that seeks the resolution of conflict between people divided by culture and 
identity must navigate that distinction.  By transforming the Capulets and 
Montagues from feuding families with similar traditions to warring cultures, I was 
engaging this problem directly.  These theoretical considerations were very 
present as I began to conceive my production of a Middle Eastern Romeo and 
Juliet.  I began my preparation with a crash course in the history of the region, 
consuming any book I could find that accounted for the sources of this very 
troubled present, and with readings about both Arab and Israeli culture.                                  
 I was exquisitely aware of the various pitfalls associated with the 
representation of cultural others, especially Middle Eastern Others.  (Edward 
Said, the cultural and literary critic most responsible for sensitizing western 
intellectuals to the perils of “Orientalism” was, after all, a Palestinian expatriate.) 
When and to what extent an actor, writer or director may inhabit a stranger, 
particularly an other whose complex of identifying factors situates that other as a 
member of a group which has been marginalized by and excluded from a 
dominant discourse?  May a white actor play a person of color?  Should a male 
writer presume to explore the experiences of a woman?  Can a heterosexual 
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director undertake a project about lesbians?  The most orthodox response from a 
position of identity politics is a resounding “no.”  The reasoning is that members 
of marginalized groups, in order to claim their own subjectivity, must struggle to 
describe and name their own experience (Harding, 128).  Sandra Harding states 
unambiguously that only members of such a group can speak as such because 
only they have “a certain epistemic privilege about their own experiences.  They 
can more easily detect the subtle forms of their marginalization and of 
discrimination against them” (131-132).  Her very lack of ambiguity, however, is 
problematic in the context of theatre, where, virtually by definition, practitioners 
(especially actors) must imaginatively project themselves into fictional 
circumstances quite foreign to their lived experience.                                                       
 Other contemporary theorizing about speaking for a marginalized other 
rejects the absolutism of Harding’s position.  Linda Martín Alcoff, while 
acknowledging the grave discursive responsibility of speaking for others, 
suggests a series of interrogatory practices that help to insure that an analysis of 
power relations is a part of any such speech.  She urges a critical examination of 
the actual impetus to speak.  She states that the speaker must interrogate the 
bearing of his/her location and the context in which the speech is engaged.  
(Significantly for the purposes of this argument, she argues that interrogation 
would be most effective if undertaken collectively with other people.)  She writes 
that accountability must be a part of speaking for others, and finally, she asserts 
that the receivers of communication must evaluate the effects of the speech on 
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its discursive and material context  (Alcoff 111-113).  I maintain that a sensitive 
and critically principled production process provides a significant opportunity for 
precisely the kind of interrogation that Alcoff contemplates.  The formal rehearsal 
process should begin with a thorough investigation not only of textual 
interpretation and dramaturgical research, but also with an open and thoughtful 
ventilation of any issues of representation that may arise.  And even before the 
rehearsal process is actually undertaken, Alcoff’s interrogation must take place in 
production meetings which determine casting, and before that in the director/ 
producer process that selects projects or staffs them.  My point is simply that the 
theatrical process provides opportunities at multiple stages for principled 
reflection and critical self-consciousness about who speaks for whom on stage.  
Critical self-consciousness, after all, is simply an aspect of the self-awareness 
that is a vital part of most theatrical technique.  And it was on that principle that I 
sought to design my rehearsal and production process.19   
 
The Production Process 
That process began with casting.  The Riverside Theatre Shakespeare Festival is 
a professional undertaking, operating under a contract with Actors Equity 
                                                 
19 I had some recent experience in representing cultural others on stage.  I had directed a new play entitled 
Bricks and Lyrics, a historical drama about modern India by an Indian playwright Abhijat Joshi in a 
university setting where most roles were necessarily assigned to non-Asian student actors.  We made a 
determined effort to interrogate our assumptions about representation at every step, and we availed 
ourselves of the generous help of Indian consultants as well as the almost daily contributions of the 
playwright, who served as a cultural tutor even as he was revising a new script. As it turned out, the play 
was attended by large numbers of the local South Asian community, who received the performance with 
generosity and enthusiasm.  We actually received several compliments on the sensitivity with which we 
had portrayed Indian culture at the time of the partition. 
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Association (the trade union of professional actors).  A company is assembled 
both on the basis of personal networks and extensive auditioning.  The Festival 
in the summer of 2002 was to include productions of both Romeo and Juliet and 
The Comedy of Errors, to be performed in revolving repertory.  This meant that 
the company of actors hired would be cast in both productions.  Both shows 
would be rehearsed simultaneously and would eventually alternate in 
performance.  This made for an especially complicated casting process, because 
while an actor playing a major role in one production (say Romeo or the Nurse) 
would typically be cast in a smaller role in the other production, it remained a 
daunting task to find actors competent to perform both shows.  The Comedy of 
Errors, directed by Ron Clark, was conceived quite broadly, employing a great 
deal of physical humor and vivid, cartoon-like characterizations.  Because of the 
competing demands of that show, the hiring of some Riverside regulars,  and the 
financial constraints of the casting process, it was simply not possible to impose 
casting requirements of specific ethnicity or even type in most cases.  Our task 
was to seek actors with the theatrical skills to handle verse in an outdoor setting 
(which required strong vocal instruments and the capacity to project a certain 
theatrical “size”), who also possessed the versatility to move from slapstick 
comedy to a culturally specific tragedy.  It was a tall order.                             
 By the time the casting process began, I had determined to use this 
production to theorize about the operation of empathetic processes in the 
reception of theatrical communication.  Having by now read a good deal of 
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Middle Eastern history and commentary about the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, I 
decided to set the production in contemporary Jerusalem, one of the few places 
in the region where middle class and wealthy Israelis and Palestinians are in 
frequent contact with each other.  This made some of the action of the play 
plausible.  Jerusalem is also a sort of symbolic epicenter of the struggle between 
these peoples.  As an important and contested site in all three of the world’s 
major religions20, but especially between Muslims and Jews, it struck me as a 
useful and dramatically combustible location for the blood feud between the 
Montagues and the Capulets.                                                                                         
 Before I could begin the casting process, however, I had another major 
production decision with which to wrestle.  I had decided to set Romeo and Juliet 
in an Israeli/Palestinian context, but I had not yet decided how I would designate 
the warring families.  While Shakespeare’s text depicts “two noble houses” and 
assigns no special blame or culpability to either side for the tragic consequences 
that ensue from the families’ hatred, it seemed clear that representing the 
Capulets as Israeli and the Montagues as Palestinian, or vice versa, constituted 
a directorial choice of complex and not entirely foreseeable implications.  My first 
impulse was to portray the Capulets as Palestinian for purely theatrical reasons.  
Romeo meets Juliet, of course, at the Capulets party, and the prospect of using 
                                                 
20 Various histories and narratives of the competing cultural presences in Jerusalem invariably 
betray the ideological biases of their authors almost immediately. For example, Larry Collins and 
Dominique Lapierre’s highly dramatic account of the struggle for Jerusalem and birth of Israel (O 
Jerusalem) is overflowing with admiring characterizations of various Israeli historical persona 
even as it deprecates Arab positions and leaders, while Karen Armstrong’s Jerusalem: One City, 
Three Faiths clearly respects the aspirations of the Palestinian people and attempts a more 
evenhanded historical account but ultimately dissolves into a fairly pessimistic assessment of the 
city’s future. 
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Arabic music and dance to stage that party was intuitively appealing to me.  As I 
began to think more seriously about the issue, and as I began to speak with 
people more intimately familiar with both Israeli and Arabic culture, I had second 
thoughts.  Virtually everyone I consulted, from both Arab and Israeli perspectives, 
agreed that it would be much more likely for a cross-cultural romance to flourish if 
the couple consisted of an Arab man and an Israeli woman.  Everyone agreed 
that the relative cloistering of Arab women and the extreme consequences and 
cultural stigma that would likely ensue as a result of an Arabic woman’s flouting 
tradition by seeking a romantic or sexual liaison with a non-Arab, especially a 
Jew, made such a relationship close to unthinkable.                                                                  
 I was reading Raphael Patai’s well-known cultural profile The Arab Mind at 
the time; he argues emphatically that unlike in the West, where an individual is 
not traditionally held morally or legally responsible for the acts of another, in 
Arabic culture, family and kinship bonds are sufficiently strong that all members 
suffer a loss of face and prestige upon the “dishonorable” behavior of any 
individual family member, especially when that behavior is that of a woman who 
is a blood relation.  “In the Arab world, the greatest dishonor that can befall a 
man results from the sexual misconduct of his daughter or sister” (127).  Clearly, 
an Arabic Juliet who flouted both tradition and family honor by permitting a 
personal entanglement with an Israeli Romeo would be inflammatory.                                
 On the other hand, Patai’s cultural study was first written in 1972.  Edward 
Said’s influential critique of orientalism with its full panoply of generalizations and 
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stereotypes about Middle Eastern culture followed only six years later.  In 
summing up his position, Said wrote, “My objection to what I have called 
Orientalism is not that it is just the antiquarian study of Oriental languages, 
societies and peoples, but that as a system of thought Orientalism approaches a 
heterogenous, dynamic and complex human reality from an uncritically 
essentialist standpoint; this suggests both an enduring Oriental reality and an 
opposing but no less enduring Western essence, which observes the Orient from 
afar and from, so to speak, above” (333).   As Said points out, virtually all 
contemporary Orientalist scholarship emphasizes the male-dominated Arabic 
family as an indispensable part of a mythic Arabic discourse (311).  I was 
determined not to fall into the trap of staging an assortment of clichés about the 
Palestinian experience.                                                                                                           
 I considered that within the Arab world, Palestinian culture was fairly 
secular and that there were role models available for young Palestinian girls of 
women who had achieved power and influence once denied to Arab women.  
(Hanan Ashrawi, the prominent Palestinian legislator and statesperson comes to 
mind.)  And Juliet was, to my mind, not only an impulsive and passionate 
adolescent, but also something of a teenage rebel.  The notion of a free-thinking 
and empowered Juliet, taking responsibility for her own desires, was an 
appealing one.  I determined to follow my original impulse – to represent the 
Capulets as Palestinian and the Montagues as Israeli.                                                                             
 As I thought about the implications of this decision, I realized that it also 
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represented significant opportunities relative to my larger project of theorizing the 
functions of empathy in politically charged theatre.  The Capulet family is 
featured much more in the text of Romeo and Juliet than the Montague family.  In 
the Capulet family, we see the clearest manifestation of the mistrust and 
antipathy that divides the families (in the person of Tybalt), and the Capulet 
family has entire scenes within which to express their feelings for and about their 
daughter, including a particularly wrenching scene (IV.5) in which their grief at 
her supposed death is foregrounded.  I welcomed the challenge of establishing 
an empathic bond between the audience (who I presumed had a predisposition 
that favored the Israeli side of the conflict) and a group of Palestinians (whose 
misery and despair invited compassion irrespective of political positions).                              
 I was especially interested in casting a Romeo and a Juliet who could 
carry the weight of these demanding roles but also be credible as the impulsive 
teenagers Shakespeare described.  We held local auditions in Iowa City and 
more extensive auditions in Chicago, but two of my most important casting 
decisions were to come from supplementary auditions.  Riverside Theatre had 
been invited to audition graduate acting students at the Professional Theatre 
Training Program at the University of Delaware, a program primarily devoted to 
training classical actors.  We cast several actors from those auditions, but 
certainly a pivotal casting opportunity presented itself when I encountered a 
young actor there named Zaki Abdelhamid.  Zaki is a Jordanian national whose 
Palestinian parents had fled from the West Bank to Jordan during the Israeli/Arab 
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war of 1967.  He had lived most of his life in Amman, with a brief sojourn in 
Beirut, before coming to the United States to pursue an acting career.                            
 Quite apart from his skills as an actor, Zaki speaks Arabic fluently, is quite 
knowledgeable about Palestinian politics and culture, and was wildly enthusiastic 
about the production concept.  I recognized immediately, of course, that he would 
be an invaluable asset as a cultural resource as well as an actor, a role he 
embraced with both energy and measured authority.  I cast him as Paris, Juliet’s 
suitor.  Shortly after completing the casting process, the Chicago actor I had 
selected to play Juliet dropped out to pursue a movie opportunity.  I had no other 
Juliet prospects with whom I was comfortable, but I happened to be in New York 
on unrelated business.  After hastily arranging additional auditions, I saw forty or 
fifty aspiring Juliets, but was especially impressed with an actor named Nicole 
Raphael, who combined wonderful skills and training with an especially youthful 
appearance and a magnetic presence.  When she accepted our offer, casting 
was finally complete.                                                                                                             
 As someone with personal experience in and knowledge of the Middle 
East and one of the cultures we were representing, Zaki was an unexpected 
asset to the production process.  As the beginning of rehearsal grew closer and 
my own book and periodical-based research reached a plateau of practical 
limitation, I began seeking the informational and experiential resources I felt were 
necessary to undertake the vexing problem of representing cultural others with 
some degree of integrity.                                                                                     
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 Joni L. Jones has outlined a series of strategies for seeking cultural 
authenticity in performance ethnography.  Her work deals with the embodied 
representation of an ethnographer whose work is contained in her own 
performance, but several of the principle she articulates have considerable 
currency even in a more conventional theatrical context, when other cultures are 
to be represented.  She suggests that the performance should address a specific 
idea rather than provide a general “you are there” atmosphere (4).  In the case of 
this production, I was intent on probing for opportunities for compassion in an 
otherwise hate-filled cultural struggle.  Clearly, we did not attempt to literally 
transport the spectator to contemporary Jerusalem.  Shakespeare’s language 
was largely undisturbed.  Jones cautions that the subjectivity of the ethnographer 
must be foregrounded (5).  Here, even the casual spectator was well aware that 
she was watching a subjective directorial concept in action.  If the fact of the 
performance was not itself sufficient evidence of this, program notes clarified the 
issue.  Jones writes that “[m]ultivocality helps to mitigate the authority of the 
ethnographer, and provide varied, even contradictory perspectives that the 
audience must synthesize” (ibid).  This production was certainly characterized by 
an extensive multivocality.   My voice as a director was in dialogue with 
Shakespeare’s text.  The warring families themselves, as represented in this 
production, together with the observations of Lawrence and the Prince, offered 
contradictory perspectives.  The Jones principle, however, that was most 
prominent in this representation of cultures was her invocation that the 
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“performance should grow as a collaboration between the ethnographer and the 
community [or communities] being presented” (4).                                                                   
 I had always planned to attach people with specific expertise to the 
production as “dramaturgical consultants.”  Eventually, I recruited a number of 
people with specific expertise about the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and both 
Israeli and Palestinian culture.  On the Israeli side of the equation, I solicited and 
received the help of Gerald Sorokin, the director of the Iowa City branch of Hillel 
(the foundation for Jewish campus life) and a political science professor who had 
served as a fellow at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv 
University, and Rachelle Tsachor, an Israeli citizen and former sergeant in the 
Israeli army, as well as a dance and movement scholar.  Both Gerry and 
Rachelle were active advocates for Israeli positions within the Iowa City 
community.   To secure some additional expertise on the Palestinian side, I 
eventually located a Palestinian doctoral student, Osama Saba, and a research 
chemist, Jehad Jadou, both active in local Palestinian politics, and both of whom 
agreed to serve as consultants to the production after receiving assurances from 
me that I would represent Palestinians fairly.21    I had to assure all my experts 
that I had no particular political axe to grind, no specific agenda to pursue, except 
that I wanted to create a contemporary Middle Eastern context for the production 
that was as fairly drawn as possible and to explore my capacity to arouse an 
                                                 
21 I could understand their reticence.  Even in progressive Iowa City, in the post 9/11 world, there was 
considerable suspicion directed toward Arabic men.  In fact, when I told people that I had found two men 
willing to help with the production whose names were “ Osama”  and “ Jehad,”  I generally received 
incredulous stares and jokes that betrayed more than a little bitterness and hostility. 
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empathetic response on the part of the audience despite any political and/or 
emotional predispositions that they might have.                                                                                                         
 Even before the first day of rehearsals, however, the realities of the 
conflict, and the passions that it inspires, intruded into my tidily organized 
production plans.  The intensity of the intifada had been mounting almost daily, 
suicide bombings within Israel had reached a peak, and Israel had sent 
significant armored forces into the occupied territories.  One of the most 
significant incursions was the siege of Ramallah, the city that served as Yasser 
Arafat’s headquarters.  Ramallah was also the home of Jehad’s family.  As his 
fear for their safety mounted, he found himself understandably disinclined to 
participate in a theatrical production in which he had no emotional or intellectual 
investment, and he withdrew.  Osama followed suit, claiming as an excuse the 
intensity of his academic schedule.  But I believed then and believe now that the 
escalating horror of the conflict, and his emotional stakes in it, rendered 
participation in a theatricalized version of the conflict unthinkable.  I scrambled to 
find another Palestinian consultant and successfully convinced a young 
Palestinian electrical engineer, Yaser Abudagga, to share some of his 
experience and expertise as part of our rehearsal process.                                                  
 At almost the same time, a friend of mine (who happens to be Jewish, a 
distinguished Shakespeare scholar and an important supporter of the 
Shakespeare Festival) called me to urge that I reconsider the production.  She, 
too, was observing the events in the Middle East with growing horror and 
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emotion.  She tearfully expressed her conviction that my production could either 
sensationalize or trivialize a global catastrophe.  Her emotional attachment to 
Israel and her fear of the present situation was such that she was unable to 
conceive of a way to represent the conflict on the stage.  I responded that I 
appreciated her convictions, but that staging difficult and potentially controversial 
matters was central to my identity as an artist and I could not conceive of 
circumstances in which any subject was off limits for theatrical exploration.  This 
difficult and emotional telephone conversation lasted over forty minutes. While I 
was full of predictable, self-affirming bravado, I must acknowledge that my 
confidence in the project was shaken.  I felt honor-bound to discuss these urgent 
communications with Ron Clark and Jody Hovland, the Festival’s artistic 
directors.  Despite their initial reservations, however, they were now committed to 
the production, and I took considerable solace in that commitment.                                        
 I had planned an unusually long period of “tablework” at the beginning of 
the rehearsal process, devoted to presentations and discussions about the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict and the attitudes and opinions of individual cast 
members, as well as the usual text work that accompanies most Shakespeare 
production.  Without question, however, the presentations by our consultants 
proved to be the most useful aspect of this part of the process.  I had decided to 
invite our Israeli and Palestinian consultants to rehearsal on different evenings, 
both to avoid any potential conflict between them and also to allow the company 
an opportunity to digest one point of view before they were subjected to a 
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second.  Accordingly, Gerry and Rachelle arrived on the third day of rehearsal to 
address the cast about Israeli history and the Israeli perspective about the 
Palestinian struggle.  Gerry spoke first, and without any notes delivered an 
extraordinary history lecture, beginning with the ancient presence of Jews in the 
region, moving swiftly to the birth of the Zionist movement, recounting the 
lobbying efforts to United Kingdom diplomats that resulted in the Balfour 
Declaration (the first official British document to call for the establishment of a 
Jewish state in the Middle east), the establishment of Israel amid Arab attempts 
to resist it in the aftermath of the Second World War, the 1967 war that resulted 
in Israel controlling additional territory, including the West Bank, and the troubled 
relationship with both Palestinians and other Arab neighbors ever since.  He 
spoke articulately and with great apparent authority for almost two hours.  I 
observed that the cast remained attentive, asking relatively few questions but 
clearly interested in his narrative.                                                                                      
 Then Rachelle spoke, narrating her experiences as an Israeli citizen and 
soldier.  She spoke almost exclusively in terms of her own experiences, 
occasionally referencing a historical force or event, but focusing on the personal.  
On more than one occasion, she was overcome with emotion, describing the 
death of a fellow soldier or the terror of constant bombardment by Hezbollah 
forces in Lebanon, and I could plainly see that she had struck a chord with the 
actors that Gerry had not.  A number of actors were obviously moved, several to 
tears.  She was peppered with questions, most addressing emotional or cultural 
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experience, and by the time rehearsal ended, I sensed a different level of 
engagement on the part of the company, one that was visceral as well as 
intellectual.  After the departure of our guests there was a spirited level of 
discussion that injected a new note of urgency into the process.                                        
 As I reflected on the events of that evening, I recognized that the 
rehearsal had supplied direct evidence of what I was after in the production.  The 
actors had responded to Rachelle’s heart-felt emotion with some measure of 
empathy, elevating their interest and engagement in her account of life in Israel 
to a plane that was more complex than intellectual apprehension alone.  I 
suspected that part of this reaction was due to the specific needs of actors trying 
to embody characters foreign to them.  Rachelle provided them with emotional 
and cultural references that were more theatrically compelling than a more 
detached recitation of historical or political “facts.”  I cautioned the company to 
resist formulating significant positions, either politically or theatrically, until they 
had heard from the other side, a point quickly reinforced by Zaki, who had offered 
polite skepticism about much of what our guests had presented.                                    
 Yaser arrived on the fifth day of rehearsal.  He was not as articulate as 
Gerry, nor as emotional as Rachelle, but he had come prepared.  He began with 
a brief recitation of the Palestinian version of the historical “facts,” which, of 
course, differed significantly from the history we had heard several evenings 
earlier, focusing on the dispossession of indigenous populations and the long 
history of UN resolutions disapproving various Israeli positions and activities.  But 
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Yaser was most impressive when he distributed photocopied maps of the 
occupied territories that traced the establishment since 1967 of Jewish 
settlements and others which identified Israeli checkpoints and roadblocks.  As 
he told stories, culled from the experiences of his own family, about the inability 
of Palestinian people to secure timely medical treatment because of the 
roadblocks, about the level of poverty and deprivation endemic in the occupied 
territories, and about what he saw as a systematic process by which his people 
were stripped of dignity, I detected a rising tide of sympathy, taking the form of a 
warmth of verbal tone and increasingly open and engaging body language, from 
many cast members (and polite resistance from a few others).  Once again, the 
appeal to emotion, coupled with information, had elicited a powerful response.  
And Yaser, like Rachelle, was besieged with questions about the day-to-day life 
experience of Palestinians.  We spent considerable time discussing the notion of 
Juliet as a rebellious (and secular) Palestinian teenager.  By the time Yaser took 
his leave, the cast was visibly aroused and enthusiastic about the challenges of 
representing the cultures we had encountered so briefly.  
 
Dramaturgical Decisions 
The other part of our table work, other than the usual effort to decipher 
obscure language and undertake a dramaturgical analysis of the play, involved 
scrutinizing the text for language or references that seemed inappropriate given 
our production context.  I had determined early on that I wanted to preserve the 
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integrity of the text insofar as possible.  One immediate problem presented itself 
in the character of Friar Lawrence.  In the text as written, both families are 
Catholic, and Friar Lawrence occupies a dramaturgical position as a sort of 
honest broker, able to command the respect of both feuding families on the basis 
of their common religious convictions.  The Friar’s speeches are peppered with 
references to Catholic ritual and practice.  Clearly, in the world I was conjuring, a 
world characterized by the conflict between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Muslims, 
the imposition of a Catholic Friar would create endless confusion and 
complication.  Moreover, his status as a Christian cleric would not enhance his 
capacity to function as someone who moved easily between the two families’ 
worlds.                                                                                                                                 
 After much thought (and a return to many of my research materials), I 
reimagined him as a physician, a volunteer working in the West Bank with 
Médicins sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders).  These dedicated 
humanitarian workers have a significant presence in the West Bank, and while 
they primarily serve the Palestinian community, they certainly enjoy a measure of 
respect in all sectors of the population and have more freedom of movement than 
most civilians.  As I pondered the various implications of this strategy, I became 
convinced that an iconoclastic Doctor Lawrence, who dabbles in homeopathic 
remedies, might well befriend the curious and eager Romeo and sympathize with 
his youthful passion.  After I edited out most specific references to Catholic ritual 
from his dialogue, I would simply have to find a way to establish his identity early 
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in the play.  That consideration, along with my need to quickly establish the 
specific context of this production, led me to a decision about how to begin the 
play.  Instead of beginning conventionally with Shakespeare’s famous prologue 
with its explication of the two feuding households and their two star-crossed 
lovers, I chose to begin the play with an Islamic call to prayer (performed by Zaki 
in Arabic on a platform overlooking the stage) that gave way to a brief wordless 
street scene, replete with Hassidic Jews promenading across the stage, 
distastefully encountering Arab street merchants who returned physical gestures 
of hostility, even while conducting business with secular Israelis.   This very brief 
sequence, together with Scott Olinger’s scenic design, dominated by “buildings” 
seemingly made of the ancient, slightly yellow stone common in the area, 
established the setting as contemporary Jerusalem and led immediately into the 
entrance of Samson, Gregory et al. and the brawl between the men of the two 
houses, now identified as Israelis and Palestinians.                                                                                                        
 The brawl, which lasted approximately three minutes, involved complex 
staging that was designed to do several things: evoke the context of Arab/Israeli 
conflict, introduce Doctor Lawrence, and establish a sense of theatricality, in 
which metaphoric flourishes and non-realistic staging were intended to provide 
license to the audience’s imagination, even while rooting the spectators in a 
specific geo-political reality.  The fighting was choreographed to be vivid and 
brutal, using a combination of hand-to-hand combat techniques and modern 
weaponry.  Some of the fighting took place in real time, and some of it was 
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simultaneously performed in slow motion.  One self-contained combat sequence, 
involving Tybalt and Benvolio and a few more combatants, was staged so that it 
was repeated ritualistically, suggesting the endless nature of the conflict.  The 
entire brawl was underscored with driving contemporary (and heavily sampled) 
Arabic club music.22  Amidst the confusion of the fighting, four women, 
representing both Israelis and Palestinians, ran and moved through the jumble of 
fighting bodies waving long blood-red silk banners.  Visually, this added 
additional movement, color and excitement to the scene, but of course, the 
banners also suggested the blood that was continually flowing as a result of the 
conflict.                                                                                                               
 During the fight, a shot rang out and one of the Palestinian combatants fell 
to the ground downstage.  After a moment, the doctor appeared upstage, 
wearing a “Médicins Sans Frontières” jacket and carrying a doctor’s bag.  He 
moved through the gyrating bodies downstage until he reached the fallen man, 
then knelt in a vain attempt to provide medical attention to the fatally wounded 
young man.  Only then did the Prince (here conceived as the Mayor of 
Jerusalem) arrive on the balcony, where he stood with several heavily armed 
Israeli soldiers, surveying the chaos below.  After a Palestinian woman hurled 
rocks at him (which also trailed red silken tails), the Prince repeatedly fired his 
                                                 
22 Music was one of the most important design elements of this production.  I chose to select all the music 
myself, following months of research and listening.  My objective was to find music evocative of the 
cultures being staged, but keyed to or supportive of specific dramatic moments.  I ended up using both 
traditional and contemporary Arabic music and a good deal of klezmer music, again both traditional and 
modern.  Music was a constant presence in this production, used to provide transitional interest between 
scenes and to underscore selected moments and sequences. 
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sidearm in the air, causing the combatants to pause while he delivered his angry 
remarks.                                                                                                                                    
 Only after the Prince finished, and the stage was cleared of combatants, 
did Doctor Lawrence rise from the body of the fatally injured brawler, peel off his 
surgical gloves, and directly engaging the audience, deliver the famous lines of 
the prologue.   That prologue, of course, not only previews the tragic results of 
Romeo’s and Juliet’s passion for each other, but foregrounds that tragedy in 
Verona amidst “two households both alike in dignity.”  These words served notice 
of the moral and functional equivalence of two sides, which in America at least, 
are not usually seen as morally equivalent.  And by shattering any fourth wall 
conventions and directly engaging the audience, Lawrence drew them into the 
world of the performance, subtly suggesting a level of complicity, or at least 
participation, in the events that were being represented.                                                                         
 I decided early on that we would not try to represent our context with news 
footage realism.  It was important to me that we remained in a theatrical 
universe, where metaphor was a conventionalized system of communication.  
We never used blood, for example, although, the brawl included expressionistic 
flourishes involving dance-like movement with red silk banners and violent 
tableaux in repetitive cycles as well as more realistic fight choreography.  We 
allowed textual reference to “Verona” to stand, though it was clear that this 
particular Verona was a metaphor and bore more resemblance to Jerusalem 
than to any Italian city.                                                                                                     
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 The burden of sustaining our Middle eastern context was carried by three 
production elements: the set itself, designed by Scott Olinger, which evoked the 
ancient stone architecture of Jerusalem, complete with Hebrew and Arabic graffiti 
and an assortment of bullet holes; the costumes by Lindsay Stang, which 
faithfully represented the odd mixtures of modernity and tradition that one 
observes in Jerusalem; and the transitional music and underscoring, that I chose 
to evoke both Israeli and Arabic traditions and to reinforce the emotional colors of 
particular theatrical moments.  One additional production element supported our 
context.  I had retained Marie Sage, a local expert in Middle Eastern dance, to 
choreograph the dance sequence in the Capulet banquet where Romeo and 
Juliet meet.  Marie proved invaluable, not only as a choreographer, but also as a 
source of information about Arabic gestural vocabularies and social behavior 
(always subject to the confirmation of our consulting experts) that lent another 
layer of authenticity to the work of the actors and richness to the metaphors they 
were creating.                                                                                         
 Ultimately, I changed very little else in the text (aside from some modest 
cutting for sense and pace) with one significant exception.   In the original text, 
the discovery of Romeo’s and Juliet’s bodies are followed by a long section 
(approximately 150 lines) in which Friar Lawrence essentially recapitulates to the 
Prince the events that have resulted in the deaths and his part in them.  None of 
the information is new.  Dramaturgically, the section provides an opportunity for 
Lawrence to acknowledge his responsibility and by virtue of his forthrightness to 
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redeem himself.  I felt that Lawrence’s speeches were anti-climactic.  More 
importantly, I believed that this extremely talky sequence diluted the emotional 
impact of the teenagers’ deaths and their families’ reactions to them.  And I was 
concerned that the diminution of emotional impact would exact a toll on the 
empathic reactions I wanted to elicit from the audience.                                                 
 During my extensive musical research, I had fixed upon an instrumental 
performance by the band, The Klezmatics, which was essentially a clarinet 
improvisation within the sonic landscape of Klezmer music.   Beginning quietly 
and plaintively, the musical selection had a processional quality that built in 
volume and intensity until it virtually exploded in a painful climax, finally subsiding 
in a sad little denouement.  The piece struck me as especially appropriate to 
underscore a scene that dealt with grief and all things funereal.  And I was 
especially interested, throughout this production, in the capacity of musical 
selections to carry emotional cues.  After much deliberation, but before 
rehearsals had begun, I decided to cut the one hundred and fifty or so lines in 
question.  I substituted a wordless sequence in which, to the accompaniment of 
this music, both the Montagues and Capulets moved slowly onto the stage, 
discovering the bodies of their children with heart-breaking physical 
manifestations of their grief.  They were joined, as the music built to an emotional 
crescendo, by others in the community and finally the Prince, who regarded both 
families with evident dismay until the music climaxed.                                                          
 As the music began its descent from that climax, he asked, “Where be 
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these enemies?”  And the final twenty lines of the text, in which there is an 
uneasy reconciliation between the two families, were performed.  I was not 
content to allow the suggestion that the death of these innocents could resolve 
the conflict, so I contrived a more ambiguous ending.  Following the Prince’s 
famous final speech, which concludes: 
 Some shall be pardoned and some punishéd 
 For never was a story of more woe 
 Than this of Juliet and her Romeo 
 
I chose to have the families exit on opposite sides of the stage.  Just before their 
disappearance, Capulet and Montague paused and simultaneously looked back 
at each other with an apparent distrust that immediately called the reconciliation 
into question.   As they exited, Doctor Lawrence was the only remaining live body 
on stage.  As a haunting song in Hebrew played, he regarded the dead bodies 
sorrowfully and then slowly turned on the audience, implicating them too in the 
tragedy that had unfolded.  I imagine that very few people in the audience could 
translate the lyrics they were hearing, but if they had been able to do so, they 
would have heard: 
The sun will set behind the hill 
Love will come to Loneliness 
Who sits weeping on a golden stone. 
  
The sun will set behind the hill 
The Golden Peacock will come 
And take all of us to the place we long for. 
 
The character of the music itself, quite apart from the lyrics, expressed a kind of 
utopian longing. 
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 As Marjorie Garber points out, the characters left on stage at the end of 
Shakespeare’s text (the Prince, both families and Lawrence, among others) 
should not be understood as having absorbed the lessons of the lovers’ deaths. 
These witnesses, all remnants of an older world of law, have 
had the experience and missed the meaning.  The task of 
understanding what has transpired is left to the audience, 
which is part of the group enjoined by the Prince to ‘Go 
hence,’ out of the theater, ‘to have more talk of these sad 
things.’  In effect there are two audiences, one on and one 
off the stage. . . The movement beyond tragedy is left to the 
spectators (212). 
My staging, with the exit of the families suggesting a still unresolved conflict and 
with Doctor Lawrence turning to the spectators, was designed to emphasize this 
process of moving the argument of the play from the stage into the audience, 
where, I hoped, there would be further conversation, flecked with compassion, 
about “these sad things.” 
Throughout the production, I took care to focus on the humanity of the 
Capulets and their allies.  Capulet himself was depicted as a loving father and 
failed husband prone to bouts of irrational rage.  Lady Capulet’s self-absorption 
was softened by her parental awkwardness and hunger for love.  Paris was 
presented as a totally honorable and attractive suitor who had the misfortune to 
be rejected by the object of his affection.  At every opportunity, I chose to depict 
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characters who were profoundly human and subject to both playfulness and pain.  
My wonderful cast embodied the ideas of this production with great depth and 
compassion of their own. 
 
Reception 
As I have suggested, before the show opened, I was apprehensive about 
the response.  Even before rehearsals began, any number of people had 
cautioned me about this production concept, suggesting that it might be 
perceived as either trivializing or exploiting the conflict, which seemed to be 
escalating daily toward ever more extreme horrors.  I sought to preempt some of 
that feeling in a program note.  I wrote that: 
I truly believe that no subject is off limits for art.  If art is one 
means of generating insight and understanding, then the 
horror of a conflict that inspires polarizing hatred and despair 
appropriately invites the transforming eye of the artist.  
Shakespeare’s insights about the fruits of hatred have never 
been more relevant.  Our emotional engagement with 
theatrical conflict and death does not in any way diminish our 
capacity to respond to the real thing.  On the contrary, 
empathy in the theatre is not unlike empathy outside it, and if 
there is any kind of human intervention that can withstand 
the hatreds born of history, fear and desperation, it is an 
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empathetic one.  Only if we truly understand and feel for all 
sides of a conflict as divisive as that which presently 
consumes the Middle East, can there be any real prospect of 
resolution and reconciliation.  Theatre is an arena of feeling.  
And this Romeo and Juliet, which does not seek to advance 
any political agenda, will hopefully invite its audiences to feel 
the consequences of political agendas that become distorted 
by hatred. 
As it turned out, public response to the production was overwhelmingly positive.  
To be sure, some audience members and one newspaper reviewer expressed 
despair that this was not a “traditional” production.  One thoughtful academic 
opined that the dissonance between the original text and the contemporary 
context was distracting.  But the vast preponderance of opinion was positive.  
 Audience members were obviously moved, audible sobbing could be 
heard and tear-streaked faces observed at the play’s end.  Newspaper 
reviewers, with the exception of the one traditionalist, were extremely generous 
in their praise.  The most frequent comment expressed to me by audience 
members was that the context imparted a weight, an emotional immediacy, and a 
reality to Romeo and Juliet that was different from past productions they had 
witnessed and very welcome.  One sophisticated theatergoer commented to me 
that he had been highly skeptical about the production concept before coming, 
had resisted it throughout most of the play, but finally succumbed at its 
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conclusion, when the Prince pronounced that “all are punished.”   Another 
theatergoer commented in an e-mail to me that “the ending of the play reduced 
the intellectual equivocation that typifies attitudes about the conflict to a 
horrifyingly simple emotional truth.”  In other words, his cognitive process had 
been conditioned by his emotional response.  I felt relieved and vindicated – 
relieved that the play had worked in its most fundamental theatrical terms and 
vindicated in my belief that theatrical empathy could be an intellectual as well as 
an emotional force.  
I have no basis to make a claim for the experience of theatrical wonder as 
part of this production.  I was too exclusively focused on the operation of 
empathy to consider that operation together with the perception of metaphor as 
part of a phenomenon of theatrical reception.  And even though my belief in the 
level of compassion generated by this production is deep and strong, my 
evidence is anecdotal.   As much as I long for the validation of a utopian 
performative based on empathy and compassion, I cannot pretend that this 
production advanced the cause of peace or alleviated the endless suffering in a 
deadly conflict whose victims enjoy no poetry, no carefully wrought dramatic 
structure, no intermission, and no escape into metaphor.  But I do believe that in 
the complex fusion of intellect and emotion that is the theatre, world-traveling and 
profound insights born of empathy are possible.   Denzin says: “A performance 
authorizes itself, not through the citation of scholarly texts, but through its ability 
to evoke and invoke shared emotional experience and understanding between 
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performer and audience” (192).  And I believe that as the sun set behind the hill 
that forms the background of the Riverside Festival stage, Shakespeare’s Romeo 
and Juliet transported many of us to the place we long for, where the pain and 
passion of our humanity is acknowledged, explored, and honored for its still 
unrealized potential. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Tragedy and Wonder:  Albee’s The Goat 
 
  
 I want to expand the province of theatrical wonder.  I have argued that 
theatrical wonder, a reception phenomenon that is characterized by a 
convergence of emotional response in the form of empathy and imaginative flight 
occasioned by the perception and understanding of novel metaphor, produces 
delight.  I have argued further that wonder in some circumstances has much in 
common with a utopian performative in that it produces an affective awareness of 
possibility, and therefore has, at least on some occasions, considerable use in 
the pursuit of progressive political goals.  But wonder is not characterized only by 
the delight of the spectator.  It may also be present in that aspect of awe that 
relates to dread, when that dread is itself the result of profound emotion in a 
metaphoric field that requires understanding.  Wonder may, in fact, be associated 
with a response to tragedy, and the reception of tragedy may also serve a 
progressive political agenda.  Aristotle’s well-known characterization of the 
idealized response to tragedy is that the experience yields pity and fear.  I 
believe that pity here may be a functional equivalent to empathy, and fear, which 
requires a certain imaginative projection by the spectator coupled with a 
fundamental level of understanding, may serve as an analogue to the 
hermeneutic process that extracts meaning from metaphor.  And while it is true 
that theorists from Brecht to Boal have denied the political efficacy associated 
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with catharsis, or tragic response, a great deal of contemporary theory supports 
the opposite conclusion. 
 It is in this context that I take up a consideration of Edward Albee’s recent 
play The Goat, or Who is Sylvia? and my production of the play in 2004.  Albee 
has subtitled his play Notes toward a Definition of Tragedy, this despite his usual 
classification as a writer in the tradition of the Theatre of the Absurd.  I will argue 
that these writerly identity positions are not mutually exclusive, and that Albee’s 
play seeks to elicit powerful emotions in a context where important ideas are 
cloaked in metaphor.  In my production, I attempted to honor Albee’s intentions, 
and in the process witnessed the evocation of a form of theatrical wonder 
characterized more by awe than delight, but one which nonetheless enables the 
conception of a more open and tolerant society. 
I saw the Broadway production of The Goat, or Who is Sylvia? in the 
spring of 2002, shortly after it opened to mixed but generally favorable reviews 
and considerable controversy.   The play depicts the impact of a revelation of a 
sexual and emotional relationship between a man and a goat on the privileged, 
successful family of which the man in question is a member.  The play had an 
immense impact on me.  I was moved and disturbed by the destruction visited 
upon its principal characters, yet I found much of the early part of the play 
genuinely funny.  I was struck both by the extent to which the play forced me to 
confront my own assumptions about sexual norms and the extent to which the 
play served as a sort of meditation on the nature of tragedy and its place in our 
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lives.  I was not enthusiastic about all the performances, especially those of the 
two supporting characters, but I guessed that my reticence was the product of 
acting choices rather than a textual weakness.  As I left the theatre that night, I 
noticed the tell-tale signs of my response to especially stimulating texts.  I was 
physically antsy, unable to sit still and process the experience in an orderly way.  
My thinking was an uneasy and volatile mix of flashing, slightly unfocused 
images and snatches of unformed ideas.  My desire to engage this text in a more 
intimate and rigorous way was palpable.   
Less than two years later, in January of 2004, I opened my own 
production of this play at Riverside Theatre in Iowa City.  By then, I had folded 
my ideas about Albee’s script into the theoretical matrix that represents my 
attempt to explore theatrical wonder, especially in terms of its relationship to 
theatrical empathy and the attachment of metaphor that heightens and amplifies 
the range and implications of such empathy.  
 
Edward Albee and the Tragic 
Edward Albee has earned his place in the pantheon of “great American 
playwrights.”  Now in his late seventies and still writing, Albee has produced a 
body of work over the last four and a half decades that has earned him three 
Pulitzer Prizes23 ( for A Delicate Balance, 1966; Seascape, 1974; and Three Tall 
                                                 
23 When Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? debuted on Broadway in October 1962, it encountered 
considerable controversy, despite some critical reaction that hailed it as a major achievement.  Many 
theatre-goers were shocked by its strong language, sensuality, and undercurrents of discontent with 
American institutions. Controversy reached a climax when the Pulitzer Prize drama jury selected the play 
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Women, 1991), two Tony awards for best play, (Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? 
(1963) and The Goat or Who is Sylvia? (2002), the Kennedy Center 
Commendation for Lifetime Achievement (1996), and the National Medal of Arts 
(1996).   Yet little consensus exists about his rightful place in a critical continuum.  
He has been analyzed as a sort of literary soul mate to Pirandello (Paolucci 
2003: 21-22).   He has been celebrated as a determined critic of social 
complacency (Amacher 22).  Individual plays have been interpreted, praised and 
critiqued as everything from metaphysical explorations of ontological quandaries 
to coded meditations about homoerotic impulses.  Albee himself has expressed a 
somewhat bemused reaction to scholarly appraisals of his work:  “I read these 
books about me.  I’m sent numbers of copies of books about me and scholarly 
papers, and I read them the way I do fiction” (Wasserman 20).  
 Above all, however, he has been hailed, from early in his career, as the 
primary American exponent of the “Theatre of the Absurd” (Cohn 6).   Martin 
Esslin, who coined the term “theatre of the absurd” in his 1961 book of the same 
name, ushered in the long association of Albee with absurdism in his 1969 
revision of his book, in which he devoted four pages to Albee, characterizing his 
work as belonging to the category of the Theatre of the Absurd in part because of 
his attack on the foundation of American optimism (267).  With reference to 
Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? Esslin argues that an element of dream and 
                                                                                                                                                 
for the award that year. The trustees of Columbia University, overseers of the awards and quite sensitive to 
the impassioned controversy swirling around the play, rejected the recommendation of the jury, resulting in 
the resignations of two of its members.  As a result of the struggle over Albee’ s work, no Pulitzer Prize in 
that category was awarded in 1962. 
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allegory (especially the imaginary child) and Albee’s “Genet-like” preoccupation 
with rituals and games justifies the categorizing of this play as beholden to the 
traditions of the absurd (268-269).   
Esslin understands the term Theatre of the Absurd to refer to a theatre 
that instead of purporting to represent a universal truth or series of truths,  
represents the highly idiosyncratic insights of one individual’s sense of being in 
the world, a highly personal, and often darkly comical, intuition about the human 
situation which may be expressed in dream-like or illogical ways, in images and 
fragments of perception that give the lie to prior attempts to render “reality” as 
coherent and universally experienced, that pierce the veil of illusions that has 
been drawn to protect us.  Albee, who is (or was) in substantial agreement with 
Esslin has been quoted as explaining that “[t]he Theatre of the Absurd is an 
absorption-in-art of certain existentialist and post-existentialist philosophical 
concepts having to do, in the main, with man’s attempt to make sense for himself 
out of his senseless position in a world which makes no sense – which makes no 
sense because the moral, religious, political and social structures man has 
erected  to ‘illusion’ himself have collapsed” (quoted in Amacher 20).  Albee’s 
rhetorical resort to political and social structures, however, suggests an interest 
in issues that extend beyond purely personal perceptions.  Indeed, I contend that 
Albee has always been, and continues to be, a social critic eager to nudge his 
audiences toward a more progressive view of those very political and social 
structures.  I will argue that The Goat, or Who is Sylvia? has a clear political and 
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social agenda – that of urging more tolerant attitudes in law and culture about 
sexual behavior. 
Despite the association of absurdist theatre with peculiarly 20th century 
themes, especially the impact and aftermath of existentialist thinking, Esslin 
relates the theatre he describes to a tradition that is as old as theatre itself: 
 Concerned as it is with the ultimate realities of the human 
condition, the relatively few fundamental problems of life and 
death, isolation and communication, the Theatre of the 
Absurd, however grotesque, frivolous, and irreverent it may 
appear, represents a return to the original, religious function 
of the theatre – the confrontation of man with myth and 
religious reality.  Like ancient Greek tragedy and the 
medieval mystery plays and baroque allegories, the Theatre 
of the Absurd is intent on making its audience aware of 
man’s precarious and mysterious position in the universe 
(353). 
This notion of connecting the concerns of the Theatre of the Absurd with more 
longstanding theatrical traditions clearly resonates in Albee’s work, especially 
insofar as connections are made to the traditions of classical Greek theatre.   
Albee’s interest in classical themes and motifs is of long standing.  His 
earlier work demonstrates a fascination with Greek tragic traditions that gestures 
toward his overt determination in The Goat to explore the meaning of tragedy.  
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Richard Amacher has noted that Albee’s first work, The Zoo Story (1959), can be 
seen as containing elements of Greek tragedy in terms of its plotting (which rests 
upon a series of cause and effect episodes) and especially in its use of a 
reversal, various discoveries and a sense of recognition in the Aristotelian sense 
(41).  According to Amacher, when Jerry rushes on the knife-holding Peter (the 
episode representing a plot reversal), “the playgoer experiences a genuine 
catharsis of pity and fear” (42).  He goes on to reflect that  
 With the realization of what he has done, Peter changes 
from his earlier tolerance for Jerry to horror of what Jerry has 
made him – a murderer.  Horror [emphasis in original] is 
perhaps not the same as Aristotle’s ‘hate,’ but Albee does 
speak of love and hate together as the teaching emotion; and 
such a mixture of love and hate is the emotional state of both 
protagonist and antagonist as the drama closes. . . . Thus the 
absurdity of survival in the twentieth century is dramatized with 
peculiarly Grecian effectiveness. (42) 
More than one critic has noted that Albee set Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? in a 
fictional location called New Carthage.  According to legend, the original 
Carthage was founded in the ninth century B.C.E. by Dido.  The maritime city 
was a rival to the Greek city states and was the principal adversary of ancient 
Rome in the Punic Wars.  St Augustine described the city as “a cauldron of 
unholy loves” (quoted in Cohn 25).  Cohn observes that in Who’s Afraid of 
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Virginia Woolf? Albee makes effective allegorical use of this historical conjunction 
of sex and power, transferring its associations to the specifically American stew 
represented by the marital warfare of George and Martha (ibid).24  Forty-four 
years after The Zoo Story and forty years after Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? 
Albee has continued his fascination with classical theatre and a cauldron of 
“unholy love,” now in much more overt fashion.  The Goat or Who is Sylvia? was 
published with the parenthetical subtitle: Notes Toward a Definition of Tragedy.   
 The plot of The Goat is quite simple.  In the first of three scenes (played 
without an intermission), we are introduced to a middle-aged married couple, 
Martin and Stevie.  They are apparently in the prime of their lives.  Martin, who is 
turning fifty, is a world class architect, both famous and famously successful.  
Stevie, who seems to fulfill a rather old-fashioned notion of wife and home-
maker, at least in terms of her vocation, is depicted immediately as Martin’s 
equal in wit and intellect.  We learn, too, that they have a much loved seventeen-
year-old son, Billy, who is gay.  They share an easy intimacy and a clear 
affection that is only slightly unsettled by Martin’s sense of distraction and 
Stevie’s slightly suspicious awareness of it.   They are awaiting the arrival of 
Ross, a public television producer and Martin’s oldest friend, who is coming to 
tape a television interview with Martin.  As the doorbell rings, Stevie voices her 
partly serious concern that Martin may be having an affair.  His response is a 
                                                 
24 In a production of Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? that I directed in Tampa in 1988, I chose to 
emphasize this classical motif (and what I saw then as a titanic clash between god-like characters) by 
working with my scenic designer, Eric Veenstra, to create a set that evoked classical themes by utilizing 
pillars surrounding a (living room) pit that resembled the orchestra of an amphitheatre with an elevated area 
for the bar that represented a sort of sacrificial altar. 
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brief parody of some Noel Coward dialogue, a theatrically overwrought and 
humorous exchange in which Stevie gleefully joins.  Martin ends the exchange 
with a confession that he has fallen in love with a certain Sylvia, who happens to 
be a goat.  Stevie, taken aback momentarily, treats this as a joke and admits 
Ross.  She leaves the men to their interview as she leaves the house to run 
errands. 
 Ross’s attempted interview is a means of exposition.  We learn that Martin 
has just won the Pritzker Prize, a prestigious award in the world of architecture.  
Moreover, he has been selected to lead a monumental and highly coveted 
project, the multi-billion dollar creation of a model city.  When Martin is too 
distracted to continue the interview, Ross attempts to draw him out.  We learn, to 
Ross’s amused astonishment, that Martin has always been faithful to Stevie – 
until recently.  Martin eventually confesses that he has met Sylvia, fallen in love 
with her, and for six months has been enmeshed in an affair.  As the scene 
concludes, Martin shows Ross a photograph of Sylvia.  She is a goat.  Ross, 
expressing his outrage and concern for Martin’s mental health warns him that he 
must talk to Stevie about this, or Ross will tell her himself. 
 The second scene begins in the midst of a family confrontation, where 
Stevie and the teenage Billy confront Martin with a letter that Stevie has received 
from Ross, informing her (in Billy’s words) that Martin is “fucking a goat.”  After 
Martin, in an extreme emotional state, makes some ugly observations about 
Billy’s homosexuality and immediately recoils with guilt and regret, the teenager 
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is sent to his room, and the scene becomes a tense confrontation between the 
husband and wife, she expressing her sense of outraged betrayal in ever 
escalating terms and he seeking to explain a love, “an epiphany,” that is beyond 
reason or sense.  The scene careens back and forth between moments of 
uncomfortable humor and moments of almost unbearable pain, during the course 
of which much pottery is broken and furniture overturned, leaving this stylish 
architect’s environment a shambles.  By the end of the scene, Billy has 
reappeared briefly only to flee the house in a state of adolescent anguish, and 
Stevie, in a chilling final face-off with Martin, bellows that he has brought her 
down and that she will bring him down as well.  She storms out of the house, 
leaving Martin alone and desolate. 
 The third and final scene begins a few hours later, when Billy returns to 
find his father alone amidst the destruction that was once his well-appointed 
home.  Billy angrily confronts his father, but ultimately expresses the love and 
need he feels for him.  Billy tearfully melts into his father’s arms, but as he seeks 
consolation there, the moment turns unexpectedly sexual, and Billy attempts to 
kiss Martin passionately.  Martin thrusts him away – then in a moment of simple 
parental compassion folds Billy into his arms again.  In the meantime, Ross has 
entered the house again unseen by Martin and Billy, and he witnesses this 
intimate moment between father and son.  As he expresses his righteous 
outrage, Martin turns to his traumatized son and tells him a story about how he 
was once sexually aroused by a baby in his lap, but discovered that it really 
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meant nothing.  It was, according to Martin, a simple physical response rather 
than an indication of something deeper.  Billy is left to wonder whether he was 
the infant in the story while Ross and Martin face each other in a duet of 
condemnation by Ross and expressions of the need for tolerance by Martin.  As 
Martin articulates his sense of aloneness, Stevie reappears covered in blood and 
dragging the corpse of Sylvia, whom she has slaughtered. 
 The play ends after a brief anguished exchange between Martin and 
Stevie.  Martin howls in solitary agony, Stevie stands in the stunned aftermath of 
her violent act, Ross looks on in shock, and Billy pathetically tries to capture the 
attention of one or the other of his stricken parents.  The final moment of the play 
is a tableau of utter misery and devastation, an expression of the tragic. 
 As someone attuned to dramatic literature from an early age, I had 
acquired a conception of tragedy at some point during high school, probably 
rendered by a teacher with a special affinity for “the glory that was Greece.”  
Long before I encountered the Poetics as a primary text, I had an understanding 
of tragedy that went something like this: A person of noble birth or high social 
stature is burdened with a personal flaw that, when combined with rather 
mysterious cosmic forces, which may or may not have something to do with 
destiny, is brought low, to a point of almost unspeakable suffering.  Somehow, 
the spectator’s experience of that misery purges him (in those days, it was 
always “him”) of bad feelings, allowing for a kind of social and personal 
regeneration.   
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 Certainly, The Goat seems to meet many of the elements of this simple 
definition of tragedy.  Martin, as one of the world’s most renowned architects, is a 
person of elevated stature.  His flaw seems to reside in his inability to conform to 
normative sexual behavior, especially when caught up in the thralls of a force 
that is a variant of, or somehow resembles, love.  His reversal of fortune and 
level of personal agony, like that of his family, is indisputable.  “So classic is The 
Goat’s structure that a reader or playgoer can almost postulate the choral ode . . 
. that might follow the play’s first and second episodes or scenes” (Kuhn 15).   I 
will return to the issue of audience reception, but clearly Albee’s play is draped in 
traditional tragic clothing.  His project, however, as announced in his subtitle, was 
not simply to render a tragedy, but to seek to define it. 
 
Tragedy, Emotional Response, and Theatrical Wonder 
The critical engagement of tragedy is rather more complex, of course, 
than my high school formulation suggested.  George Steiner argues that recent 
attempts to gain a theoretical purchase on tragedy, coming from intellectual 
traditions as various as anthropological, ritual, structuralist, post-structuralist, 
feminist, deconstructionist, and linguistic, have done little to address the 
fundamental definitional question of what actually constitutes tragedy (535).  He 
hazards his own definition that tragedy is a dramatic representation of a highly 
specific world-view.  “It entails the view that human life per se, both ontologically 
and existentially, is an affliction . . . that men and women’s presence on this earth 
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is fundamentally absurd or unwelcome, that our lives are not a gift or a natural 
unfolding, but a self-punishing anomaly (Steiner 536).”   On first blush, this 
seems like a definition that dovetails nicely with the Theatre of the Absurd as 
Esslin has described it.  The conclusion of Albee’s play, in its most fundamental 
terms, where a perfectly happy and successful group of people has been virtually 
and actually destroyed, without any hope of relief or redemption, suggests 
something akin to Steiner’s affliction.  But Steiner’s understanding of tragedy is 
offered as a general statement of universal application, and the Theatre of the 
Absurd, if nothing else, is idiosyncratically subjective, the highly personal 
perception of the world by an individual artist in highly specific circumstances.  
More importantly, Steiner offers a cool intellectual analysis that does not 
incorporate the emotional reaction of the spectator as part of the fundamental 
essence of the dramatic phenomenon that he seeks to define.  
Albee is clearly seeking to elicit emotional reactions from his spectators.  
One way in which this exercise in understanding the tragic does invoke the 
absurd is in its use of humor, its insistence on provoking laughter.  “The Goat  
can be termed theatrically ‘absurd’ in its openly discussed mixing of very dark 
and very hilarious comedy into its tragedy, especially in its rapid and non-linear 
alternations of the zanily (or hysterically) comic and seriously sad” (Kuhn 25).  
The sadness and pain suffered by the principal characters in The Goat also 
seem to demand an emotional response from the audience, a reaction 
predicated upon the spectator’s almost grudging connection to those characters.  
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Both as a theorist and as a practitioner, I am vitally interested in that emotional 
reaction.  I believe that reaction involves the stimulation of an empathic 
response, in Martin’s case an empathic response to someone engaged in 
behavior which is highly distasteful to most spectators.  Edward Albee’s “notes 
toward a definition of tragedy” challenges us to explore the limits of our capacity 
for empathy and invites us to ponder the tension between forces in our lives as 
fundamental as love and sexuality with the constraints imposed upon them by 
social convention and regulation.  In other words, Albee is using the nuances of 
tragic reception to invite us to consider realms of behavior and experience quite 
foreign to most of us. 
All theoretical considerations about tragedy begin, of course, with 
Aristotle.  While the primacy of the Poetics in western theatrical and literary 
theory is not seriously disputed, there are considerable differences of opinion 
about almost every interpretive detail of this foundational work (Carlson 16).  The 
most unified definition of tragedy within the Poetics appears in chapter 6, where 
tragedy is described as “an imitation of a noble and complete action, having the 
proper magnitude; it employs language that has been artistically enhanced by 
each of the kinds of linguistic adornment, applied separately in the various parts 
of the play; it is presented in dramatic, not narrative form, and achieves, through 
the representation of pitiable and fearful incidents, the catharsis of such pitiable 
and fearful incidents” (Aristotle 11). 
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The concept of catharsis, which relates to the emotional dimension of 
tragedy at issue here, was never fully developed or explained in the extant 
writings of Aristotle.  Its interpretation has occasioned constant scholarly 
controversy.  The most common interpretation treats catharsis as a kind of 
medical term, relating to the alleged phenomenon by which the passions aroused 
in spectators by tragedy are purged or cleansed.  An alternative view considers 
catharsis from a moral perspective, where the impact of the tragic experience on 
the spectator is understood as purification, and an intellectual enlightenment 
about how disturbing emotions may fit within a harmonious conception of the 
world.  Still other scholars have urged the idea that catharsis is a structural or 
artistic term, representing the means by which the plot is returned to a sense of 
equilibrium from a state of disruption (Carlson 18).  Charles Segal points out that 
prominent classical scholars in recent years “have argued strongly that catharsis 
refers to an intellectual [italics in original] clarification, either of the events or the 
emotions, rather than to emotional, medical, or ritual purification or purgation” 
(153), but he goes on to argue that Aristotle is concerned with the emotional 
reaction of an audience to a tragedy.  For Aristotle, he says, “the emotions also 
have a cognitive basis and presumably can be ‘clarified’ by intellectual 
processes” (155).   Like empathy, therefore, catharsis, the pity and fear 
contemplated by Aristotle, must be understood as having both a cognitive and an 
affective dimension.  Pity may be akin to sympathy, but pity and fear, taken 
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together, require a process of identification that either resembles empathy or is, 
in fact, empathy by another name.   
My argument is that empathic response, with its intellectual and emotional 
constituents, is a necessary part of the process by which an audience may be 
moved to wonder, and I have further claimed that wonder, by virtue of its power 
in the realm of the deeply felt imaginary, is a phenomenon with potential for 
social and political impact.  In a world view that denies the Cartesian division 
between mind and body, between cognition and emotion, there must be an 
acknowledgment that emotional response can have real efficacy in terms of a 
societal consideration of vital issues.  I believe that Aristotle, who after all was 
defending the beneficial aspects of poetry from Plato’s assault on art as too 
dangerous for inclusion in The Republic, understood this as part of his analysis of 
tragedy.  I contend, too, that Edward Albee has incorporated this idea into his 
own exploration of tragedy in the context of The Goat or Who is Sylvia? where 
his aim is not only an exercise in definition, but also a plea for tolerance of sexual 
difference that has far-ranging political and social implications.  Much like a 
utopian performative, which evokes an affective apprehension of possibility, 
Albee is engineering a theatrical occasion where our emotional response 
compels an acknowledgment that our own sexual codes and assumed values 
may not be as neatly circumscribed as we might have believed.   
This valorization of emotional response flies in the face of a great deal of 
influential theory about politically efficacious theatre.  Bertolt Brecht famously 
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railed against empathy as a phenomenon that narcotized audiences, impairing 
their capacity for detached analysis and the political action that could presumably 
flow from such an analysis.  Boal has argued that catharsis is politically 
conservative in that its purging effect does not require action to affect social 
change.  These various expressions of skepticism about the political agency of 
emotional identification have been undermined by more contemporary 
understandings about emotional response and its place in political discourse. 
The basic tenets of Brecht’s theoretical formulations for a politically 
effective theatre are well known.  They include his call for a theatre stripped of 
illusionistic practices, his use of the so-called alienation effect as an acting 
technique, the use of music, slides, and various forms of commentary as 
techniques to compel ruptures in the narrative and in the emotional involvement 
of spectators, his formulation of the notion of gestus as a technique for staging – 
all the theoretical adjustments to theatrical practice that Brecht collected under 
the rubric of “epic theatre.”  All of these adjustments were calculated to facilitate 
the process of thoughtful consideration and political analysis by the audience, 
which also meant, for Brecht, the avoidance of emotional involvement by the 
audience in the events of the play.   
One of Brecht’s most famous ideas, particularly with regard to styles of 
acting, is encapsulated in the German term verfremdungseffekt.  The traditional 
English translation of this term as “alienation effect” has caused considerable 
confusion and often led to a misapprehension that Brecht favored an acting style 
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that was stiff, formal and devoid of emotion.  Brecht himself, by the time he wrote 
A Short Organum for the Theatre, debunks this reading of his intentions:   
At no moment must he [the actor] go so far as to be wholly 
transformed into the character played.  The verdict: ‘he 
didn’t act Lear, he was Lear’ would be an annihilating blow 
to him.  He has just to show his character, or rather he has 
to do more than just get into it; this does not mean that if 
he is playing passionate parts he must himself remain cold.  
It is only that his feelings must not at bottom be those of 
the character, so that the audience’s may not at bottom be 
those of the character either.  (Willett 193-194) 
Brecht is arguing for a style of performance that facilitates the critical awareness 
of the audience and avoids an emotional engagement on the part of both actor 
and audience that militates against such a critical engagement.  John Fuegi 
argues persuasively that by the term verfremdung Brecht intended something 
“richly and provocatively ambivalent” (83).  Brecht was seeking a theatrical 
means by which he could “disrupt the viewers’ normal or run of the mill 
perception by introducing elements that will suddenly cause the viewer to see 
familiar objects in a strange way and to see strange objects in a familiar way” 
(83).  In other words, “the task of the V-effect . . . is to reveal a suppressed or 
unconsidered alternative; to show the possibilities for change implicit in 
difference and contradiction” (Thompson and Sacks 194).  Acting style, like other 
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aspects of epic theatre, is intended to create a condition in which critical analysis 
is encouraged.  The actor attempting an “alienated” style by which he comments 
in some way on his character is simply seeking to create such a condition by 
discouraging a runaway empathy on the part of an audience that allows 
emotional response to overwhelm the capacity for an intellectual vantage point.   
Brechtian theory, however, has demonstrated a certain functional 
elasticity.  Elin Diamond, in appropriating the Brechtian concept of gestus for 
purposes of a feminist analysis of mimesis, observes that both “feminist theory 
and Brechtian theory are moving, changing discourses, open to multiple 
readings” (1997: 43).  States provides an example of such a reading when he 
considers emotional responses to Mother Courage as written by Brecht that 
seem to vindicate the matrix of emotional response in tragedy, despite his 
misgivings: 
But as Brecht draws her, we are suspended in an 
Aristotelian paradox: she elicits both pity, the impulse to 
approach or to understand, and fear, the impulse to retreat 
(though in Brecht’s critical theater we must substitute 
another word for tragic fear, perhaps outrage, in the sense 
that we know ‘this should not be!’).  But it is through this 
balance of conflicting feelings, of empathy and objectivity, 
that Brecht avoids the excesses of sentimentality and moral 
didacticism and creates a form of classical theater.  This is 
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not what Brecht had in mind, but it is what will make his 
plays producible long after Verfremdungseffekt is a dead 
word. (1985: 106) 
Diamond reads the term verfremdungseffekt, however, in such a way as to insure 
a long life, describing it as “the technique of defamiliarizing a word, an idea, a 
gesture so as to enable the spectator to see or hear it afresh” (1997: 45).  She 
goes on to apply this concept to an interrogation of gender:  “Understanding 
gender as ideology – as a system of beliefs and behavior mapped across the 
bodies of women and men which enforces a social status quo – is to appreciate 
the continued timeliness of verfremdungseffekt, the purpose of which always is to 
denaturalize and defamiliarize what ideology – and performativity – makes seem 
normal, acceptable, inescapable” (47).  I suggest that Albee has a similar 
enterprise in mind in The Goat: to use the technique of tragedy to defamiliarize 
our notions of sexual propriety, to enable us to consider bestiality as an idea and 
a metaphor afresh, and, in the process, destabilize our ideas about sexuality in 
general. 
Certainly the tradition of the tragic is one of engaging ideas.  Even the 
most ardent proponent of a Brechtian perspective would grant that for the 
Athenians in 5th century Greece B.C.E., at least those Athenians classified as 
citizens, coming to grips with ideas and active political involvement was a cultural 
preoccupation.  “Athens was animate with debate and argument, and public life 
was a kind of lived performance in which a community of interested (or simply 
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curious) parties could form at any moment” (Rehm 5).  The Festival of Dionysus, 
with its competition for tragedians, was a cultural and religious civic institution 
that fostered political debate even as it sought to emotionally move its audiences 
by its demonstration of theatrical art.  
Embracing the notion that cognitive and affective elements of audience 
response are not severable, classics scholar Ismene Lada argues the thesis that 
“although Greek theatre justifies Brecht’s conception of the ‘Aristotelian’ 
auditorium as a space where ‘everybody feels’, emotion within the Greek 
dramatic frame is a privileged way of attaining understanding, self-realization, 
and socio-cultural self-definition” (Lada 398, emphasis in original).  Citing 
decades worth of research in the social sciences that suggest that cognitive 
processes are the primary mechanism by which emotional reactions are elicited, 
she translates that research to a consideration of Aristotle’s formulation for tragic 
response: 
 To narrow the focus on the inherently ‘tragic’ emotions of  
‘pity’ and ‘fear,’ the ability to reason well, together with a 
multitude of cognitive considerations, are the sine qua non 
parameters in the determination of an individual’s proneness 
to the emotive state of pitying; fear, correspondingly, not only 
is elicited on the basis of a rational evaluation of the reality, 
proximity, and imminence of danger, but also leads to further 
deliberative and mental action (403). 
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Thus she argues that, in Greek tragedy, knowledge, which was culturally 
understood to be a precursor to action, was achieved through the emotional 
apprehension of someone’s suffering or death. 
  In Greek theatrical experience then, a fundamental channel 
  of communication between author, performer, and their 
  addressees is sustained through the transfusion of emotion, 
the identity of shared feelings.  Moreover, in contrast to 
Brecht’s – and Plato’s! – evaluation that poetry’s appeal to 
emotionality jeopardizes the individual’s attempt at rational 
control, emotion is a privileged way of getting access to the 
truth, of reaching both understanding of others and, most 
importantly, self-realization (404). 
I would complete Lada’s line of argument by urging that the understanding and 
self-realization to which she refers is much more than a necessary antecedent to 
rational control; it is a prerequisite for informed and efficacious action.  And while 
her argument is intended to rescue the Aristotelian consideration of Greek 
tragedy from Brechtian dismissal, I contend that these same insights apply to 
Edward Albee’s much more contemporary experiment with tragic form.  Many of 
the extant Greek tragedies addressed some kind of social malaise, a societal 
condition that required healing or some kind of intervention (Kuhn 28).  Here 
Albee is addressing the social malaise of sexual intolerance.  If Brecht was 
seeking a theatrical means by which he could disrupt the spectator’s normal 
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perception by introducing elements that will cause that spectator to see the 
familiar as strange and the strange as familiar, then I believe that Albee 
accomplishes this in part by inviting our compassion in circumstances when it 
might otherwise be withheld, by invoking empathy in spite of our predisposition 
for judgment. 
 
Metaphor as a Portal 
 While classical literature and mythology is replete with references to sex 
between humans and other creatures,25 few could argue that bestiality or 
zoophilia (the terms are used almost indistinguishably, at least in popular 
discourse) is regarded as abhorrent by a clear majority of people in our culture.  
Twenty-eight of fifty states have laws specifically prohibiting sexual relations 
between humans and other species, and many others include bestiality within 
legal definitions of sodomy.  The taboo is sufficiently deep that it is almost 
impossible to imagine a circumstance in which this particular sexual behavior 
could be described in mainstream cultural conversation without inviting disgust 
and condemnation. 
 Riverside Theatre, where I directed my production of The Goat, has a 
regular practice of offering a public forum about issues presented or suggested 
by its productions, led by a prominent local academic, before opening.  These 
                                                 
25 Zeus took the form of a swan to seduce Leda, for example. The minotaur was the offspring of Queen 
Pasiphae and a white bull.  And of course the satyr, a half-man half-goat creature with particularly 
licentious appetites for nymphs and other females taking human form, was associated in myth with the 
ecstatic practices of Dionysus.   
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forums are typically attended by some of the most loyal and sophisticated 
members of the theatre’s regular audience.  At the well-attended forum that 
preceded the opening of this play, there was considerable discussion about 
Edward Albee and his propensity for theatrical provocation, but as the 
conversation turned to the specific subject of bestiality as a subject for theatrical 
exploration, substantial numbers of the audience expressed a level of distaste 
that I have never heard before in similar settings.  More than one offered 
observations to the effect that he or she would find it difficult to sit through such a 
production, and in response to a specific question, many in the audience 
indicated that they would find it impossible to sympathize with a character 
involved in that particular variety of sexual behavior.   
Almost as soon as rehearsals began, I was informed by the artistic leaders 
of the company that they had received an angry telephone call from one of their 
most prominent and generous supporters demanding to know, without having 
either read or seen the play, why they would sink so low as to bring “this kind of 
filth” into the community.  Despite his longstanding history of support for the 
liberal agenda of the theatre, he was unmoved by their explanations about the 
play’s pedigree, its inherent plea for tolerance, or its metaphorical associations 
with other vital social issues.  He likened it to child pornography and threatened 
to withdraw his financial support from the theatre.  (Ultimately, he did not 
withdraw that support, but he never could bring himself to see the production.)  
Clearly, attitudes about bestiality and the social taboos associated with it, run 
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deep within contemporary American culture.26  Perhaps because the taboo is so 
profound, there is also considerable fascination with the taboo.  “Sexual 
relationships between humans and lower animals have long occupied the minds 
of men and women. . . . [M]ost compendiums of myths abound in tales of gods 
and goddesses taking non-human forms to fornicate with desired mortals. 
William Butler Yeats retold the rape of a great beauty by Zeus with visceral 
eloquence in ‘Leda and the Swan,’ and James Dickey wrote spellbindingly of a 
sheep/child preserved in a laboratory jar. There are also tales of women and 
animals. The legend of Catherine the Great and her stallion is apocryphal, but 
the Danish writer Peter Hoeg convincingly and rather lyrically told of a passionate 
affair in ‘The Woman and the Ape’” (Johnson, Hartford Courant review of The 
Goat).  A Google search for the word “bestiality” yields 1,670,000 references, an 
astonishing number of which are pornographic websites, offering stories, 
photographs, and films of the most graphic nature, catering to what is apparently 
a huge and profitable market.    
Clearly, by presenting a protagonist who claims not only to have had an 
ongoing sexual relationship with a goat, but also to have fallen in love with her, 
Albee is quite consciously urging his spectators to enter a zone of discomfort.  
And he gives voice to the disgust and condemnation that he no doubt expects in 
his audience in each of the other three characters in the play.  When Martin 
finally reveals the identity of his mysterious lover to his best friend by showing 
                                                 
26  The taboo is by no means peculiarly American.  The most serious criminal penalty for bestiality I could 
find was in the United Kingdom, where punishment may extend to life imprisonment. 
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him a photograph, Ross responds with righteous outrage:  “You’re in very serious 
trouble . . . THIS IS A GOAT!  YOU’RE HAVING AN AFFAIR WITH A GOAT!  
YOU’RE FUCKING A GOAT!” (punctuation in original 22-23).  Martin’s son Billy 
is confused and incredulous and becomes involved in a shouting match with his 
father that results in him contemptuously referring to him as a “goat-fucker,”  only 
to have Martin reply by calling him a “fucking faggot” (23).   Martin immediately 
regrets this shocking and hateful epithet delivered to his own son, and even his 
wife, Stevie, who is struggling with her own pained reaction to Martin’s conduct, 
comes to his defense: 
  I said your father’s sorry for calling you a fucking faggot 
  because he’s not that kind of man.  He’s a decent, liberal, 
right-thinking, talented, famous, gentle man (Hard) who right  
now would appear to be fucking a goat; and I would like  
to talk about that, if you don’t mind (24). 
But despite Stevie’s apparent reasonableness and sense of humor, she can 
scarcely contain her outrage, which is continually expressed in this scene, both 
by her words and her actions (she destroys pottery and overturns furniture at 
regular intervals during her confrontation with her husband).  As the scene draws 
to its climax, Stevie finally articulates the depth of her reaction: 
 STEVIE.  (A huge animal sound: rage; sweeps the bookcase 
 of whatever is on it, or overturns a piece of furniture. Silence: 
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 then starting quietly, building.)  Now, you listen to me.  I have 
listened to you.  I have heard you tell me how much you love 
me, how you’ve never even wanted another woman, how we 
have been a more perfect marriage than chance would even 
allow.  We’re both too bright for most of the shit.  We see the 
deep and awful humor of things go over the heads of most 
people; we see what’s hideously wrong in what most people 
accept as normal; we have both the joys and the sorrows of 
all that.  We have a straight line through life, right all the way 
to dying, but that’s OK because it’s a good line … so long as 
we don’t screw up. 
MARTIN.  I know; I know. 
STEVIE.  (Don’t interrupt me!) Shut up; so long as we don’t 
screw up.  (Points at him.)  And you’ve screwed up!                                                          
  MARTIN.  Stevie, I …  
STEVIE.  I said, shut up.  Do you know how you’ve done it?  
How you’ve screwed up? 
MARTIN.  (Mumbled.)  Because I was at the vegetable stand 
one day, and I looked over to my right and I saw … 
STEVIE.  (Hard and slow.)  Because you’ve broken 
something and it can’t be fixed! 
MARTIN.  Stevie … 
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STEVIE.  Fall out of love with me? Fine!  No, not fine but that 
can be fixed … time … whatever!  But tell me you love me 
and an animal – both of us! – equally?  The same way?  
That you go from my bed – our bed  … (Aside-ish.) it’s 
amazing, you know, how good we are, still, how we please 
each other and ourselves so … fully, so … fresh each time 
… (Aside over.) …  you go from our bed, wash your dick, get 
in your car and go to her, and do with her what I cannot 
imagine myself imagining?  Or – worse! … that you’ve come 
from her, to my bed!? … and do with me what I can imagine 
… love …want you for!? 
MARTIN.  Deep sadness.)  Oh, Stevie … 
STEVIE.  (Not listening.)  That you can do these two things 
… and not understand how it …  SHATTERS THE 
GLASS!!??  How it cannot be dealt with – how stop and 
forgiveness have nothing to do with it?  And how I am 
destroyed?  How you are?  How I cannot admit it though I 
know it!?  How I can not deny it because I cannot admit it!?  
Cannot admit it because it is outside of denying!? 
MARTIN.  Stevie, I …  I promise you, I’ll stop; I’ll …  
STEVIE.  How stopping has nothing to do with having started!?  
How nothing has anything to do with anything!?  (Tears – if there –
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stop.) You have brought me down, you goat-fucker; you love of my 
life!  You have brought me down to nothing!  (Accusatory finger 
right at him.)  You have brought me down, and, Christ!, I’ll bring you 
down with me! (43-44). 
This climactic segment of Scene 2 not only expresses the depth and 
extent of Stevie’s outrage, it gestures toward the layered complexity of Albee’s 
design.  On one hand, it provides an example of one of the ways in which the 
audience is invited to sympathize with Martin’s predicament.  Here, as in most of 
this scene, he is squarely on the defensive.  Despite Stevie’s demand for 
information and explanation, for most of the scene, as in this fragment, Martin 
struggles to penetrate the daunting barrier of Stevie’s volcanic emotion.  He 
simply can’t get a word in edgewise for much of the scene.  We know him to be a 
good and gentle man.  Indeed, Stevie has described him in precisely those 
terms.  His inability to communicate the full extent of his love for her and his own 
principled confusion at a time of overwhelming crisis invites our empathy.  Who 
cannot identify with someone swept away by forces that he has unleashed but 
cannot control?  Charles Isherwood, in his perceptive review in Variety of the 
New York production, comments on this: 
 ’You've broken something and it can't be fixed,’ she [Stevie] 
says bitterly, but it's hard not to notice that she's the one 
smashing crockery and upending the furniture. And the quiet 
sincerity of Martin, who recognizes the absurdity of his 
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situation but also insists on its gravity, soon begins to work 
strangely on our sympathy. The cruelty in Stevie’s shrill 
attacks is in stark opposition to Martin's wounded pleas (‘Don't 
mock me’) and tender descriptions of his ‘epiphany’ with 
Sylvia. Albee has described the play as ‘testing the tolerance 
of the audience’ -- another way of saying that it tests the 
audience's empathy.   
I describe Martin’s confusion as principled, because even as he perceives 
the evident damage that his conduct has inflicted upon his family, he cannot deny 
what he has experienced: a profound intercourse with another creature that he 
describes variously as an epiphany - and a love so pure and innocent as to be 
both beyond understanding and his capacity to effect it.  He cannot explain the 
phenomenon that has engulfed his life, but he is unwilling to deny its power.  
There is both dignity and integrity in Martin’s stubborn refusal to disavow his own 
experience, even in the face of its terrifying destructive power.   
Stevie’s pain, and our empathetic appreciation of it, helps to redeem her 
from the apparent cruelty she manifests in her relentless attack on Martin.  This 
is a double tragedy, in which Stevie’s life as well as that of Martin, is destroyed.   
The scene excerpt quoted above also evokes several of Albee’s major 
thematic preoccupations.  One of these is the vexed and complex relationship 
between love and sex.  Stevie conflates the two in one speech, describing 
Martin’s professed love for both Sylvia and herself in the context of sexually 
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intimate moments.  Later in the play, Billy pronounces his own inability even to 
complete his thoughts on this topic: “I get confused . . . sex and love; loving and . 
. .” (51).   Love abounds in The Goat.  Ben Brantley, in his New York Times 
review of the play observes that The Goat is “about a profoundly unsettling 
subject, which for the record is not bestiality but the irrational, confounding and 
convention-thwarting nature of love.” 
 The love of Martin and Stevie is articulated and rearticulated, but it is 
insufficient to prevent their mutual destruction.  The love between Martin and his 
son Billy is also demonstrated clearly, but it doesn’t prevent the exchange of 
hateful and damaging epithets and accusations.  Moreover, it is complicated by a 
whiff of truly forbidden sexuality, an incestuous homoerotic aspect to their 
relationship, which truly rocks an unsuspecting audience in Scene 3.  Albee 
makes the argument in this play that sexuality, or at least the socially permissible 
expression of sexuality is bound by a bewildering complex of rules and 
constraints, but love is, virtually by definition, a mysterious and ultimately 
ineffable force in our lives that cannot be externally constrained.  The inevitable 
rupture between love and sexuality, according to Albee here, is one source of 
tragic consequences.  
Another theme resonating in the quoted segment has to do with the 
precariousness of our lives, a theme that reverberates in both tragic and 
absurdist contexts.  Stevie observes that hers and Martin’s life is good, replete 
with all the joys and sorrows that a life well lived by bright, perceptive people can 
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generate:  “We have a straight line through life, right all the way to dying, but 
that’s OK because it’s a good line … so long as we don’t screw up.”  In Stevie’s 
view, the equilibrium of their lives has been disrupted by Martin’s screw-up, his 
willful violation of fundamental rules.  Martin sees it differently as the result of 
something that is beyond both understanding and will:   
Don’t you see the . . . don’t you see the ‘thing’ that happened 
to me?  What nobody understands? Why I can’t feel what I’m 
supposed to!?  Because it relates to nothing?  It can’t have 
happened!  It did but it can’t have! (39-40).  
For both of them, a model life of personal and professional achievement, a warm 
and fully functional family unit, and a profound sense of well-being have all been 
shattered in one revelatory instant.  In Aristotelian terms, a discovery has 
engendered a tragic reversal. 
 In discussing Martin’s sexual involvement with Sylvia the goat, Stevie 
makes reference to him doing with her “what I cannot imagine myself imagining”  
And even Martin, in his faltering attempt to describe his experience with Sylvia 
the goat,  speaks of that experience as “an ecstasy and a purity, and a … love of 
a … un-i-mag-in-able kind” (punctuation in original, 39).  I suggest though that 
Martin’s power of imagination (he is carefully described as a world-class architect 
– a designation that certainly implies a superior imagination) is precisely what 
renders him open to the profound experience he has after encountering Sylvia.  
He is able to transcend the boundaries of the ordinary and the quotidian by virtue 
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of his imaginary leap that takes him from an amusingly pastoral encounter with a 
barnyard animal to a sense of union, and ultimately sexual congress, with the 
“soul” that he perceives on looking into Sylvia’s eyes.   
Imagination is, of course, the engine of empathy, the vessel by which we 
travel across psychic space and experience (or at least intimately perceive) the 
worlds of others.  Edward Albee, in turn, relies upon the imagination of the 
audience, not only to participate in Martin’s emotional journey, but also to engage 
his use of metaphor.  For while Martin has quite literally taken up with a goat, it 
seems clear that Albee simultaneously intends, by his use of the goat as a pivotal 
subject in the play, to conjure up other associations and topics. 
We must note, at the outset, that Sylvia is not a cow, a sheep, a pig, or 
any other animal that might have engaged Martin’s attention, but a goat.  Albee’s 
choice here is bound up both in his interest in exploring the nature of tragedy and 
in his preoccupation with the conflicts between sexual behavior and social 
constraint.  The Oxford English Dictionary confirms that the etymology of word 
“tragedy” is derived from the Greek for “goat-song.”  Goats were closely identified 
with the ecstatic cult of Dionysus, among whose mythic followers were satyrs, 
creatures combining features of men and goats and remarkable mostly for their 
sexual appetites and capacities.  The Greeks associated Dionysus not only with 
regeneration, sensuality, and wine, but also with bodily fluids, including both 
blood and semen.  The great Greek tragedies, of course, were written to 
compete for honors at the Athenian festival that honored Dionysus, and among 
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the ritual practices associated with that festival was the sacrifice of a goat.  For a 
work that seeks to explore and define the essence of tragedy, these historical 
associations are irresistible.  
But if the goat gestures toward the Dionysian in historical terms, the 
Dionysian is also integrally related to Albee’s consideration of sexual 
transgression.  It is possible to read Albee’s use of the goat as the object of 
Martin’s affections metaphorically, as a stand-in for other sexual behaviors that 
depart from normative mainstreams, especially homosexuality.  (Albee’s decision 
to use a predominantly masculine name, “Stevie,” for Martin’s specifically female 
wife also contributes to a sense of sexual ambiguity.) 
Albee is an out gay man, and while his work has rarely focused 
specifically on gay sexuality, critics have often noted homoerotic motifs in his 
work.  Here, where Albee has described himself as writing a play that explores 
the limits of tolerance, Martin’s tolerance for his own son’s homosexuality is 
probed quite explicitly, when he lashes out at his son as a “fucking faggot” even 
as he seeks tolerance and understanding for his own zoophiliac sexual 
experiences.  More importantly, Albee has chosen to name the son Billy, an 
obvious reference to goats, and to have Billy engage his father in scene three in 
an overtly sexual manner.  When Martin seeks to reassure his son as to the 
relative meaninglessness of sexual impulses, he tells him a story about a time 
when his “friend” had his kid on his lap, a kid not old enough to be a boy or a girl 
yet, whose squirming caused his friend to become erect (51).  As it becomes 
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clear that Martin is referring to himself, and that the kid in question is likely his 
son, Billy, we are left wondering whether this is a play about an affair with a goat 
or an oblique treatment of homosexual incest.  I believe that Albee is quite 
sincere in his literal descriptions of Martin with the goat, but it also seems clear 
that he has seized an opportunity to add breadth and depth to his essential 
proposition by allowing for some metaphoric resonance relating to that goat. 
Albee investigated the metaphoric resonance of the heterosexual married 
couple as far back as Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?  There, George and 
Martha’s troubled marriage, ruptured by deep antagonisms and sustained by 
elaborate illusions, served as a compelling symbolic reference to the tensions 
seething below the surfaces of American institutions and American complacency 
in that particular slice of time (the early 1960’s).   In The Goat, Martin’s and 
Stevie’s marriage stand once again for a broader idea – the rules and 
conventions of orderly society.  Theirs is portrayed as a model marriage, 
complete with ongoing intellectual and sexual compatibility, until Martin flaunts 
the rules by reaching sexually beyond his species, invoking Stevie’s wrath, the 
unambiguous condemnation of Ross, and the utter destruction of everyone living 
within the orbit of the rules that have been violated. 
And as in Virginia Woolf, The Goat makes extensive use of games and 
game-playing as a metaphor for the prevalence of social rules and predictable 
patterns, and the competitive character of people who seek to bend the rules to 
their own purposes.  While George and Martha play darkly mischievous games 
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(like Get the Guests and Hump the Hostess) that have profound emotional 
consequences, both for themselves and for their guests, the word games favored 
by Martin and Stevie seem more designed to underscore the limitations of 
language when engaging cosmic forces and unknowable mysteries.  At the most 
pitched moments of their argument, either Stevie or Martin will parenthetically 
acknowledge an especially good or an especially unfortunate turn of phrase.  
They are always in competition, seeking to best the other in wit or cleverness, 
even as they seek to express emotional extremes that would seem to render wit 
superfluous.  The slippery inadequacy of language is a favorite Albee theme.  
“Indeed, the common thread that runs through many of his seemingly diverse 
plays is his characters’ oft-stated concern with language and, in particular, the 
failures and limitations of the linguistic medium.  For Albee, language is the 
medium or meeting ground which exists between the interior and exterior worlds 
of the speaker and the listener” (Wasserman 29).   Here the theme is advanced 
with crystal clarity:  After Martin calls attention to Stevie’s emotionally fraught and 
imprecise use of language, she replies, “women in deep woe often mix their 
metaphors” (38).  This is on one hand a direct acknowledgment of the 
prominence of metaphors in the play, and on the other hand a nuanced argument 
that in the realm of the tragic, where lives are precariously balanced on the edge 
of catastrophe, there is a primacy of experience that resists comparison, i.e., that 
is inimical to metaphor. 
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In my production at least, Stevie’s line about deep woe and metaphor 
invariably provoked uneasy laughter.  Albee’s use of humor, especially in the 
midst of circumstances that seem anything but funny, is a consistent feature in 
the body of his work.  That is especially true in The Goat.  It is reasonable to 
inquire what the place of humor is in a work that purports to define tragedy.  Our 
models for tragic writing, the extant works of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and 
Euripides, are notably devoid of humor.  While the tragic competitions at the 
Festival of Dionysus required the submission of three tragic works and a satyr 
play, which was a vehicle for broad and bawdy humor, to the best of our 
knowledge, the forms were strictly segregated.  While the Athenians apparently 
recognized a value in comic relief, the use of humor was relegated to a separate 
work, one that presumably would not detract from the weight and seriousness of 
the tragic trilogy that preceded it.  Albee, however, is exploring tragedy in the 
context of our contemporary world, a post-Beckett world in which the boundaries 
between genres are blurred and hybrid forms predominate.  But Albee is not 
simply offering a tragicomedy.  He is determined to bring his audience to a place 
of profound emotional response, and he employs humor as a tactical device in 
that effort. 
Unexpected humor and sometimes inappropriate humor in this play serves 
to keep the audience off-balance, unable to comfortably predict the direction of 
the events unfolding before it.  We laugh, to be sure, but in the words of Charles 
Isherwood, “before long that laughter begins to stick in the throat, and by the end 
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of the latest and possibly most provocative play from the chronically provocative 
Edward Albee, it has been replaced by something closer to anguish: for a family 
in tatters, and for the lack of compassion that is at the root of human 
destructiveness and, one senses uneasily, at the root of so much laughter” 
(2002).   
 
The Goat in Production 
While The Goat, or Who is Sylvia? was given the Antoinette Perry Award 
(more popularly known as the Tony) for best play, the critical reaction to the New 
York production was decidedly mixed.  Of twenty-one reviews I read, seven were 
clearly positive, six were clearly negative, and eight were somewhat ambiguous, 
finding merit in some aspects of the play and the production, while expressing 
serious reservations about others.  Barbara Phillips, in The Wall Street Journal, 
for example, dismissed the play as a “very minor Albee effort.”  Elysa Gardner, 
writing for USA Today, describes it as a “self-indulgent mess, in which the 
cynical, disdainful view of family life that has informed some of Albee's more 
eloquent works reaches its nauseating nadir.”   Howard Kissel, of the New York 
Daily News, while acknowledging Albee’s aspirations toward the tragic, opines 
that  “[t]he sad truth is that the genre The Goat better exemplifies is boulevard 
comedy, and even here it fails. For comedy to work on more than a gag level, 
you have to believe in the characters. From the second it begins, almost 
everything about The Goat rings false.”  Michael Kuchwara, on the other hand, 
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writing for the Associated Press, describes it as a “play that is as startling as it is 
satisfying. In fact, it is one of the most satisfying productions of the Broadway 
season . . .  Although it is often quite funny, The Goat, which opened Sunday at 
the Golden Theatre, is a serious, thoughtful, even tragic play despite the comic 
outrageousness of its premise.“  Martin Denton, reviewing the play for 
NYTheatre.com, writes that it is a “provocative, funny, troubling play . . . that 
demands to be seen, and read, and heard.”   
Clearly, a number of critics had considerable difficulty grappling with the 
theme of bestiality (apparently either literally or metaphorically), characterizing it 
as straining credulity or being too disgusting a topic to invite serious 
consideration.   While Edward Albee no longer responds to specific critical 
remarks, his words in reaction to an attack on Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?, 
written four decades ago, seems an appropriate retort: 
Well, if the theater must bring us only what we can 
immediately apprehend or comfortably relate to, let us stop 
going to the theater entirely; . . . Further: If the theater must 
only, as Mr. Hates puts it, ‘reflect or express the fundamental 
beliefs, feelings, convictions, aspirations’ of our audiences, 
then say I, down with all debate; down with all playwrights 
who have questioned the underpinnings of all the 
fundamental beliefs; . . . down, then, say I, with Moliere, 
Ibsen, Shaw, Aristophanes.  Down with the theater as an 
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educational as well as an entertainment medium.  Down with 
the theater as a force for social and political advancement.  
Down with the theater! (Amacher 23) 
Albee has consistently, throughout his career, understood part of his function as 
a public intellectual to be provocation.  He has championed the place of the 
theatre in the larger context of great debates about ideas.  And he has always 
seen himself as part of a continuum of writers for the theatre that have shared 
this commitment.  Perhaps Michael Feingold, of The Village Voice, had this in 
mind when he wrote in his review of The Goat: 
One of the easiest plays in decades to burlesque and 
ridicule, Edward Albee’s The Goat is also the one most likely 
to be talked about seriously—angrily,   ferociously—for years 
to come. You can hear the controversy rising around you as 
you exit up the aisle, and it does not abate on the way home. 
For a moment, the theater has become the principal source 
of New York conversation again . . .  Yes, Mr. Albee knows 
the art of giving moral debate an aesthetic shape.  If it's too 
early to list The Goat among his masterpieces, still, those 
who are scrambling to inscribe it on the scroll of his disasters 
had better move slowly: They may yet find themselves off in 
the hall of shame, with the guys who suppressed Ghosts and 
hooted down The Rite of Spring.  
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 For me, the enduring value of this play seemed clear, and I was especially 
concerned that my own production make clear that value to the audiences I 
would be addressing.  I was convinced that a production of this play was a 
pathway to a certain variety of theatrical wonder, that variety of wonder 
associated with the tragic – and with the pity and fear that Aristotle had described 
several millennia ago.                                                                                           
 My experience in preparing and evaluating this production was framed by 
two events:  During the time that I was in rehearsal, I was teaching a course in 
play analysis at Cornell College (where I teach in the Theatre Department).  As 
part of that course, my class of twenty-five students undertook an intensive 
engagement with the text of The Goat, an engagement that included, for some of 
them, dramaturgical research projects relating to the play.  The class was able to 
attend a performance of the play after it opened.  Second, during the run of the 
play at Riverside Theatre, I resided over a lively talk-back with members of the 
audience and my cast.  Both my experience with my class and my experience in 
dialogue with a general audience proved to be especially useful in thinking about 
this play and this production.                                                                                   
 I had discussed the essential premises of the play with my class before 
they read it,  so I was not surprised that, for many, the shock value of Martin’s 
sexual involvement with a goat was substantially diminished, though some 
students confessed to being “creeped out” by the idea.  I was somewhat 
surprised during the initial discussion of the play to find that for a substantial 
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minority of the students, Billy’s and Martin’s kiss, and especially Martin’s story 
about a man being arouses by a baby in his lap, were considerably more 
disturbing than inter-species sexuality.  When one student objected to these 
incidents in the third scene as being gratuitous and unnecessary, another student 
argued passionately that they represented an essential part of Albee’s design, 
that, in fact, the play built specifically to these moments in order to challenge our 
assumed values where they really counted: with respect not only to bestiality, but 
to the same sex relationships that the bestiality stood for metaphorically, and 
beyond those to the taboos involving incest and pedophilia.  His point was not 
that Albee was advocating on behalf of these practices, but that he wanted to use 
them to shake our complacency, just when we had become somewhat 
desensitized to the bizarre passion of Martin for Sylvia.  The class debated these 
points for hours, and I think Albee would have been pleased.                                 
 I learned during class discussions that, on the basis of reading the script, 
the overwhelming majority of students felt considerable empathy for Martin.  
While virtually none of them would acknowledge a capacity to identify with his 
sexual passion for an animal, they were entirely prepared to accept that he was 
an essentially good man being torn apart by forces, in this case the destructive 
dimension of love, that were quite beyond his control.  I was struck by their 
almost universal antipathy for Stevie.  They resented her unwillingness to listen 
to Martin, even after she had demanded that he account for his actions.  Very 
few students seemed able or willing to place themselves in her shoes.  They 
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tended to be dismissive of Ross, writing him off as a villain who represented the 
most repressive and judgmental aspects of social convention.  And few students 
seemed to engage Billy as anything except a device to plead for tolerance with 
regard to homosexuality.  They approved that message, but they did not engage 
this character in more human and personal terms.                                                                   
 I emerged from these class discussions with a conviction that, if this 
production was to have the tragic power I imagined, it would be necessary for the 
audience to identify with some of the other characters as well as Martin.  Only 
then I believed would the total devastation of this fictional family have the kind of 
impact that truly penetrated the detached composure of an audience at a 
theatrical event.27   My rehearsal strategy was directly conditioned by my 
students’ responses.                                                                                     
 An unusual aspect of producing an Albee play is that the producing entity 
must seek Albee’s approval of the actors and director undertaking the production, 
before that production can be licensed.  We had assembled our cast for this 
production, therefore, at a much earlier point than was usually the case.  I cast 
                                                 
27 I also took from this class some very valuable insights about zoophilia, and the extent to which Martin’ s 
behavior either conformed to or deviated from the experience of zoophiliacs who had been studied by 
psychologists.  Two of my students, Diana Ingersoll-Cope and Matt Heindel, chose to write research papers 
on this topic in fulfillment of an assignment in dramaturgical research.  They both discovered that the 
phenomenon of zoophilia (a term preferred in the literature to “ bestiality” ) was more widespread than we 
had assumed.  They found that many of Martin’ s descriptions of his emotional reactions to Sylvia and his 
behavior were quite consistent with case studies in the literature.  There was one vital exception:  Most 
reported and studied cases of men involved in the practice of zoophilia were otherwise fairly dysfunctional 
in terms of their sexual relations with humans.  Martin is depicted as having a satisfying sex life with his 
wife.  (Interestingly, many women involved in sexual behavior with animals retained sexual functionality 
with their human partners.)  They discovered a substantial community of zoophiliacs who argue for 
acceptance of their “ lifestyle,”  likening their struggle for acceptance to various civil rights movements.  
They both detailed considerable controversy relating to whether or not animals can be understood to 
consent to a sexual relationship with a human, an issue taken up in the play by Stevie.  (Ingersoll-Cope and 
Heindel). 
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David Combs, a wonderful character actor from Los Angeles as Martin.  I had 
thought of Jody Hovland, one of the co-artistic directors of Riverside Theatre and 
my good friend, as Stevie from the time I had become aware of the play.  Her 
partner (and the other artistic director of the company), Ron Clark, was tapped to 
play Ross, and I chose Jackson Doran, a gifted young actor from Iowa City, to 
play the role of Billy.  We did not anticipate and did not receive resistance from 
the author to this casting.   
          I had chosen these actors not only because I believed each of them was 
well qualified to perform his or her assigned role, but because I had worked with 
each of them many times before, and they had each worked with each other.  We 
had a relatively short rehearsal period for both economic and scheduling 
reasons, and I wanted to be sure that our time would be used efficiently.  I 
believed that given our experience in working together, we would begin with a 
level of trust and comfort the attainment of which would otherwise consume 
valuable time.  As the emotional terrain we traversed during rehearsal became 
more and more treacherous and sensitive, I had more than one occasion to be 
grateful for that threshold decision.                                                                                       
 Taking the insight gleaned from my experience with my Cornell class, I 
was determined to find a way to make each of these characters empathetic in 
some way.  Ross was immediately the most problematic.  He betrays the 
confidence of his close friend and stands in judgment of him.  He is not a 
sympathetic character.  And yet he is identified as Martin’s closest friend.  We 
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determined to explore the reasons and indicia of that friendship in rehearsal, 
focusing on the early part of the first scene between these two men, before the 
revelation of Martin’s involvement with Sylvia the goat.  I worked with David and 
Ron to achieve a level of easy intimacy and playfulness between these two men 
that would account for Martin’s affection for Ross.  We eventually developed a 
rich subtext of camaraderie and a series of warm physical interactions between 
these two characters that provided a compelling rationale for their friendship.  I’m 
not sure that we ultimately made of Ross a character with whom many audience 
members would choose to identify, but, at the very least, we established a 
foundational friendship which allowed Ross’s betrayal of Martin’s confidence to 
seem especially painful and imbued with a sense of genuine loss.                            
 Jackson Doran, an unusually experienced and accomplished actor for his 
twenty-two years, created a convincing seventeen year old Billy.  He was able to 
develop a slouching, somewhat awkward physical presence, and an uneven 
post-pubescent vocal quality that bestowed instant credibility on the confused 
adolescent character he was portraying.  We decided immediately not to graft 
onto this character any physical or behavioral attributes that could be read as 
gay.  Billy’s sexuality was a given in the text.  We wanted to be very careful to 
avoid any characterization that smacked of stereotype.  Jackson brought to the 
table a wonderful emotional availability in addition to his technical skill, and he 
made Billy’s pain and bewilderment so excruciatingly raw, his pain so manifest, 
that the critical moment when Billy impulsively kisses his father in a sexual way 
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could be seen as an occasion calling for comfort rather than censure.  Martin’s 
attempts to console him, even with the potentially off-putting story of a man’s 
arousal at a baby in his lap, became the natural response of a loving father to a 
son in distress, rather than a provocation directed to the audience.               
 Stevie was a more difficult case.  Albee has a line early in the play in 
which Ross hears a sound that Martin jokingly identifies as the sound made by 
the Eumenidies (the vengeful furies of Greek myth) in a bit of clever 
foreshadowing.  But Stevie’s behavior is not unlike a fury.  While depicted in the 
first scene as a warm, sophisticated, and fun-loving partner to Martin, in scene 
two she is outraged, aggressive, and accusatory.  Her assault on Martin 
throughout this scene is unrelenting, and while intermittently humorous, builds to 
a terrifying climax of rage that ultimately results in Sylvia’s slaughter.  Yet if the 
play is to fulfill its tragic potential, we must feel the loss suffered by the entire 
family, not just Martin.  To some extent, the audience is allowed the opportunity 
to empathize with Stevie’s pain and outrage.  We can identify with her inability to 
understand a goat as a rival.  When Martin asserts his love for Stevie despite his 
professed love for the goat, she replies, “How can you love me when you love so 
much less?” (25). Her attacks, however, on Martin are so ferocious at times that 
their intensity threatens to overwhelm our capacity to understand her behavior.                            
 Albee provides an important opportunity to confront this problem midway 
through the second scene.  Stevie has a rambling speech in which she describes 
her relationship with her late mother and her mother’s advice about marriage.  
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This speech then moves to an affirmation by Stevie of the extent of her love for 
Martin and the happiness she had experienced in their marriage.  The speech is 
designed to reveal Stevie’s more fragile side, though her moment of vulnerability 
is superseded by an episode of destructive rage when Martin attempts to comfort 
her.  We chose in rehearsal to explore and expand this moment of Stevie’s 
vulnerability with the express intention of inviting more audience sympathy for 
her.  Jody worked over the course of rehearsals to find the appropriate level of 
exposure for Stevie in this delicate moment, the right amount of pathos.  It turned 
out to be heartbreaking, and as her voice cracked and her face glistened with 
tears, I found myself responding emotionally to her pain even as I recoiled at the 
ferocity of her anger moments later.  I came to understand this as a pivotal 
moment in the play, the last and lost opportunity for understanding and 
compassion to trump the destructive power of rage and vengeance.                          
 Martin is the focal point of the play.  He is never off stage.  It is, of course, 
his conduct which is the catalyst for the essential arguments of the play, and it is 
his behavior that tests our capacity for tolerance.  Albee has written Martin as a 
good and decent man, devoted to his wife and son, possessed of extraordinary 
imagination and creativity that has translated into recognized and celebrated 
achievement within his field, who nonetheless is gripped by passions that he can 
neither understand nor control.  As the reactions of my class demonstrated, 
Martin is a character who, on the page, invites some measure of empathy.  My 
concern in rehearsal was to insure that this probable audience reaction was 
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maintained, and, if possible, deepened on the stage.                                         
 David Combs is an accomplished actor, who has made for himself a 
career largely in television and in commercials.  The stage remains his first love, 
however, and he is always eager to find opportunities for the far less lucrative 
work that theatre represents.  I had worked with him on a number of occasions, 
primarily in the context of the Riverside Shakespeare Festival, where among 
other roles, he had played Malvolio for me in Twelfth Night and Jacques in As 
You Like It.  Comedic character roles are something of a specialty for him, and 
he was enthusiastic about exploring the much darker realm conjured in The 
Goat.  Throughout the early part of rehearsal, David was somewhat tentative, 
exploring different choices at different moments in the play, without truly taking 
stock of the depths of despair to which Martin sinks.  In these early rehearsals, 
David managed to find a simplicity and earnestness that made Martin’s 
relationship with Sylvia somehow plausible, but the devastation that Martin 
suffers remained an abstraction despite our frequent conversations about it.  
 David was with us as a guest artist, living in temporary quarters, separated 
from his wife and friends.  While everyone else associated with the production 
had responsibilities and a life outside rehearsal, for David, virtually all his time 
outside of rehearsal was spent thinking about and studying the script.  The 
intensity of his focus paid off handsomely about halfway through the rehearsal 
process.  He called me at home late one night, hours after rehearsal had ended 
to inform me that he finally understood the ending of the play, by which he meant 
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the utter hopeless destruction that Martin experienced.  He attempted to joke 
about it, calling me a variety of cheerfully obscene names for having put him 
through this, but despite his humor, he was clearly shaken.                                            
 The following day in rehearsal we returned to the third and final scene of 
the play, and for the first time, David processed as an actor the extent of Martin’s 
fall, a processing that manifested itself in his gradual physical diminution, his 
uncertain gentleness with Billy, his plaintive sense of searching for a means to 
make himself understood, and finally, on Stevie’s entrance with Sylvia’s carcass, 
his total emotional collapse.  David, not Martin, sobbed convulsively for a period 
after I had called the final blackout and was cradled by Jody for a long time, now 
his fellow actor again, who moments before had been the instrument of his 
misery.  From that point on, David never failed to courageously enter this state of 
emotional extremity, taking his fellow actors with him, and the ending of the play 
took on a theatrical power that was simultaneously draining and exhilarating.  I 
was eager, as was my cast, for the crucible of an audience.   
 
The Production Received 
 We opened on January 23, 2004.  The opening night audience was clearly 
stunned at the play’s conclusion, and reaction was unequivocally enthusiastic.  
My first opportunity to receive more formally organized feedback came several 
days later, when my Play Analysis class attended a performance and stayed for 
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a conversation with me and the cast.  I was especially curious to know whether 
the experience of seeing the play in performance had significantly altered any 
perceptions about it.  For this audience, one that had read and extensively 
analyzed the playtext, the play would not, I thought, be especially shocking or 
provocative.  We had, after all, discussed the issues raised by the play and 
dissected Albee’s writerly tactics for days.  Yet as I sat on stage and surveyed 
the faces of my students, they seemed as stunned and moved as had other 
audiences I had observed.  The first few comments by my students confirmed 
that generally, despite their familiarity with the script and their intellectual 
engagement with it, they had been unprepared for the emotional impact of seeing 
it in performance.   As they verbalized their response, it became clear that many 
of them had simply been overcome with an empathic reaction – to both Martin 
and Stevie.   The immediacy of live performance, the experience of engaging 
these characters in embodied form, coupled with their preexisting intellectual 
analysis had catapulted many of them into a state that might be described as 
awe.                                                                                                              
   The reaction of my students seemed to provide evidence that tended to 
confirm an interactive theory of the theatre experience, where the full range of 
meaning resides in the ephemeral and embodied intersection of performer and 
spectator on the occasion of a theatrical exchange.  This is consistent with 
Sauter’s model of performance analysis in The Theatrical Event: Dynamics of 
Performance and Perception.  Sauter’s model focuses on the theatre experience 
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as a communicative event that occurs in the actual encounter of performer and 
spectator (the mutuality of that encounter is a key part of his analysis) and upon 
the contexts in which the communication takes place.  His characterization of the 
theatrical encounter as a communicative event considers it a place where 
meaning is sought.  I contend that his model also helps to account for the 
stimulation of empathy as part of that “meaning.”                                                            
 Using a self-described phenomenological approach, Sauter divides 
theatrical communication into three dynamically interconnected aspects: the 
sensory aspect, the artistic aspect, and the symbolic aspect (82-88).   I think 
Sauter’s sensory aspect of performance is especially useful in theorizing some of 
the implications of embodied performance and the response of my students.  On 
the sensory level of communication, spectators may have an empathic response 
simply by perceiving the physical movement and facial expressions of 
performers, something quite impossible in reading the script.  A substantial body 
of psychological research has demonstrated the existence of a phenomenon 
called “emotional contagion,” where people perceiving an emotionally significant 
facial expression or posture imitate it unconsciously, and in the process 
experience some form of the emotion which initiated the process in the first place 
(Hatfield et al).  It is a useful reminder of both how immediate and how embodied 
is the exchange between performer and spectator.  Levenson and Ruef, in 
exploring the physiological dimension of emotional knowledge underscore this 
post-Cartesian point of view: “Emotion is arguably the prototypical mind-body 
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phenomenon … If one experiences emotional rapport with another, there will be 
an element of physiological rapport as well” (45).  In describing a series of 
instances of physiological synchrony that attend moments of emotional rapport, 
they cite facial mimicry as the subject of an especially large body of research, all 
of which suggest a nexus between facial mimicry and emotional rapport (or 
empathy): 
 If one person is in the throes of an emotion and is displaying 
the facial expression appropriate to that emotion, another 
person might view that expression and either automatically 
(via processes of facial mimicry) or intentionally produce the 
same facial expression.  The person who mimics the facial 
expression of another could then begin to experience the 
subjective experience of the associated emotion as well as 
having the associated physical responses activated.  In 
terms of empathic accuracy, the receiver of an emotion 
transferred in this way would have access to additional clues 
to how the other person was feeling beyond those that 
derive from observing that person’s behavior and 
considering the environmental context.  Now, receivers could 
obtain supplemental information about the other person’s 
emotions by considering their own emotional state (58-59). 
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In a theatrical context, this process might describe a level of sensory and 
nonverbal communication between actor and spectator that is far more profound 
in emotional terms than the mere cognitive processing of dialogue.  Hodges and 
Wegner, in describing ways in which cognitive process may trigger automatic 
empathy, state that “thinking about the characteristics of a person may yield an 
automatic empathic response that increases the likelihood that one will behave 
as one believes that person would behave” (318).    
 As I observed my students watching the performance, I was struck by the 
extent to which many exhibited facial expressions that seemed to mirror 
expressions I had observed in watching David and Jody in rehearsal and 
performance.  I specifically observed facial expressions that corresponded to 
moments of pain and surprise.  The latter expression was the most interesting, 
because unlike Albee’s characters who were theoretically receiving surprising 
information from time to time in the course of the scene, these students knew 
perfectly well what was coming.  I cannot claim  to have derived information 
using a scientific methodology, but the anecdotal evidence of my own 
observation suggested an active process of empathetic connection or contagion.  
This was true even at the climactic moment when Stevie entered with the bloody 
bag that was supposed to contain Sylvia’s corpse.  I observed faces accurately 
mirroring Martin’s shock, despite their knowledge and expectation of this 
moment.                                                       
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 Sauter’s second category of performer/spectator intersection, the artistic 
level, adds a dimension of intentionality or design to the relatively automatic 
responses described above.  The actors, after all, are seeking specifically to 
affect the audience.  Theatre artists routinely investigate the emotional and 
cognitive landscapes that transform the theoretical abstract into the theatrical 
particular.  That, of course, was precisely the agenda I described in rehearsal, 
where the actors were seeking a level of personalized emotional connection with 
their characters. The skill of the performer (or the director or the playwright) in 
portraying others in fictionalized circumstances and the effort of the audience in 
receiving that portrayal establishes an empathic portal – an opportunity to 
empathize with an other that otherwise might never occur.  Actors routinely 
therefore seek to perfect techniques of what the psychological literature refers to 
as controlled empathy in seeking identification with the characters they portray. 
In their discussion of controlled empathy, Hodges and Wegner write that  
[C]ontrolled empathy is as effortful as climbing up a 
mountainside . . . We can think of reaching a particular 
mountain peak as offering a certain vista, or perspective, just 
as reaching empathy offers us a certain person’s perspective.  
In our attempts to reach the mountain peak, we search for 
grips, holds, and trails that will help us on our way (320). 
This is not only descriptive of the actor’s process in building character, it also 
describes a process of reception, where a spectator seizes upon key moments 
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involving dialogue or gesture or association to construct a means of achieving 
perspective on what is unfolding before her. My students seemed to respond, not 
to the text alone, or the virtuosity of individual performances, or to my directorial 
shaping and selection process.  Each of these factors was important I believe in 
accounting for their emotional reaction to the performance, but, in speaking with 
them, it was the totality of the experience, the gestalt of it, that brought them to a 
different plateau of engagement.                                                                                                  
 As the run of the production continued, it became obvious that there was a 
“buzz” about it within the local theatre-going community.  The production was 
talked about frequently, both for its perceived theatrical merits and in terms of its 
content. Resistance to the idea of a show often described as “about bestiality” 
could be discerned in empirical terms.  Box office figures suggested that the 
show was doing adequately financially, but not nearly as well as we had hoped, 
given the seemingly positive reactions of those who actually saw it.  Halfway 
through the run, an audience was invited to remain after a Friday night 
performance to engage me as the director and the cast in a dialogue.  These 
talkback events are a regular feature of Riverside Theatre’s main indoor season. 
 A typical talkback involves perhaps 40% of the audience and lasts for 
approximately 30 minutes.  On this occasion, approximately 75% of the audience 
remained in the theatre for the event, and the discussion went on for well over an 
hour.  It began somewhat awkwardly.  I took the stage after the curtain call, 
announced our intention to have a very informal dialogue in which we would 
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respond to questions and comments, and invited audience members to speak 
out.  I was met with complete silence and a small sea of faces that refused to 
focus on me.  The audience had been transported by the experience of the play 
into a state of awed silence, a state of pity and fear, a state of dread, a state of 
tragic wonder. 
  I improvised a few remarks about Edward Albee’s career and my 
understanding of his intentions in writing this play.  After perhaps five minutes, a 
woman raised her hand, asked a question, and we were off and running, soon 
involved in a spirited discussion of the play and the players.  At the conclusion of 
the event, one theatre-goer approached me to explain the initial reticence of the 
audience.  “We were too shell-shocked at the end of the play to begin a 
discussion immediately,” he explained.  “In the future, you should allow some 
time for us to recover.”    
 As is often the case, in my experience, on occasions like these, a certain 
proportion of the questions invariably dealt with the acting process.  People 
wanted to know how the actors summoned such extreme emotion and what the 
aftermath was like, and so on.  But there was also a great deal of conversation 
about the substantive content of the play.  I was gratified to learn how many 
audience members, in response to my questions, professed an empathetic 
reaction to three of the four characters.  While no one wanted to excuse Ross’s 
betrayal of his friend, a surprising number of people expressed understanding of, 
and even identification with, Stevie’s outrage, even as they confirmed their 
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empathy for Martin.  One audience member who now professed a deep sense of 
empathy for Martin had attended the pre-opening discussion.  There he had 
doubted his capacity to sympathize with anyone involved in bestiality.  The 
experience of the play had overcome his personal revulsion at the subject matter. 
 As the conversation turned to the “message” of the play, opinion divided. 
A significant minority articulated an opinion that the tragic conclusion of the play 
served as a sort of warning about the consequences of truly transgressive 
conduct.  A clear majority of the audience, however, seemed to embrace that 
interpretation of the play that involves a claim for the necessity of both tolerance 
and compassion.  We actually had brief but substantive discussions about 
whether or not zoophilia should be identified as destructive behavior, about the 
unpredictable and sometimes unfathomable intersections between love and sex, 
and about the place of understanding in ordering social regulations.  Significantly, 
many respondents saw Martin’s bestiality in metaphoric terms, enabling a leap to 
a more general consideration of sexual behavior.  Virtually all the spectators who 
spoke acknowledged both a profound emotional experience and an active 
intellectual engagement with the play.  At the conclusion of the discussion, I was 
satisfied that at the least, we had offered a production that was truly provocative, 
one that stimulated serious conversation and a desire to understand phenomena 
outside the experience of most spectators.                                                                                                                           
 For more than a month after the production closed, people who had seen 
it and who knew of my association with it would stop me to discuss it.  I have 
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never been associated with a production that occasioned more searching 
conversations long after the event.  Elin Diamond writes, in seeking to reconcile 
aspects of Brechtian theory with the concept of postmodern difference: 
But Brechtian theory leaves room for at least one feature of 
écriture – the notion that meaning is beyond capture within 
the covers of the play or the hours of the performance.  This 
is not to deny Brecht’s wish for an instructive, analytical 
theater; on the contrary, it invites the participatory play of the 
spectator, and the possibility – for Brecht a crucial possibility 
– that signification (the production of meaning) continue 
beyond the play’s end, even as it congeals into action and 
choice after the spectator leaves the theater (1997: 49). 
I do not claim that the emotional or intellectual understanding achieved during the 
course of some spectators’ reception of The Goat resulted in concrete action.  
But to the extent that people continued to think about the experience and 
continued to produce ideas about its meaning after the event, an empathetic 
theatrical engagement by the audience has served a Brechtian goal of a theatre 
that compels social analysis instead of frustrating it.  The experience of the tragic 
has led not to a reinforcement of a social status quo, but to its interrogation. 
Charles Isherwood has written: 
[T]he playwright is seeking in The Goat to affirm that 
tragedy . . . has a place in contemporary culture and can 
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still move us with its primal power.  With daily newspapers 
filled with stories that turn the most shocking 
circumstances into banalities, we can still be shaken, be 
awed, be filled with ‘pity and terror’ by the dilemma of a 
human being confronting the extraordinary in life.  Albee is 
trying to shock us into an awareness that yes, the deeper 
mysteries of life are still abroad in the world; more 
importantly, they still cry out for compassion – the nobler 
form of pity (2003, 105). 
 The Goat, or Who is Sylvia? invites empathy with characters whose conduct is 
considered outside acceptable boundaries.  It does so while inviting its audience 
to make metaphoric associations that expand that conduct into areas closer to 
the experience of its audience.  It demands a kind of personal reckoning that is 
freighted with both emotional and intellectual elements.  And it performs these 
functions by demanding that the audience respond to its own embodied 
experience phenomenologically, in the uncompromising and immediate context 
of live performance.  On this occasion at least, the play offered more than a 
definition of tragedy; it offered a passport to a particular province of theatrical 
wonder, where delight is displaced by dread and the awful acknowledgment of 
human frailty.  
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A Postscript: 
Thinking Back and Looking Forward 
 
 This project has been, in large part, an attempt to describe and theorize a 
phenomenon of reception in specific theatrical circumstances.  I have argued for 
my status as a model spectator, an audience member uniquely attuned, at least 
in my own directorial work, to the impossibly complex combination of conceived 
intention and evanescent embodied experience that is theatrical reception, and I 
have seized upon a variety of intuited assumptions about the responses of other 
hypothetical spectators.  I have reported my observations of other, less 
personally implicated, audience members in the productions I have discussed 
wherever possible, as I have reported the anecdotal evidence of the articulated 
responses of individual audience members on various occasions.  I make no 
claim of undertaking more scientific efforts to measure and report upon audience 
reactions to the productions I have examined.   I cannot accurately predict 
whether, in the final analysis, my autoethnographic accounts of viewing and 
directing experiences muster sufficient probative force to convince the reader of 
my claims about theatrical wonder.  I do, however, make the following claim:  My 
research has convinced me that my initial conception and description of theatrical 
wonder as a phenomenological event occasioned by the effort to understand 
novel metaphor in circumstances colored by the empathetic association with 
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others is a theoretically viable and useful way to engage aspects of theatrical 
performance.  Moreover, that research has had profound impact on me as a 
practicing artist.  Some of the insights gleaned from my investigation loom large 
in my preparations for future projects. 
 My earliest conception of theatrical wonder as an emotionally full 
expression of delight in theatrical artistry, the legacy of Tinkerbell, has ripened 
into a complicated consideration of embodied metaphor, critically inflected 
notions of intersubjectivity, and utopian performatives.  Theatrical wonder is now 
implicated, for me, in the processes by which I perceive in the theatre that which 
is possible in the larger world and acknowledge the emotional impact of that 
perception.  Theatrical wonder has expanded to embrace the awe of tragic 
imagination along with the delight of the innovative imagination that bodies forth 
unexpected associations.  Theatrical wonder has become not only a theoretical 
lens that provides a means of engaging a theatrical past, but also a quest.    
 From my consideration of Theatre de Complicite (and the training that 
enables its work), I have taken a keen appreciation of the fruits of virtuosity and 
elevated artistry, but I have also taken an understanding of the special power of 
metaphor when it is literally embodied by the performer and intersubjectively 
experienced by the spectator.  I have absorbed a lesson about the way that a 
milieu of playfulness and a strategy of collusion with the spectator enhance the 
opportunities for theatrical events that seek to engender wonder.   
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 From my experience in directing Harry’s Way, I have learned that a 
metaphor which becomes too familiar, and which is perceived in a theatrical 
circumstance that valorizes intellectual distance and diminishes empathetic 
opportunities, loses its agency with regard to a capacity to inspire wonder.  A 
strategy designed to facilitate the engagement of ideas succeeded, but an 
implicit cost of that strategy was the elimination of the possibility of fusing intellect 
and emotion in the unusually productive way that I have associated with wonder. 
 My production of Romeo and Juliet provided an opportunity to explore the 
impulse toward compassion in a particularly contentious context.  I am not at all 
convinced that the production elicited an experience of wonder, in all the 
complexity that I have sought to describe for that phenomenon, but I believe that 
the conscious attempt to explore the operation of theatrical empathy gestured 
toward a utopian conception of foregrounding the human cost of hatred in 
productive ways.  It was also a useful exercise in the theatrical practice of cultural 
ethnography, an attempt to find a principled and responsible way to encounter 
and theatrically represent a cultural Other. 
 Working on The Goat provided an opportunity to explore the breadth of 
wonder, to understand that the apprehension of the tragic has a vitality in a 
progressive context, by virtue of its simultaneous appeal to imagination and 
feeling, which goes beyond the socially conservative phenomenon of catharsis, 
where the venting of emotion serves to reaffirm social equilibrium.  When tragic 
reaction is flecked with wonder, it carries with it an elusive glimpse of an 
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alternative world, a world, in this case, when perhaps sexual behavior that moves 
beyond the boundaries of social acceptability might invite compassion and 
tolerance instead of reflexive condemnation and the devastation that judgment 
without compassion can yield. 
 We live in fractured, contentious, and fearful times.  Taking note of that 
uneasy air of national insecurity and suspicion, Ben Cameron notes that  
[t]he theatre invites us to see our fellow human beings with 
generosity and curiosity.  To commit to the theatre in these 
times is to commit to conversation.  To commit to the value 
of hearing each other.  To commit to the collective 
imagination – that precious wellspring of renewal without 
which no movement forward is possible.   To keep alive a 
vision of life other than as it is being lived (8).   
The value of seeking to understand theatrical wonder from a theoretical vantage 
point is to enhance the prospects of creating the phenomenon in practice.  It is a 
practice that rewards curiosity, in both the artist and the spectator.  The 
empathetic awareness of others is a necessary precedent to generosity.  The 
value of theatrical wonder is that in appealing to our collective imagination, our 
faith in our own capacities is renewed and energized – and our notions of the 
possible are nourished and expanded.  Theatre remains a laboratory of human 
behavior and exploration that gestures to the future with optimism and hope, and 
I go forward in my work as a director determined to conceive that work with 
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optimism and hope – optimism about the prospects of engaging theatrical 
wonder again and hope that the possibilities suggested by that wonder find 
concrete expression in human conduct. 
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Appendix 
Production photographs from Harry’s Way 






Harriet (L) and Harry (M) are visited by a social worker (R). 





A doctor examines Harriet. 
Harriet (L) and Harry (R) encounter a probation officer. 
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Harry playfully tortures his brother. 
Harriet in the moment after shooting Harry. 
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Production photographs from Romeo and Juliet  
Photos by Luke Granfield, used with permission 
Riverside Theatre Shakespeare Festival, 2002 
 
 
Palestinian women in the marketplace of “Verona” 






Images from the riot 




Image from the riot 




       
 
Juliet and the Nurse 
Mercutio joins the Capulet men at the dance.  (Palestinian 
men typically dance with each other at these events.) 





Juliet with the Capulet women at the party. 
Juliet meets the disguised Romeo. 
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 Moments from the balcony scene. 




Doctor Lawrence  attempts to dissuade Romeo from pursuing a Capulet. 
The wedding 




Mercutio (L) and Tybalt (C) fight while Romeo attempts to intervene. 





Mercutio in his death throes with Benvolio. 
Lady Capulet and the Nurse react to Tybalt’s death. 




Lord Capulet (L), the Prince (C), and Benvolio (R). 
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Juliet learns of the deaths and of Romeo’s banishment. 
  261 
 
 
 Romeo and Juliet spend a night together 
but must part with the dawn. 





Capulet grieves for the daughter he believes is dead. 
The next dawn finds the lovers united in actual death. 




Production Photographs from The Goat, Or Who Is Sylvia? 




 Stevie (L) listens as Martin attempts to explain his behavior. 





Stevie at her most vulnerable. 
Martin describes holding Sylvia’s head in his hands. 




Billy confronts his father in Scene Three. 




Stevie returns at the end of the play with Sylvia’s slaughtered carcass. 
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